Uighur Foreign Fighters: Al Qaeda’s Connection
Analysis of military actions in Syria in the past month shows that Uyghur militants of Turkestan Islamic Party(TIP) hold their positions taken up earlier in Idlib province and are in no haste to go back to China. On November 23, 2017, the media center of TIPIslam Avazi (Voice of Islam)via Telegram posted a video in which jihadists destroyed two tanksТ-62 and nearly ten soldiers of the Syrian army. TIP used advanced anti-tank weapons, armored vehicles and drones, which confirms its good military technical capability.
The Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkestan established in the 80s of last century in Chinese Xingjian was later renamed into the Turkestan Islamic Party and since 1997 it has been known to be based in Afghanistan. Since then, TIP is actively cooperating with terrorist groups al Qaeda and Taliban. In 1998, the leader of TIP, HasanMahsum, received a passport from the Taliban in Kabul. As was reported by the Permanent Mission of the PRC to the UN, in October 2000 Osama bin Laden financed the TIP with $300,000.
Close cooperation with Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan has radicalized the ideology of the TIP and jihadism has become a key element of the party platform.The TIP adopted the ideology of al Qaeda along with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, whose members were the natives of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan.The Uyghur and Central Asian militants underwent joint military training in camps based in Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kunduz, Herat, Qandahar, Sheberghan, and Wardak. After the commencement of the military operation of the Afghanistan-based US forces and the fall of the Taliban regime, the base of TIP became Waziristan. After Hasan Mahsumwas killed in 2003 in the joint operation of the U.S. and Pakistan armed forces in South Waziristan, the leader of TIP became Abd al-Haqq al Turkistani. He managed to unite a vast number of Islamic radicals from Central Asia and China scattered throughout Waziristan, who fled prosecutions and repressions in their motherland. Abdul Haqq was appointed to al Qaeda’s elite Shura Council in 2005. Today Abd al-Haqqis located in northern Syria and continues to be the leader of the TIP.
After the outbreak of the civil war, Syria became the site for the deployment of many terrorist groups in the world. In February 2012, on the recommendation of al Qaeda’s leader Ayman al Zawahiri, TIP jihadists moved to Idlibprovince, and together with Jabhat al-Nusra are fighting against government forces of Bashar al-Assad.
Thedata on the number of Uyghur TIP militants located in Syria varies. According to Dubai-based Arabic Al Aan TV, from 10,000 to 20,000 Chinese Uyghurs moved to Zanbaq and Jisr al Shughour to join the military wing of al Qaeda in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra, which significantly changed the demography of Idlib province. But this version is hardly probable. Syria’s ambassador in Beijing, Imad Moustapha, had said that there are about 5 000 Uyghurs fighting against the Syrian army. But based on an analysis of independent sources, Turkish and Arab media, as well as videos from the scenes of fighting and drills posted by Islam Avazi Media Center, we had claimed earlier that there were more than 2,000 Uyghur militants of Turkestan Islamic Party in Syria. Moreover, about 600 Uyghurs joined ISIS, most of whom have died so far or fled back to Turkey, Pakistan and Afghanistan.
It should be noted that many Uyghurs, who fled from China, came to Syria with their wives and children. The Media Center Islam Avazi regularly produces video reports on how children of Uyghur militants of TIP undergo military training and learn the basics of Sharia law. According to the Islam Avaziin Telegram, “hundreds and hundreds of Uyghur children are brought up in Syria and in the future will become real soldiers of Allah and will liberate the land of East Turkestan from the unfaithful Chinese through jihad.”
The transportation of a family can sometimes cost up to $10,000. To reach Syria, the Uyghurs use different routes. Due to low travel expenses, many people prefer to travel to Turkey through the countries of Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan) and then cross the Syrian border. Some arrive through Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is considered a more established route. There are people among TIP militants who covered a long distance through the countries of Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore), even coming through Australia. But the main transport shipment point is Turkey. The Erdogan government, due to linguistic, religious and ethnic similarities, is more supportive of Uyghur refugees and provides consular support to them.
