Chinese intelligence, military, political, and strategic institutions view the joint military defense agreement signed between Israel and Greece in the Mediterranean (culminating in the $3.5 billion Achilles Shield missile deal) with cautious suspicion and a multi-dimensional strategic assessment. This Chinese intelligence and strategic perspective oscillates between (fear of the militarization of vital sea lanes and the pursuit of preserving Beijing’s substantial economic interests) in both countries. The Chinese perspective can be broken down, according to its levels of analysis and assessment of institutions and its impact on the Belt and Road Initiative, as follows:
– First: The perspective of the Chinese intelligence and security apparatus, represented by the Ministry of State Security (MSS), which acts as the Chinese intelligence service, on monitoring indirect American influence:
Chinese intelligence believes that the military rapprochement between Athens and Tel Aviv is part of a US-sponsored security architecture aimed at controlling the Eastern Mediterranean and countering the influence of other powers, such as Turkey and Russia. This, in turn, strengthens Washington’s ability to contain non-military Chinese expansion in the region. Furthermore, this raises concerns about the risks of cyber and information breaches. Chinese security agencies take into account that the Israeli defense and intelligence systems to be deployed in Greece, such as the advanced command and control system, could be used to monitor or gather information about nearby Chinese infrastructure, most notably the Greek port of Piraeus, which is operated by the Chinese company COSCO.
– Second: The Military Establishment’s (People’s Liberation Army PLA and the Central Military Commission of China) Perspective on the Militarization of Maritime Routes:
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1) Chinese military planners are concerned about the Eastern Mediterranean becoming an area of constant and intensive military maneuvers, as it may be threatening freedom of commercial navigation. This is something that relevant Chinese intelligence and strategic circles are trying to understand.
2) Testing Western and Israeli Technology: Chinese military research centers are meticulously studying the effectiveness of systems sold to Greece, such as the David’s Sling and Spider, analyzing their combat doctrine and the level of integration of NATO and Israeli technologies to prepare for similar scenarios in East Asia.
– Third: The political and diplomatic vision (of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Chinese Communist Party) for maintaining a pragmatic diplomatic balance in the Eastern Mediterranean region:
Politically, Beijing maintains close relations with Greece (as a reliable European partner) and with Israel (despite relative political coolness due to China’s positions on Middle Eastern issues, the Gaza wars, and Iran). Chinese diplomacy seeks to exert pressure behind the scenes to ensure that these military agreements do not translate into policies hostile to Chinese investments.
– Fourth: The Impact of the Joint Military Defense Agreement Between Israel and Greece on China’s Belt and Road Initiative:
The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative is affected by this joint military agreement between Israel and Greece on two main levels (negative and positive) and a third, pragmatic level, as follows:
1) Negative Impacts and Risks: China fears a threat to its European bridgehead (the port of Piraeus). The Greek port of Piraeus is considered the crown jewel of the maritime component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Europe. For Chinese intelligence, defense, security, and strategic circles, this means the militarization of the region and the introduction of advanced Israeli radar and intelligence equipment linked to NATO, a military alliance opposed to Chinese interests. This places the commercial port of Piraeus under significant security pressure and reduces China’s flexibility in transforming it into a fully independent logistics hub in the future.
2) China fears that the joint Israeli-Greek defense agreement could undermine its Belt and Road Initiative by creating and launching the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), an alternative to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative.
The Israeli-Greek-Cypriot alliance supports the establishment of an energy corridor and alternative transport routes, such as the IMEC, which passes through the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, reaching Greece. Chinese intelligence, military, political, and strategic circles consider the Israeli-Greek military agreement a security umbrella to protect these competing routes.
3) Opportunities and Pragmatic Neutrality: Thirdly, China prioritizes protecting trade stability. From another perspective, China believes that a robust defense system to protect gas fields and shipping lanes in the Eastern Mediterranean could contribute to the long-term stability of global trade, provided that the red lines for Chinese investments remain untouched and given the economic inability to dispense with China’s pivotal role. Here, Beijing is confident that Athens and Tel Aviv cannot do without their economic partnership with China. Greek economic liberalism and its need for Chinese investment make it keen to separate military cooperation with Israel from trade and logistics partnerships with Beijing within the framework of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
From this, we arrive at the essence of the strategic position: China views this joint military agreement between Israel and Greece as an indirect geopolitical challenge, spearheaded by Washington’s allies, to delineate spheres of influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. However, China is responding to this challenge with quiet economic and diplomatic means to ensure that this defensive umbrella does not become a barrier preventing the flow of Chinese goods through Mediterranean ports.
