The war involving Iran, Israel and the United States has reshaped the strategic balance across the Middle East, leaving the Strait of Hormuz at the centre of a wider contest over regional security, economic leverage and political influence. While military operations may have eased, the underlying tensions remain unresolved, with Iran retaining significant leverage over one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints.
In this exclusive interview with Modern Diplomacy, Dr. Rob Geist Pinfold, an expert on Middle Eastern security and international relations, examines what “winning” means for Tehran after the conflict, why Iran is unlikely to fully relinquish its political claims over the Strait of Hormuz, and how the Gulf states are recalibrating their response to Iran.
Dr. Geist Pinfold also discusses the changing US-Israel-Iran strategic relationship, the growing role of the Houthis and the possibility of another round of conflict. Rather than viewing Iran, Israel or the Gulf states as unified actors with fixed objectives, he highlights the internal political shifts and competing interests shaping the region.
The conversation further explores whether the Middle East is moving toward a negotiated settlement or becoming trapped in a prolonged “no-war, no-peace” environment—with significant consequences for regional stability and the global economy.
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You’ve argued Iran sees strategic value in prolonging this war rather than rushing to end it. What does “winning” actually look like for Tehran at this stage—is it about outlasting Washington’s patience, or something more specific?
Israel and the US made their goals clear in the last war: they sought regime change in Tehran. That they were unable to deliver it has allowed the regime to claim victory, since when your opponent sets such lofty goals, then all you have to do is survive. But Iran has done more than that. It has managed to create a status quo where there is no scenario at present—political, military, or otherwise—where it gives up its control over the Strait of Hormuz. With the US blockade in place, it may have lost some of that control, but all it really needs to do is demonstrate that it can cause enough chaos to dissuade companies from sending commercial vessels down the waterway and insurers from insuring them. And it remains capable of doing that. Now the Houthis—arguably Iran’s most important remaining regional ally—are threatening to close the Bab el Mandeb Strait and are escalating their attacks against Saudi Arabia, with the US unable or unwilling to respond. In short, Iran has not only ‘won’ in a narrow sense that it has survived: despite absorbing punishing blows, it has managed to exert influence over the region and the global economy in a way it could not before the conflict. The US, meanwhile, has managed to induce a crisis of regional confidence in its own leadership.
The Strait of Hormuz has become Iran’s main point of leverage. How sustainable is that as a bargaining chip, and what would have to change for Iran to actually give it up?
To answer that question, it’s important to first consider what Iran ‘giving up’ Hormuz would look like. Will it stop threatening commercial shipping? Quite possibly, if it reaches an accord with Oman that the US rejects publicly but tolerates tacitly. But will Iran go back to the pre-war status quo and renounce its claim to exercise authority over what goes in and out of the waterway? That is far less likely. At present, the only foreseeable way to open Hormuz to pre-war levels of shipping would be a deal that grants Iran (alongside at least some of the GCC states) a political role in overseeing the waterway, possibly as part of a multinational committee. It could also renounce its demand that it charge a toll on all ships if—and only if—the US agrees to wholesale sanctions relief, meaning that Iran won’t need to use Hormuz to raise revenue. At the end of the day, Iran’s control over Hormuz has always been less about money and more about political prestige; in short, it may give up the former but not the latter. A role in a post-war Hormuz, then, is less a bargaining chip for Iran to get the US to concede on other issues and more a demand that it will not give up in full under any conditions.
You’ve written about the Gulf states’ reluctance to get pulled into this conflict directly. Is that restraint holding, or are you seeing cracks in it as the war drags on?
