Europe has spent the past four years trying to make sure it would never again depend on Russia for its energy in the way it did before the invasion of Ukraine. In 2021, Russia supplied more than 40 percent of the EU’s imported gas, much of it through pipelines. Since then, those imports have fallen sharply. Europe built up its ability to receive liquefied natural gas, or LNG, and turned increasingly to suppliers such as the United States.
That shift helped Europe get through several winters without the shortages many feared in 2022. But the war with Iran has made the picture more complicated. Disruption around the Strait of Hormuz has shaken the global LNG market just as Europe prepares to take another major step away from Russian energy. From January 1, 2027, the EU is due to stop Russian LNG imports that are still arriving under older long-term contracts. At the same time, European gas storage is noticeably lower than it was last year.
Europe is not suddenly back in the energy crisis of 2022. Still, the timing raises an uncomfortable question. The EU has clearly reduced its dependence on Russia, but has it really made its gas supply more secure, or has it become dependent on a different kind of market?
The January deadline is part of a gradual phaseout rather than a quick cutoff. Russian LNG bought through short-term contracts was banned earlier in 2026, while older long-term contracts were given until the beginning of 2027. The remaining Russian pipeline gas has a later deadline. This was meant to give European companies enough time to find other suppliers without causing another major price shock.
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The problem is that Russian gas has not disappeared from Europe yet. ACER’s monitoring of the phaseout shows that it still covers around 12 percent of EU gas demand. Long-term Russian LNG contracts also continue to bring significant volumes into Europe. This means January is not just a political date. Europe will have to replace gas it is still actually using.
Storage would normally make that easier, but Europe has less of a cushion this year. Gas storage was around 68 percent full in mid-September, well below the level seen around the same time last year. The European Commission said after a September meeting of its Gas Coordination Group that supplies remained stable and that the EU was prepared for winter. That is reassuring, but it does not mean the market is comfortable. Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen has also warned about high prices and called on governments to consider ways of reducing demand.
The situation in the Middle East is what makes this winter especially difficult to predict. Before the current conflict, close to one fifth of global LNG trade passed through the Strait of Hormuz. Qatar, one of the world’s biggest LNG exporters, depends heavily on that route. When flows through the strait were disrupted, the effects did not stay in the region. They quickly reached Europe and Asia.
The International Energy Agency reported sharp increases in European and Asian gas prices after the disruption. At points this year, LNG prices in Asia were higher than in Europe. That matters because many LNG cargoes are flexible. If buyers in Asia are willing to pay more, traders have a reason to send ships there instead.
This is one of the biggest differences between the energy problem Europe faced before 2022 and the one it faces now. Russian pipelines tied Europe closely to one supplier, which gave Moscow considerable leverage. LNG gives Europe many more choices, but Europe also has to compete for those supplies. Building an LNG terminal does not guarantee that a ship will arrive there.
The Iran conflict has made that competition much easier to see. Europe is looking for gas at the same time as major Asian importers such as Japan, South Korea and China. Problems with Qatari supply have added even more pressure.
In late September, for example, QatarEnergy told the Italian utility Edison that contracted LNG deliveries would not resume until at least early December. A disruption thousands of kilometres away was suddenly affecting the supply plans of a European company heading into winter.
Europe’s growing reliance on LNG makes events like this more important than they once were. EU LNG imports reached record levels in 2025, and the United States supplied well over half of them. American LNG has been crucial in replacing Russian gas and has given Europe alternatives it badly needed. But it also shows why the word “diversification” can be misleading. Europe now buys gas from more places, but much of that gas still reaches it through the same global market, where prices can move quickly and cargoes can change destination.
For now, Brussels is sticking to the January deadline. There is a strong political reason for doing so. The phaseout was not designed only to change where Europe buys gas. It was also meant to stop Russia from rebuilding the influence it once had over European energy and to reduce the money Europe sends to Moscow while the war in Ukraine continues. The Baltic states in particular have pushed for a firm approach because they see Russian energy dependence as a security issue, not simply a question of price.
The costs are not felt equally across Europe, though. Some European companies still have long-term contracts for Russian LNG, and ending them carries financial consequences. Greece has also raised concerns about restrictions affecting its large shipping industry. These disagreements do not necessarily mean governments want to return to Russian gas, but they show why the final stage of the phaseout becomes harder when energy is expensive.
There is also some doubt in the market about what would happen if the situation became much worse. S&P Global reported in July that traders did not appear to be fully preparing for the loss of Russian LNG in January. Some believed that a more serious supply crisis could eventually force Brussels to show some flexibility.
There is a limited emergency option in the rules themselves. The Council’s explanation of the Russian gas phaseout says restrictions can be temporarily suspended if sudden developments seriously threaten a member state’s gas supply. It is a narrow emergency measure, not an easy way to cancel the ban. Even so, its existence shows that the EU knows an energy policy made under normal conditions may become harder to defend during a real shortage.
Much will therefore depend on the winter. If storage holds up and global LNG supplies improve, Brussels will have far more room to keep the January deadline exactly as planned. A colder winter or further disruption around Hormuz would make the decision more difficult. European industries already dealing with high energy costs would feel the pressure first, while countries that have pushed hardest to end Russian imports would be reluctant to give Moscow another opening.
This is why January matters beyond the amount of Russian LNG involved. Europe is in a better position than it was in 2022. Russia has much less influence over its energy supply, Europe has more infrastructure, and there are more countries it can buy gas from. Those are real improvements. The Iran war has simply shown that they do not remove every vulnerability.
Europe used to worry about depending too heavily on pipelines from one country. Now it has to think about what happens when several suppliers sell into a global market and Europe is competing with buyers elsewhere for the same cargoes. The risk is different, but it has not disappeared.
The January ban will show how far the EU is willing to go to finish its break with Russian LNG when doing so becomes more expensive. Whatever happens, Europe’s experience this year has made one thing harder to ignore: moving away from Russia was necessary, but it was only the first part of solving Europe’s energy problem.