The evolution of the Jihadist ideology of the Turkestan Islamic Party
The ideology of TIP has come a long way from Uyghur nationalism, the struggle for independent Uyghurstan to the global jihad. The ideology of the group sharply radicalized in 2000-2012, when the leaders of TIP fully adopted the concept of global jihad from al Qaeda and the Taliban. Close cooperation with Ayman al-Zawahiri finally proved to the leader of TIP Abd al-Ḥaqq and his closest associates that “the path of jihad is the only way to prevent Chinese repression, protect our religion, language, national culture and liberate the lands of East Turkestan from the government of Beijing.”
Despite the widening range of ideology, the anti-Chinese slogan and call for jihad against Beijing remains the main doctrine of TIP. All Islam Avazi propaganda materials raise the issue of Xinjiang and express concern about the repression of Uyghur Muslims in the XUAR. TIP leaders are constantly appealing to issues that are traditionally painful for Uyghurssuch as the no-growth policy, the expansion of Xinjiang by the Chinese, discrimination against national minorities and the persecution of Islam by Beijing. “Fighting against China is our Islamic responsibility,” one of the Islamic ideologists of the party, Abdullah Mansour, said. According to the logic of TIP leaders, the armed struggle against China is not a political task of the party, but the will of Allah. Thus, throughout its existence, the TIP combines two categories in its ideology: global jihad and a narrow anti-Chinese direction. Yet the ultimate goal of both directions is the establishment of the Caliphate.
The anti-Chinese slogan of TIP is actively supported by the leader of al Qaeda Ayman al Zawahiri. He has repeatedly praised “the heroism of Uyghur Muslims for their commitment to jihad all over the world.” Zawahiri lauds leaders of the Turkistan Islamic Party ShaykhHasanMahsum and Abd al-Ḥaqq. Zawahiri blasts the Chinese government as an “atheist occupier,” saying that Chinese authorities prevent the Muslims of East Turkistan from “performing their religious rites” and forces them to “change their religion.” This is the tactics of al-Qaeda. Al Qaeda has consistently portrayed Muslims as the victims of various aggressors, thereby seeking to capitalize on the discontent within local Muslim populations.
In the competitive struggle between alQaeda and ISIS for leadership in the global jihad, the head of TIP Abd al-Ḥaqq strongly supported the position of his spiritual mentor Zawahiri. He said that the proclamation of the “Caliphate” was like reaping the unripe harvest because it was created without the approval of Islamic leaders and the Muslim ummah. In his opinion, the Islamic State had to be declared on the basis of Sharia law, not political interests. He compared ISIS with a bastard, which is considered to be the gravest sin in Islam. Abd al-Ḥaqqroundly condemned the actions of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and urged the Uyghurs to leave the territory of the so-called Islamic State.
This position of TIP has been caused by the three factors. First, while supporting Zawahiri, the leader of the Uygur jihadists tried to observe the continuity of the ideological concept of jihad adopted from alQaeda. Secondfactor was the desire to preserve the core structure and independence of TIP. Third factor was not to lose leadership within the group. As practice has shown, the choice of Abd al-Ḥaqq in favor of alQaeda proved to be justified from the point of view of survival and preservation of Uyghur militants amid the fall of ISIS. Therefore, the TIP group still acts as an independent participant in transnational radical Islamism. TIP managed to combine ethnic identity and the principles of global jihad, which contradict each other.
After a careful analysis of the speeches of the leaders of TIP on the Internet, articles of Islamic Turkistan(تركستاناإلسالمية) magazine in Arabic, video and audio materialsin the Media Center Islam Avazi, we can conclude that the ideology of the Turkestan Islamic Party is based on Wahhabism and militant Salafism. It was the religious works of Islamic thinkers Muhammad ibn al-Wahhab, Ibn Taymiya, SayyidQutb, Ayman al Zawahiri that became the ideological basis of the TIP together with the Uyghur mentality. The ideological doctrine plays an important role in the radicalization of the Uyghur youth, as well as in the search for and attraction of more potential supporters to TIP. Radical Wahhabism and Salafism had a significant impact on the mindset of Uyghur militants.
