It is a well-documented fact that the possession of resources has significantly governed power structures. The early colonisation of distant lands for control over vital land resources and labor to today’s quests to maintain energy and mineral resource hegemony are telling of a specific pattern: those holding critical regional resource capacities are susceptible to being drawn into geopolitical battle. At the heart of the critical minerals resource debate, a global player is reemerging: Africa. Africa is no stranger to resource exploitation – the 19th to 20th century “Scramble for Africa” was a tight-fisted bid for colonial control over the abundance of natural resources, leaving the continent facing immense internal strife post-independence. Now, with the 21st century’s recalibrated global focus on techno-economic development, critical minerals are coveted by every state hoping to cement itself within the global order. Africa holds about 30% of the world’s critical minerals required for developing and building almost all modern-day technology. In today’s so-called ‘rules-based order’, countries are starting to use novel strategic maneuvres to project control over Africa’s critical minerals capacities, setting the stage for what may be called the Second Scramble for Africa.
Africa’s Critical Minerals
Africa’s critical minerals capacities are spread throughout the continent, with specific minerals localised to specific regions. Northern African countries host arsenic, tantalum, and niobium compounds, useful for semiconductor and steel production – these are further utilised in building crucial electronic infrastructure. Countries such as Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Gabon, and South Africa hold about 70% of the world’s manganese reserves, which is crucial for steel, battery and EV production. Zimbabwe and Namibia have lithium reserves, a key component for lithium ion battery production. Africa’s critical minerals capacities, while encompassing 30% of the world’s reserves, are yet to be fully instrumentalised into functioning supply chains. Global tech players have acknowledged the region’s critical minerals potential and are strategising to make it market ready.
The EU-South Africa Investment Roadshow
The European Union is dependent on external suppliers for much of their critical minerals requirements. China, Brazil, Turkiye, and Tajikistan are key exporters of magnesium, ferroniobium, borates, and antimony to the EU, respectively. The EU has recently been rethinking its heavy reliance on external suppliers due to the global climate of supply chain restrictions and economy protectionism, evidenced by China’s recent rare earths export curtailment. Its derisking bid comes with diversification imperatives due to a lack of domestic capacities. Amidst Chinese supply chain restrictions, the EU pledged to initiate a round of investments worth $13.98 billion in South Africa to boost regional production ability. This will enable the operationalisation of the locally available critical minerals into working supply chains that will cater to global markets.
Reporters claim that the EU’s investment interest in South Africa comes as a cause-and-effect of its needing to derisk from China. While South Africa’s rare earths potential may hold up as an eventual alternative to China’s reserves, its non-rare earth critical minerals are not the same as China’s. China exports 96% of all of the EU’s magnesium imports, while South Africa contains manganese vanadium and specific noble metal reserves. This is a key distinction to make: all rare earths are critical minerals, but not all critical minerals are rare earths. This being said, South Africa certainly holds potential for rare earths refining and alternative supply chain distribution. A month back, the US was also rushing to South Africa as a rare earths alternative to China, albeit falling short of the EU’s bid at $50 million. These investments strengthen domestic producers such as Steenkampskraal, taking steps toward making South Africa market ready and immensely attractive to global players seeking to diversify.
Zimbabwe’s Export Ban
Zimbabwe also holds critical mineral reserves, making up approximately 10% of 2025’s lithium production worldwide. Despite its lucrative lithium and rare earths supply chains, the government imposed a complete ban on the sale of the critical minerals. This was reportedly done to quell concerns regarding export malpractices preventing adequate domestic profit returns. In addition to this, the ban also ensures that lithium is processed domestically instead of being exported to China and other external parties, giving Zimbabwe more control over the supply chain.
Zimbabwe’s example highlights the agency that the 21st century affords countries with resource capacities. Despite this strategy causing the country to lose out on critical profits, Zimbabwe took steps to avoid external supply chain exploitation and create opportunities for those within the country through the processing internalisation. Such a strategy is telling of Africa’s different options in tackling the issue of critical minerals. Allowing investment and external parties to stake claims on crucial resources makes African countries prone to supply chain exploitation. The manner in which the different countries choose to approach the issue, be it through signing lucrative investment deals to strengthen domestic processing or to cut off exports entirely, will define whether critical minerals will catalyse the “Second Scramble for Africa.”
