As the United States and its Western allies remain preoccupied with the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, tensions with Iran, and a broader series of geopolitical crises, China has sought to use the resulting strategic space to expand its economic, diplomatic and security influence.
Beijing has increasingly presented itself as an alternative voice in the international system, particularly among countries in the Global South. Chinese diplomatic and state-media messaging has emphasized the costs of what Beijing portrays as an increasingly unstable US-led international order, while China has sought to position itself as a supporter of development, sovereignty and negotiated solutions to international conflicts.
Rather than viewing these crises solely as threats to global stability, Beijing has sought to turn some of their consequences into strategic opportunities. Its approach can be understood through four broad areas: economic leverage, diplomatic positioning, military and security expansion, and the development of alternative international partnerships and institutions.
Economic leverage: Russia, Iran and the energy advantage
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The war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia have significantly strengthened China’s economic position vis-Ã -vis Moscow. As Western markets became increasingly restricted to Russian energy and other commodities, China became Russia’s largest trading partner and expanded its purchases of Russian oil and gas.
The relationship has also given Beijing greater leverage in negotiating energy supplies and deepening economic ties with Russia. Moscow’s growing dependence on Chinese markets has created an asymmetry in the relationship, although Russia remains an important independent strategic actor with considerable military, energy and geopolitical capabilities.
The Ukraine war has also created new opportunities for China to deepen its engagement with Central Asia. As Russia’s ability to devote economic and diplomatic resources to its traditional sphere of influence has been constrained, Beijing has expanded its economic and security engagement with the five Central Asian states. China has sought to link regional development more closely to its Belt and Road Initiative while increasing cooperation in areas including security, surveillance technology and military training.
The same pattern can be seen in China’s relationship with Iran. Despite US sanctions, China has continued to purchase Iranian oil through alternative commercial and financial channels, providing Tehran with an important source of export revenue. This relationship has strengthened China’s position as an important economic partner for Iran while giving Beijing continued access to a strategically important energy producer.
The wars and disruptions affecting global energy markets have also created opportunities for Chinese energy and technology companies. China’s large domestic industrial base has enabled it to expand exports of products such as electric vehicles and solar panels, reinforcing Beijing’s ambition to position Chinese clean-energy technologies as alternatives to conventional fossil-fuel systems.
Taken together, these developments have allowed China to strengthen its position within an increasingly fragmented global energy and trade system.
Strategic diplomacy and the battle for the Global South
China’s second major opportunity has emerged in the diplomatic arena.
Beijing has used the Gaza war and the broader conflict in the Middle East to contrast its diplomatic approach with that of Washington. Chinese diplomatic messaging has emphasized Palestinian rights, a ceasefire, the two-state solution and the need for a broader international role in resolving the conflict.
China has also sought to demonstrate that it can act as a diplomatic intermediary. Beijing released a 12-point position paper on the Ukraine conflict and hosted Palestinian factions in an effort to promote reconciliation. Although these initiatives have not produced decisive solutions to the conflicts themselves, they have allowed China to strengthen its diplomatic profile.
This is particularly important in the Global South, where criticism of Western double standards has increased over the handling of conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza.
Beijing has therefore sought to present itself not necessarily as a replacement for the United States, but as a different model of international engagement—one that emphasizes sovereignty, economic development and political dialogue while resisting what it describes as Western interference.
Chinese diplomacy in the Middle East has been reinforced by economic and humanitarian engagement. Beijing has supported reconstruction and development initiatives and has repeatedly called for an international peace process on the Palestinian issue.
The immediate impact of these initiatives should not be overstated. China has not solved the major conflicts in Ukraine or the Middle East. Nevertheless, they have helped Beijing cultivate diplomatic influence and strengthen its appeal among countries seeking greater room for maneuver between the major powers.
Military lessons and expanding security influence
The third area concerns security and military affairs.