Another peculiarity of TIP is the desire of Uyghur militants to adapt to local environment, mix well with local residents of Idlib and not toadvertise, unlike ISIS, cruel executions in their propaganda materials on the web. According to political scientist Colin P. Clarke, TIP works well with locals in the territories where it is present and has readily cooperated with a number of non-Uyghur jihadists who are part of JFS in key battlefield operations in Latakia and Aleppo. In those towns occupied by JFS, TIP members are relatively popular because they are not associated with administrative issues, such as levying taxes or enforcing Sharia law.
This practice corresponds to the doctrinal strategy of alQaeda, whose leader Ayman al-Zawahiri said, “We adapt to the practical reality wherever it is. We would take into account the circumstances of each jihadist arena and what achieves its interests.”
The foggy future of Uighur Jihadists
Today, while ISIS has almost been destroyed and the government of Bashar Assad, with the help of Russia and Iran, is trying to take control of the country’s main cities, many jihadists of the Islamic State are leaving Syria. But unlike them, Uyghur militants of TIP are in no haste to return to China, although they promise to return to their homeland in their propaganda materials and conduct jihad against Chinese atheists.
First, this is dueto the tactics of guerrilla warfare of alQaeda, which has experience of underground survival in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the African subcontinent.
Second, many Uyghurs came to Syria with their families and spent considerable financial resources on the trip. According to the analyst of Al Arabiya MohanadHage Ali, some sold their homes, businesses to raise money for the trip. During their stay in Syria, many of them managed to settle down, adapt to local conditions. Therefore, they intend to stay in the Middle East for a long time.
Third, the strategic ally of TIP Jabhat Fateh al-Sham acting as a defender of the Muslim Sunnis of Syria will play a significant role in armed struggle with the government forces of Syria and will support the Uygur jihadists, who are also Sunni. Therefore, the massive return of TIP militants to China should not be expected.
But if the military situation in Syria does not develop in favor of TIP, the Uyghurs will seek an underground shelter in the countries of Central Asia, Turkey, Pakistan and Afghanistan. But this won’t reduce the threat to China. On the contrary, different branches of the Turkestan Islamic Party in Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Middle East will pose a great threat to Beijing’s implementation of its super-project “One Belt One Road”.
Therefore, China is interested in the military defeat of the radical Islamic groups operating in Syria and Iraq and the physical destruction of the maximum possible number of Uyghur militants fighting therein. The Chinese government has already announced its willingness to participate in the post-war reconstruction of Syria and Iraq. Beijing and Damascus have already begun discussing post-war infrastructure investment in Syria.This provides additional leverage for Beijing to persecute and expel Uyghur militants of TIP from Syria and Iraq.
Islam Between Fatwa and Suicide Attack
Jihad of the Moderate Islam against Salafi-Jihadist groups
Pakistan seems to take active measures against the ideology of radical Islamism after Donald Trump accused Islamabad of playing a “double game” on fighting terrorism and warned it would have to do more if it wanted to maintain U.S. aid.In mid-January 2018, more than 1,800 Muslim clerics in Pakistan issued fatwa against jihad and suicide bombings.
The text of the legal religious decision specifies that “suicide bombings are ‘haraam’ and violate key Islamic teachings.”“This fatwa provides a strong base for the stability of a moderate Islamic society,” Pakistan President Mamnoon Hussain told at an official ceremony. The fatwa has been developed by 30 clerics, and another 1,829 prominent representatives of the Islamic clerics have supported this position, as AlArabiya has written in its message.
As a scholar analyzing the process of radicalization of the Islamic ideology and the activities of Salafi-Jihadi groups in Central Asia and in the Middle East, I’d like to emphasize that this measure taken by the Pakistani authorities have been approved by many ulamas of moderate Islam in the region. Only Afghanistan’s President Ashraf Ghani criticized the anti-terror fatwa issued by religious scholars in Pakistan, saying the anti-terrorism fatwa should have covered the entire Muslim world, including his country.