The Gulf states’ restraint despite Iran’s aggression against them was founded on the strategic calculation that this was not their war and they would little to gain from it. For many of them, that still rings true. Many Gulf states—particularly Saudi Arabia—are naturally status quo-oriented powers that put a premium on respect for sovereignty and borders. As such, they are nervous of any attempts at regime change and even more so at the prospect of regime breakdown in Iran and the replacement of a government they might not like with a worse alternative: indefinite chaos. That largely still holds true. Nevertheless, the lack of a better ‘day after’ has meant that many Gulf states are tentatively mowing towards more hawkish responses to Iran—the majority of the GCC states are alleged to have struck back against Iran in some form. But this should not be a mistake for a comprehensive grand strategic transformation. The GCC states are all still negotiating with Iran. They are also a complex set of actors with divergent views; Bahrain, for instance, is at the hawkish end of the spectrum, whilst Oman is the most engagement-focused—the others all sit somewhere in between.
How has the US-Israel relationship shifted the strategic calculus for Iran? Does Iran read Washington’s current posture as more enabling of Israeli action, or is that overstated?
The common consensus is that the recent war on Iran was Israeli-led and Israeli-designed. It could be termed Israel’s war, but I’d argue it was more Netanyahu’s war in that the Israeli Prime Minister made containing Iran his life’s work. After October 7, Israel’s grand strategy became far more hawkish and militarily proactive and politically revisionist, and it is Netanyahu that has spearheaded that transformation. In short, this is not just an Iranian perception or Tehran’s propaganda. Nevertheless, Iran has had a tendency to project a simplified view of US-Israel relations; this is a contradictory prism—Israel is seen both as the US’s loyal proxy (i.e., the little Satan to the Great Satan) or as a malignant hand guiding US foreign and security policy in the entire region. The recent war will have likely fuelled the latter perception. But there is also an issue of credibility in the US. Tehran has never trusted its American interlocutors and will do even less now, given the US unilaterally sank the JCPOA and then twice attacked Iran directly in 2025 and 2026 (in both instances in coordination with Israel), whilst Omani-sponsored negotiations were taking place. This lack of trust complicates negotiations today.
Where does this conflict’s strategic logic seem to be heading—toward a negotiated de-escalation, a prolonged stalemate, or something else entirely?
Whenever I talk to people in the region—in both Tehran and Tel Aviv—they seem to be convinced that we are headed for another round, i.e., another war between Israel, the US, and Iran. I am not entirely convinced, but my prediction is even less optimistic. Wars are inherently terrible. But they are also catalysts for change in that previously unthinkable policy options become possible, and the political deck of cards is reshuffled both internally in the participating states and between the participating actors. This means that sometimes wars can produce more durable solutions or settlements. In the case of the Middle East, however, the region seems trapped in a paradigm of no-war, no-peace, where uneasy ceasefires are punctuated by sporadic escalations from either side whilst negotiations make no tangible progress. This quagmire is bad for states, it’s bad for people, and it’s bad for the regional economy because it hampers recovery. Neither Iran nor the US seems keen on a return to war, but neither is willing to make the necessary conditions for a significant de-escalation. The result is that the region is likely to stay stuck in the current status quo, possibly for quite some time.
What’s the biggest thing Western media coverage is getting wrong about Iran’s strategic thinking in this war?
We have to be careful of a tendency to simplify the key actors in this conflict, e.g., ‘Iran wants X,’ ‘Israel wants Y,’ or to discuss ‘the Gulf states’ as if they are one coherent actor. This is particularly problematic when it comes to Iran, because the regime is now in a real and fluid state of change following the assassination of many leading figures. As a result, we are still trying to figure out who holds the cards in Iran today. And the chances are that the Iranian leadership is too, given they are jostling for position. We know that the political leadership is weakened and the IRGC (Revolutionary Guards) is now stronger, but even this is a simplification—there are many different actors and personalities within the IRGC, and even individuals who are not explicitly IRGC may have a background within the organization. It seems like Iran has become more hardline not just as a result of how the war proceeded externally, but also as a result of how the deck has reshuffled internally, but we still don’t know how permanent this transformation is. Does it mean that a deal can’t be done, for instance? Or does it mean the opposite: that some kind of a settlement could moderate Iran’s behavior? It is likely too early to tell right now, so I would urge analysts not to jump to any definitive conclusions for the time being.
