The leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan met in the Caspian resort of Avaza, Turkmenistan, on October 8, 2026, for the eighth Consultative Meeting of Central Asian Heads of State. At first, it was just a typical regional conversation. Look closely, though, and a new tension emerges in the post-summit statements: Central Asian governments show unprecedented unity on what they want but lack the same unity on how to get it. Now the landlocked heart of Eurasia is at a turning point between words and deeds.
The Thickness of Consensus
The Avaza summit was an amazing display of unity. The meeting was held for the first time in the formal format of six parties; Azerbaijan’s participation was symbolic and the “most important and natural result of many years of mutual movement,” Turkmenistan’s President Serdar Berdimuhamedov said.
Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev presented the most specific economic vision: “We have already come to a point where it is not enough to exchange standard products with each other; we need to create finished products together. The formula “six economies, one product” fully reflects the essence of what we should strive for. He put forward a regional atlas of in-demand professions and competencies to match the development needs in the sectors of mining, tourism, and AI with the labor market.
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In his speech, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev addressed the region’s most existential threat: water. We have to work on new ways to manage transboundary water resources,” he said to the other leaders. A Central Asian Framework Convention on Water Use could be a first step towards developing a new regional architecture of cooperation.
Even the most isolationist country in the region, Turkmenistan, indicated a change. Berdimuhamedov urged giving “maximum substance” to negotiations and activities for the establishment of transport and logistics connectivity, unequivocally supporting the long-delayed trans-Caspian pipeline and the Central Asia–Caspian Sea–South Caucasus–Europe corridor.
The Action Deficit
But despite this rhetorical overlap, the joint statement from the summit was “largely aspirational concepts.” It’s what they do next that will give a measure of their resolve to get beyond rhetoric, as Eurasianet’s analysis bluntly put it.
The water framework convention, which was first mooted months ago, remains “under consideration by all parties.” The Council for Infrastructure Development, which Uzbekistan initiated, has not yet met. The trade and economic cooperation program is still a document and not a roadmap for 2035.
The ‘consensus without execution’ is a pattern that has been shadowing Central Asian regionalism for decades.
The main challenge is structural: upstream countries (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) are using water for generating hydropower, while downstream countries (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan) are relying on water for agriculture. The solution is giving away control of resources, something no leader has been willing to do.
External Forces Reshaping the Calculus
It is not internal momentum that could finally break the impasse; rather, it’s external pressure. In 2026, the geopolitical and economic dynamics in Central Asia are undergoing a significant transformation, with several external players making a mark at the same time.
The push for critical minerals in America is the most strategically important step. California-based Cove Kaz Capital Group entered into a contract to acquire a 70% controlling stake in Severniy Katpar LLP, holding licenses for one of the largest undeveloped tungsten deposits in the world, in Kazakhstan. Letters of intent have been issued by the U.S. International Development Finance Corp. and the Export-Import Bank for possible financing up to $1.6 billion. It is believed that the project has approximately 20% of the world’s tungsten reserves and will be able to produce around 12000 tonnes per year once it is up and running.
Cove Kaz’s Executive Chairman Pini Althaus was very clear about the geopolitical aspect: “There is a systemic shortage of tungsten that can’t be resolved at existing mines, even in China; there is a medium- to long-term market shortage as well as an acute shortage.” Central Asia is a key part of Washington’s plans to establish alternative supply routes.
In response, Uzbekistan has offered to establish a Regional Alliance on Critical Minerals, starting with a Unified Digital Map of Critical Mineral Reserves. It is a defensive maneuver as much as an economic one: regional coordination to not be dismembered by outside powers vying for resources.
In the meantime, South Korea’s involvement has increased. A first Korea-Central Asia summit in September 2026 raised the frequency of leaders’ meetings to every two years and made the focus critical minerals, energy, AI, and digital technology. South Korea has what Central Asia wants: tech capital, industrial upgrading, and no China, Russia, or America.
Gulf states are also moving in. In 2026, Sultan Haitham bin Tariq of Oman made his first-ever state visit to Kazakhstan, which included a $150 million joint investment fund and 2 GW of renewable energy deals. Symbolically, however, Oman is the first Gulf country to be a shareholder in the Eurasian Development Bank.
