As the world’s leaders gather for the 81st UN General Assembly, the ink is just starting to dry on the “amended and supplemented” agreement that, it is hoped, will lay to rest the tensions between the Trump Administration and the Danish Commonwealth that peaked at the beginning of this year with the supposed intention to extend US sovereignty over Greenland. For US diplomats, this is likely to provide a welcome opportunity to turn their attention to some of America’s many other engagements around the world. Denmark, however, to whom the matter was of a much more pertinent vital interest, must maintain a much more concerted political focus on the High North for the foreseeable future.
Firstly, Denmark cannot afford to take for granted that the matter is settled definitively. For now, President Trump seems pleased with his deal. It will be good for Denmark if things stay that way. Danish officials might even want to play up the agreement as an American victory at Denmark’s expense, supporting the narrative that is likely to be pushed by the White House. This would be unpopular with the Danish public, but with no elections scheduled before 2029, the government of Prime Minister Frederiksen can probably afford the embarrassment. Nevertheless, it should not be ruled out that the Trump Administration or a potential successor might renege on the deal, perhaps claiming Danish or Greenlandic non-compliance, and reopen the issue. Denmark must make contingency plans for that eventuality.
Assuming, though, that the deal holds, the situation over the next few years seems clear-cut. On paper, the agreement does not change very much about US access to Greenland. It has been pointed out that the Trump Administration could have achieved virtually all of its stated defense-related objectives within the constituent country under the previous agreement from 1951. In fact, the height of the Cold War saw a much larger stationing of US armed forces than is expected now. Yet the mode in which the new agreement has been imposed promises a much more dominant US presence in Greenland. This will essentially force the Danish Commonwealth to bandwagon with the US for the next few years.
Eventually, however, Washington’s interest in Greenland is likely to fade, at which point it will probably seek burden-sharing with allies to free up resources for a more pressing theater. This will be Denmark’s opportunity to bring home strategic control of the country by gradually taking over monitoring, patrolling, and garrisoning. If Denmark can adequately account for the defense of Greenland to a degree that America’s northern flank is secure with only a token American presence, any future US administration is unlikely to take issue.
Stay ahead of the geopolitical week.
MD Briefing delivers expert analysis across five global fronts — the Indo-Pacific, energy, geoeconomics, European security, and the Middle East — every Monday morning. Free.
Greenland as a constituent country has the potential to bring the Danish Commonwealth a level of geopolitical leverage far beyond what Denmark Proper and the Faroe Islands could amount to. It might be something of a stretch to categorize Denmark as a middle power, but if a concert of middle powers is to play a pivotal role in global affairs, as now seems to be the prevailing opinion in Europe, a small state like Denmark will need to bring something to the table if it is going to be able to watch out for its interests through negotiation. The idea has been floated of eventually the US as Denmark’s principal security partner with France, the UK, Germany, and Canada, all of which are very keen on the middle-power idea. This, however, ignores two crucial circumstances: Firstly, none of these countries are likely out of pure altruism to accept a costly, permanent military commitment in an extreme environment for which, as of writing, only Canada has the required special capabilities. They would want something in return. Secondly, Denmark would have no guarantee that another security partner would not turn on it as the Trump Administration did. From a purely geostrategic point of view, trying to offload the responsibility for defense would be akin to pawning Greenland instead of selling it, paying a hefty price while surrendering the Commonwealth’s most noticeable asset.
Harnessing Greenland’s strategic potential, though, requires considerable military and financial resources. Denmark will need to make Greenland and the North Atlantic the overarching focus of its defense policy at the expense of European commitments, but the Danish armed presence in the Baltics can be easily offset by other European allies anyway. The Commonwealth will have to invest heavily in naval and aerial capabilities over the next few years, focusing its ongoing rearmament efforts in these fields with an eye to effective power projection in the Arctic. It will also need to pour resources into infrastructure in Greenland. It is a valid question whether the “seat at the table” that control of Greenland buys the Danish Commonwealth is worth this price, but it is essentially one that has already been answered when the Danish government mobilized all the political capital at its disposal to thwart President Trump’s desired takeover. While it is true that the Danish constitution bars a sale of Greenland, nothing prevented Copenhagen from accepting a nominally independent Greenland under heavy US influence. There are already a handful of fully sovereign island states with populations smaller than Greenland’s. This solution would have made Greenland a somewhat paradoxical addition to the UN’s list of small island states and, for geopolitical purposes, turned Denmark into a fourth, albeit slightly wealthier, Baltic country. This, however, was resoundingly rejected and would without a doubt be so again.
Before Copenhagen can start preparing the Danish Navy to control the seas of Greenland, though, it must take on a political challenge as daunting as the one it went through dealing with President Trump’s annexation plans: If the Danish Commonwealth is to leverage Greenland for international leverage, then it must find a way of doing so that is acceptable to Greenland. Greenland must be made partial to a joint policy and given equal ownership of a shared voice in the world to an extent that will assuage the desire for sovereign pride that has led to calls for independence. Denmark must become a polity that the Greenlandic people are not merely willing to accept for the time being but one that they actively want to be conjoined with. A genuine national project will have to be created by drawing Greenland, its officials, and elected representatives to the center of the shared narrative. This will be the real political challenge, but once it is achieved, the strategy is simple.