It should be noted that prominent theologians, muftis and ulamas of the Islamic world before had issued similar Islamic directive or fatwa against suicide bombings used by terrorist groups. For example, in 2010, a prominent Islamic preacher, Doctor of Theology Muhammad Tahir ul-Qadri issued a global fatwa against suicide bombings. In his book, “Fatwa on terrorism and suicide bombings”, issued in English in London, he has organized theological arguments based on ayats of Quran against killings of civilians and against suicide bombings. He set out a point-by-point theological rebuttal of every argument used by al-Qaeda inspired recruiters. At that time Tahir ul-Qadri told that his 600-page judgment, known as a fatwa, completely dismantles al-Qaeda’s violent ideology.Unfortunately, after 8 years, we have to admit that the promises made by Tahirul-Qadri have not been accomplished. His fatwa didn’t destroy the radical ideology of al-Qaeda, which keeps on succeeding in recruiting new supporters throughout the world and using suicide bombings.
In 2014, Saudi Arabia’s senior clerical leadership has issued a new fatwa, or legal ruling, declaring terrorism a “heinous crime” under sharia law to undermine the legitimacy of ISIS insurgents in Iraq and Syria and to discourage support for the extremists.In 2013, Afghan and Egyptian Muslim scholars raised the issue of the release of a fatwa prohibiting suicide bombings, which are actively used by the Taliban militants.In March 2015, Spiritual Directorate of the Muslims of Russia also issued a fatwa against ISIS, which said that the creation of the Caliphate was the haraam without the approval of all the Muslims of the world and approval of the shurah. Russian ulamas have noted that Islam forbids the announcement of the Caliphate without the “shurah” procedure (approval) with all the Muslims of the world. Announcement of the caliphate without approval is deemed a fitnah (revolt). Similar fatwas against the use of suicide bombers by al-Qaeda and ISIS have been issued by Islamic ulamas of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, India and other states.
Yet the efficiency of Islamic directive or fatwa against jihad issued by muftis and ulamas of the Islamic world remains low. Because of their methods of countering the ideology of Islamic radicalism and the ways of fatwa,the explanations given to the people are not sufficient to convince them. Unlike them, the Islamic radicals use social media efficiently and treat various categories of people exactly.
It is naïve to think that if religious scholars issue a fatwa against al-Qaeda and ISIS, the ideology of Islamic radicalism would be delegitimized, while their supporters would lay down arms and would not use suicide bombings.
I have always argued that the ideology of radical Islamism, which allows the use of suicide bombings “against crusaders, Jews and other enemies of Islam”, first of all, must be fought by the Islamic countries, prominent ulamas and recognized muftis that know well the theory and practice of the Islamic religion. However, a burst of the violent ideology of the Islamic radicalism and the active use of suicide bombers in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan last year prove that the Islamic countries and their clergy lose out significantly to transnational groups of al-Qaeda, Taliban and ISIS in an ideological struggle. The downfall of the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria does not mean that the ideology of the militant Salafism has been prostrated in these countries and suicide bombings have stopped. Vice versa, the activity of the supporters of the Islamic State has increased significantly in social media where they call for jihad against the United States, Russia, Israel and other countries in the West.
It is the call for jihad that is the ideological weapon in the arms of terrorist groups. In the traditional moderate Islam, jihad is not among the five pillars of the faith and is understood as the defensive war against harassment of the Muslims. However, the Islamist radicals try to make jihad as the sixth pillar in the Islamic science, after Shahada (a declaration of faith), Salat (daily worship), Zakat (almsgiving), Siyam (fasting during the Ramadan), and Hajj (the pilgrimage to Makkah).
The Salafis consider jihad mainly as an armed struggle, placing emphasis on the attacking aspect of the holy war. They declare participation in jihad as the sacred duty of every true Muslim. Ideologists of radical Islamism Sayyid Qutb, abd al-Salam Faraj, Ayman al-Zawahiri have developed jihad strategy and tactics for the modern world, emphasizing the methods of using of suicide bombers. In social media, terrorist groups from Central Asia Katibatal Tawhidwal Jihad, the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), Katibatal-Imam Bukhari call the Muslims to join jihad in Sham and defend Islam instead of sitting at home. They claim that only after the overthrow of kafirs and restoration of the unity of all Muslims (ummah), like it was in the golden age of Caliphates, peaceful relations can be established within the ummah.
