Beyond Rare Earths: Kazakhstan’s Untapped Germanium Potential

Since returning to office in January of 2025, President Trump has made securing critical mineral supply chains a cornerstone of his political and economic agenda. Yet one country critical to achieving that objective has received little attention in Washington: Kazakhstan. In the spring of 2025, China enacted a wave of export controls on critical minerals in response to President Trump’s tariffs on China, enacting stricter licensing requirements on exports of magnet minerals, reducing exports by 52.9% from April to May, 2025. These minerals are used in semiconductor, radar, and military technologies. The American auto industry and manufacturing industry were also hit hard, with a noticeable magnet deficit being recorded in the following months. Although the minerals “trade war” is over for now, Beijing’s licensing system is still in place, making future retaliation easy. China’s dominance of critical mineral processing poses a significant vulnerability to the American economic and defense industrial bases. Yet Kazakhstan’s combination of abundant mineral reserves, limited processing capacity, and willingness to attract foreign investment presents Washington with a strategic opportunity to diversify supply chains before China expands further.

Why Kazakhstan Matters

Kazakhstan is strategically important to American national security for several reasons. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has complicated its economic relationship with Kazakhstan, while Astana has increasingly sought to diversify its foreign investment partnerships. Russia has historically concentrated its economic presence in Kazakhstan’s uranium and hydrocarbons sectors, while investing comparatively less in developing processing capacity for other critical minerals. Instead of investing in domestic mineral processing, Russia has opted to use old Soviet-era equipment to mine and import raw materials to process within Russia. Kazakhstan does not want to merely export raw minerals but process them domestically, leading it to attract foreign investment abroad. Not only is Kazakhstan actively looking for investment opportunities, but it also has a lot of critical minerals the United States needs for semiconductors, military technology, and more. One important mineral for semiconductor production in Kazakhstan is germanium, of which it has an estimated 4,372 tons in reserves. Given its large reserves of critical minerals, Kazakhstan has employed a multi-vector foreign policy, turning to China, the European Union, and the United States for mineral processing investment, making it another battleground for investment between the US and China.

China’s Growing Mineral Footprint

Through China’s Belt and Road Initiative launched in 2013, China has heavily invested in critical mineral processing. Chinese investment is not limited to mineral extraction; Chinese companies are also establishing a presence across processing, equipment, contracting, and other parts of Kazakhstan’s mineral supply chains. This gives China even more control of global supply chains as its companies have control over critical mineral processing. For example, China has invested over $12 billion in Kazakh aluminum processing and a further $7.5 billion in copper, minerals that are both vital for America’s auto and construction industries. The most important copper investment has come in the form of a $1.1 billion copper smelting plant in the Abai region. This plant is also being used for gold, silver, and sulfuric acid processing. Chinese firm Jiaxin International Resources Investment is also building a tungsten processing plant in the Almaty region. Publicly reported Chinese investment has instead concentrated on copper, aluminum, and tungsten processing, leaving germanium comparatively underdeveloped. This gives Washington an opportunity to establish itself as a valuable economic and technological partner in Central Asia.

The U.S. Opportunity in Kazakhstan

For America, Kazakhstan is of critical importance because of China’s dominance of critical minerals used in the American defense industry. America’s most advanced military platforms rely on infrared sensors, specialized electronic components, and semiconductors that depend on secure supplies of strategic minerals, including germanium. China currently produces roughly 77% of the world’s germanium, creating a significant vulnerability for U.S. industries and defense systems that rely on germanium-containing components. A prolonged disruption of Chinese mineral exports could strain American defense production and complicate the ability to sustain military technology during a conflict in the Indo-Pacific. With China looking to secure supply chains in Kazakhstan, it is looking to reduce opportunities for alternative suppliers for the United States. In short, the United States must act now before it is too late.

Building a Long-Term Partnership

In order for the US to compete with China in Kazakhstan, it needs to become Kazakhstan’s partner of choice. Other than a $1.1 billion investment in a tungsten processing plant, Washington has devoted relatively little attention to critical mineral processing in Kazakhstan. Although Kazakhstan is a major producer of zinc and lead, in which germanium is extracted as a byproduct, much of the country’s mining sector still requires modernization. To capitalize on this opportunity, the United States should focus not only on financing new projects but also on providing the technical expertise necessary to modernize Kazakhstan’s mining and processing industry, such as advanced geological surveying tools and safer mining. In addition to safer extraction, the United States should invest in germanium processing plants because Kazakhstan currently has virtually no germanium refining capability. The United States should invest in this because China hasn’t done so yet, giving the US a chance to establish an early foothold in Kazakhstan’s germanium processing industry. American engagement should extend beyond capital investment to workforce development and technological training. Part of the Belt and Road Initiative’s influence stems from China’s practice of deploying Chinese firms and workers on overseas projects while also investing in the training of local workers, creating long-term economic and technical ties with partner countries. In short, capital alone will not challenge Chinese influence in Kazakhstan, but a combination of capital, technology, and onshore labor training will give the United States an edge in becoming Kazakhstan’s preferred partner.

China poses a strategic threat to America’s defense industry due to export controls and its weaponization of its critical mineral supply chains. Kazakhstan is becoming an economic battleground between China and the West and Kazakhstan seeks to maximize economic returns by engaging both China and the West. Currently, China is increasingly becoming Kazakhstan’s partner of choice, but the US has an opportunity to change that. For Kazakhstan, diversifying its partners gives it more leverage over all of them, whereas if it relies on Chinese and EU funding, its investors will have more bargaining power. If Washington hopes to diversify critical mineral supply chains away from China, Kazakhstan represents one of the few remaining opportunities to establish a meaningful processing partnership before Beijing further expands its position.