The United States’ simultaneous support for Ukraine and Israel has placed considerable demands on American military stocks, logistics and defense production. From Beijing’s perspective, the diversion of US attention and resources toward Europe and the Middle East has created additional strategic space in the Indo-Pacific.
China has continued to increase military pressure around Taiwan while strengthening its activities in the South China Sea and maintaining pressure on countries such as the Philippines and Japan.
At the same time, the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have provided Chinese military analysts with an opportunity to study modern warfare at close range. The extensive use of drones, precision weapons, air-defense systems, electronic warfare and other technologies has generated lessons that could influence Chinese military planning.
The experience of the Ukraine war is particularly significant because it has demonstrated both the opportunities and limitations created by drones, long-range precision weapons and increasingly transparent battlefields. Developments in the Middle East have provided additional lessons concerning missile and drone warfare, air-defense capabilities and the vulnerability of military infrastructure.
Such lessons could become relevant to Chinese planning for a potential Taiwan contingency.
Beijing has also continued to expand military exercises and security cooperation with Russia, Middle Eastern states and countries in other parts of the Global South. China’s growing participation in joint exercises and defense exchanges reflects a broader ambition to increase its role in regional security affairs.
In the Middle East and Africa, Chinese security engagement remains well below the level of the United States in terms of military presence and alliance networks. Nevertheless, Beijing has been gradually expanding military exchanges, counterterrorism cooperation, arms-trafficking prevention and other forms of security collaboration.
The significance of this trend lies less in an immediate Chinese replacement of US military power than in the gradual expansion of China’s security footprint beyond East Asia.
Building alternative institutions and partnerships
The fourth element of China’s strategy is institutional.
Beijing has sought to strengthen organizations and partnerships that give developing countries alternatives to Western-led institutions. The expansion of BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has provided China with additional platforms through which to deepen political and economic cooperation with the Global South.
At the same time, the Belt and Road Initiative remains central to China’s strategy. Infrastructure investment, ports, transportation networks, energy projects and digital connectivity allow Beijing to connect economic relationships with longer-term geopolitical influence.
China has also promoted initiatives such as the Global Development Initiative, seeking to frame development cooperation as an alternative to models associated with Western conditionality.
This approach has particular appeal among governments that want foreign investment without the political or governance conditions sometimes associated with Western assistance.
China’s model is therefore not based exclusively on military power. Its broader strategy combines trade, infrastructure, technology, finance and diplomacy. The objective is to make China’s economic relationship with developing countries increasingly difficult to separate from its wider geopolitical influence.
This does not mean that Beijing has created a fully developed alternative to the US-led international economic system. The dollar remains central to global finance, and China’s own economic relationships remain deeply interconnected with Western markets.
Nevertheless, China is gradually expanding the number of countries and institutions through which it can operate without relying exclusively on Western-led structures.
China’s strategic opportunity
China has not caused the wars and crises that have created these opportunities, nor has Beijing replaced the United States as the dominant global power. Yet the simultaneous crises confronting Washington have created strategic space that China has been willing to exploit.
The Ukraine war has strengthened China’s economic leverage over Russia and created new opportunities in Central Asia. The Gaza war has given Beijing an opportunity to challenge Washington’s diplomatic narrative in the Global South. Conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have provided Chinese military planners with valuable lessons about modern warfare, while China’s expanding defense relationships have gradually widened its security presence.
At the institutional level, meanwhile, Beijing continues to strengthen BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the Belt and Road Initiative and other mechanisms through which it can deepen relations with developing countries.
The larger significance of these developments is that US-China competition is increasingly being fought not only in the Indo-Pacific but also across the Global South.
The Middle East, Central Asia, Africa, Latin America and parts of Europe are becoming arenas in which economic partnerships, diplomatic influence, technological cooperation and security relationships overlap.
China’s greatest strategic gain from the current period may therefore not be the replacement of American power, but the expansion of its own room for maneuver.
The more Washington is consumed by simultaneous crises, the more opportunities Beijing has to present itself as an alternative partner—and to gradually reshape the balance of influence in a changing international order.