The Quran as the Source of Truth in the Ideological Struggle
To defend their own positions, both parties – prominent scholarsof moderate Islam and leaders of radical Islamist groups – appeal to the ayats of the Quran and hadiths. In their fatwas, the ulamas and muftis of Pakistan, Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, as well as prominent theologian Tahirul-Qadri claim that Islam has nothing to do with terror and the Quran does not allow suicides by means of bombs. As an argument, the authors of fatwas refer to the famous surah 4:29 of the Quran, which reads as follows,“And do not kill yourselves [or one another]. Indeed, Allah is to you ever Merciful.”
However, ideologists of radical Islamism also refer to the Surah Ali ‘Imran [3:169-170] of the Quran for the purpose of recruiting new suicide bombers and inspiring them to the acts of violence and terror:”And never think of those who have been killed in the cause of Allah as dead. Rather, they are alive with their Lord, receiving provision, rejoicing in what Allah has bestowed upon them of His bounty, and they receive good tidings about those [to be martyred] after them who have not yet joined them – that there will be no fear concerning them, nor will they grieve.”
The leader of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has become the leading theoretician of suicide terrorism by rhetorically blurring the line between suicide and martyrdom. In essays such as “Jihad, Martyrdom, and the Killing of Innocents,” among others, Zawahiri differentiates the two on the basis of intention: Ending one’s life “out of depression and despair” is suicide, but ending one’s life “to service Islam” is martyrdom. Zawahiri told that “the death of a martyr is not the end of the jihad, but rather a clarion call to the witnesses of truth. Martyrdom has come to pour fuel on the fire of rage blazing in the hearts of his troops against the Crusaders.”He goes on to state that anyone who joins the UN is not a true Muslim, calling them Henchmen of the Crusaders.
Zawahiri calls the governments of Muslim states the betrayers of Islam. To intensify his thoughts, he refers to ayat 60:4 of the Quran, in which Allah via his Messenger, Muhammad, summarizes the Muslim-Infidel relation as plainly exampled by Abraham, when he states: “We disown you and that which you worship besides Allah. We renounce you. Enmity and hate shall forever reign between us–till you believe in Allah alone.”
The Foggy Future of Fatwa
Thus, as the analysis has shown, the efficiency of fatwas against suicide bombings issued by prominent religious scholars and Islamic clergy of Pakistan, Russia, India, and some Central Asian states remains low. To speak simply, the impact of fatwas on terrorist groups of al-Qaeda, ISIS and their branches in Central Asia, Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad, the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), Katibat al-Imam Bukhari remains very low. The Islamic extremist groups do not consider the authors of fatwas as prominent authorities in sharia law.
Moreover, they think that these fatwas have been issued by order of the governments of Islamic countries, which they consider Irtidad, i.e. renegades of Islam.According to Islam, apostasy is punished by death.Sahih al-Bukhari [52:260]: “…The Prophet said, ‘If somebody (a Muslim) discards his religion, kill him.’”Therefore, terrorist groups of al-Qaeda, ISIS and Taliban do not recognize and do not accept the fatwas against suicide bombings issued by the spiritual leaders of moderate Islam. Radical Islamist groups have their own advices on religious affairs and they follow their own commandments. This is another sign that confirms that radical Islam does not accept the principles of modern society and the democratic legal order.
In my opinion, the fatwas against suicide bombings used by terrorist organizations have a positive impact on the struggle against the ideology of Islamic radicalism for several reasons. First, the positive aspect of fatwas issued is their impact on public perception. Despite the fact that they cannot strike a devastating blow to the ideology of terrorist groups, this initiative of Pakistani religious scholars can in some way prevent the recruitment of new jihadists.
Second, fatwas contribute in some way to the public debates among the leaders of traditional moderate Islam and violent jihadists, which can lead to the revision of contradictory interpretations of some important elements of the Islamic science.
Third, after the issue of such fatwas, the Islamic world gradually comes to understand that the Muslim community of the world plays the decisive and defining role in the struggle against the ideology of radical Islamism and destruction of jihadist groups. Responsibility for the destruction of Islamist terrorist groups and jihadist ideology lies on the shoulders of the governments of Islamic states.
We can say quite literally that current Islamic civilization goes through a critical and crucial point in its history and the fate of this civilization directly depends on its ability to cope with radical ideology of the ISIS, al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups.
What Role Should Criminology Play in Government Policymaking?
At this very moment in time, there is not much agreement over what the role of criminology should be in society. Therefore, in this academic article, an attempt will be made at portraying what the author considers to be a more appropriate picture of the role of criminological research in government policymaking based on multi-disciplinarity, multi-professionality and multi-institutionality.
For the purpose of this analysis, I will employ the notion of public criminology as the type of criminology which ‘takes as part of its defining mission a more vigorous, systematic and effective intervention in the world of social policy and social action’. The reason why public criminology seems to be the perfect fit for the conduction of a proper discussion on the relationship between criminological theory and government policy is that it attempts to give meaning and context to social facts, moving beyond ‘administrative criminology’ or ‘policy criminology’ which is considered to be practiced in an optimal fashion when it uses experimental evidence that leads to easily proven benefits.
The Influential Role of Theory in Politics
With the advent of all the changes occurring in the 21st century, there is a need for a stronger bond between criminological research and government policymaking. There have been scholars advocating for an insulation of crime and punishment institutions from the political arena, together with other leading criminologists which have concluded about the criminological industry that it is politically and socially irrelevant and does not have much to add to the big debates on crime and justice However, most criminologists recognize the benefits of getting involved one way or another in the process of governmental policymaking. As a case in point, Kitcher (2001) tried to answer the question of what collective good is criminology enquiry aiming to promote and came up with a long and, perhaps, inexhaustive list of added benefits, namely reduction in crime, improved efficacy of criminal justice institutions, heightened public security, the protection of the rule of law, individual liberty and human rights and responding to crime in a reasoned manner while dispelling myths.
Multi-disciplinary Criminological Research
Treatments of multi-disciplinarity in the development of criminology throughout history do not exist in the academia. Nor has any other branch of knowledge (i.e. psychiatry, psychology, law, sociology, forensics, medicine, anthropology) been able to claim criminology as its own. For this reason, it is important to bring to the forefront the problematiques of multi-disciplinarity regarding the production of criminological research and of multi-professionality concerning the government policymaking.
At one side of the spectrum, criminology has accustomed itself so far to operating in arenas, which have already been inhabited by other disciplines, while being delineated as constantly ‘raiding’ these disciplines. Nonetheless, not possessing enough ‘autonomy’ and being more outward looking has been looked at as a strength. Thus, it can be argued that it is crucial for the strength in relevance of criminological research in governmental policy for it to be multi-disciplinary, as opposed to morphing into a single discipline. In the unfortunate event of the latter, criminology would risk an increase in insularity from key debates in the political science and on the political scene. Since many scholars agree with the fact that criminology does not engage in the distribution of a shared conceptual language or a basic theoretical tradition, methodological and theoretical pluralism are not only preferred, but should be endorsed and promoted by criminologists in the governmental policy sphere. This can be achieved through the engagement of economists, sociologists, developmental psychologists and operations researchers, among others, in the creation of professional criminological knowledge.
Multi-professional Government Policymaking
On the one hand, the side of policymaking and the “circumstances of politics” are exceedingly relevant and need to display certain ‘multi-professional’ traits in order for criminological research to be easily put into practice. The issue of who is on the receiving end of all of this criminological research has been initially brought up together with Harold Laswell’s concept of the ‘science of democracy’ in which he draws attention to the necessity of establishing specific audiences for criminological research .Hoppe (2005) attempts to answer this dilemma by framing ‘the policy analyst’s operational task as focusing the attention of all those involved in policymaking so as to bring about their maximum rationality’ . In the category of ‘all those involved’, we should be able to include politicians, police, penal professionals, international political agencies, private security companies, pressure groups, non-governmental organisations, social research companies, consultancy firms, media organisations and the public opinion (i.e. crime victims) which should all both sponsors and recipients of criminological research. Therefore, academics should not be so hung up on engaging externally solely for the purpose of informing public policy, considering the possibilities offered by commissioned research from the part of NGOs and businesses or the prospects brought about by consultancy work. As a whole, these newly-forged networks should provide a great source of multi-professional engagement in the production, mediation and usage of criminological research. In terms of production and usage of criminological research, it might prove valuable to keep in mind that government policymaking should encompass a wide operation of ‘practical rationality’ in which all concerned voices are able to come to ‘reasonable decisions’ Moreover, their participation in the formulation of the criminological policy discourse could provide ‘reality checks’ which help prevent scholarly insulation found in other social sciences apart from criminology.
Since democracy is at the heart of governmental policymaking in the 21st century, the ‘professional’ knowledge needs to be supplemented by knowledge from a broad spectrum of sources such as science, the media, party preferences and opinion polls in order for a proportionate and representative policy response to be formulated. In this sense, one can argue that governmental policymaking is not as much of a science, as it is a craft, not as much of an ‘art of the optimum’ as it is an ‘art of the possible’. As discussed above, it is impossible to escape politics if criminologists want to be included in the crime policy discussion since ‘the only legitimate way for anybody’s views about principle or policy to be put into practice is through the dirty and messy business of politics’.
Multi-institutional Collective Decision-Making
This is best represented by Loader and Sparks’ concept of the ‘democratic under-labourer’. This idea contains an ‘institutional-critical dimension’ responsible for facilitating the interaction process between criminology, criminal justice institutions, the government, the media and the civil society organisations. This comes in the shape of an effort to try and ‘explain how criminological claims are likely to fare when translated into ‘communication formats’ of other social organisations and thereby shed light on the obstacles that stand in the way of a more informed politics of crime’
When translating criminological research into policy, decisions should be taken collectively, bearing in mind the prevalence of ‘self-interest, ignorance or prejudice’ of different stakeholders in the policymaking arena which might impede the process of reaching an agreement between policymaking parties. Conversely, these various know-hows different policymakers bring to the table also imply different lenses around crime controversies which, as opposed to gridlock, could set forth alternative manners of ‘thinking and responding to crime’. Using Wegner’s concept of ‘boundary’ as both the border between two ‘communities of practice’ and a way to ‘develop ways of maintaining connections with the rest of the world’ and applying this concept in relation to criminology as put into use by Jones (2012), specific practical ways of forming interlinks between disciplines, professions and institutions surface. Jones (2012) proposes that some of these could encompass ‘industry work placements, academic exchange, visiting scholar programmes[…]conferences, workshops, work programmes, seminar series, secondments, or consultancy work’ . Taking it a step further, he goes on to suggest that even social activities, communal newsletters, email distribution lists or office and site visits could potentially aid in the process of connecting various practices. Furthermore, by exploiting the notion of ‘boundary work’ as employed by Henry and Mackenzie (2011), it becomes clear how boundaries between criminologists and non-criminologists lead to a ‘failure of academics to make research comprehensible to external audiences’
One of the best mechanisms employed for the inclusion of more stakeholders in the translation of criminological knowledge into policymaking is interactive governance. This method helps facilitate ‘relational interaction’ between state and non-state contributors to the dissemination of criminological work through, for instance, ‘reflexive monitoring and dynamic social learning’ since in the dynamic age of globalisation people tend to trust in the ‘reflexive monitoring of action’ to guide us. The benefits of connecting with particular governmental, academic, civil society groups, and even corporate actors, can aid in the creation of alternative justice policy proposals (i.e. remaking of criminal justice institutions).To go a step even further, the creation of a ‘market in crime control’ populated with ‘consultants’ and ‘entrepreneurs’ selling their expertise to criminal justice and law enforcement agencies is something to strive for and not fear because of potential loss of academic integrity . While these proposals might not be implemented in the next couple of years, they will certainly create more space for an active presence of criminologists in contemporary controversies.Nevertheless, collective decision making should be exercised with caution considering the dangerous prospect of deadlock due to potential ‘burdens of judgement’ such as troubles deciding upon what can be deemed as relevant evidence or competing values of policymakers as a result of various life experiences
All things considered, criminology can truly play an influential role in informing public policy as long as it learns how to engage with other disciplines. However, nothing will bring great results if the government policymaking machine does not do its part in inviting multiple professions to the decision table. These two actors (i.e. criminology and government) should learn how to work in a multi-institutional fashion commissioning a variety of stakeholders for the policy consultation process. Bearing in mind the “catastrophic trajectory of contemporary policies”, this short essay served as a platform to envisage a multi-disciplinary criminology, a multi-professional government policymaking and a multi-institutional engagement in order to successfully respond to the trials of living in the era of globalisation. Thus, the main inference that we draw from this paper is that the relationship between criminological research and government policy should, in its turn, occupy a multi-disciplinary arena. It should fearlessly and unapologetically acknowledge that it contains a ‘subject matter but no unique methodological commitment or paradigmatic theoretical framework, fact which can only move the debate forward in order to design the ideal type of criminological engagement with government policymaking.
Iranian Intelligence response to the new security challenges in the West of Asia
During the years after the Islamic Revolution of Iran, national security considerations have undergone various changes. Changes have been conducted in the light of the pursuit and continuation of some of the great features of the Islamic Republic’s holy system. The country’s security considerations are divided into three axis-driven discourse-driven, center-driven and growth-driven divisions. In each discourse, four basic variables, namely, “national security goals and principles”, “national power”, “national security threats and vulnerabilities”, and finally “national security policies” have been considered. Islamic loyalty, how it originated and speed its growth was so sudden and shocking that most analysts and observers were shocked. How self-immolation by a simple street vendor in Tunisia has led to the emergence and growth of democratic democracies in the Middle East and the fall of the dominoes of North African countries, and how none of the world’s leading analysts and future scholars failed to make the slightest speculation about its emergence needs a debate Another is to review the methods of analysis and approach to dealing with political phenomena. On the other hand, the emergence of radical Islamist groups emerged in the wake of the lockup and stalemate of the liberationist movement in Syria, and the rapid growth of a group such as ISIL, which, until two years ago, was one of the names of extremists al-Qaeda, The whole area of the game changed completely from western Iraq and eastern Syria, turning it from a guerrilla group to overnight. Of course there is no doubt that this cannot happen without the coordination of security systems in the countries of the region and the world.
Thus, the challenges of the region changed from one to two years from soft to hard. In analyzing the causes of emergence, leading challenges and, consequently, determining the orientation of defense strategies, two basic approaches can be considered. In the first approach, the weight of analysis is given on the scene of global power, and the regional forces are the majority of the vertebrae playing on the enemy’s ground. Questions like this:
- Are these superpowers of the world seeking to change the fabric of political powers in the Middle East?
- Does the Trump government follow what its Republican self-government governments, father and wife Bush wanted to do?
- Are the Arab Gulf states, in the form of traditional and closed spaces, cannot be a good alliance for the West bloc and its head in the United States?
All of them will have a fairly positive answer. If we look at the cases with this hypothesis, conspiracy theory, color and smell become more pronounced, and its predecessor comes back decades ago, and it can even be traced back to World War I. Returns The emergence of Islamic extremist groups, the September 9th, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Iran-Iraq War, the Arab-Israeli wars, and even the rise of Israel, are all examples that can be analyzed in the context of conspiracy theory and can explain the Middle East’s current situation. Be In this approach, the tip of the Iranian intelligence movement will go to the world powers more than their puppets in the region.
However, without intending to abandon this approach, one can look at another window, and at least since 2000, on the other, as well as the fact that Western countries, and at their head, the United States more than the beginning and the end These currents have a role to play, in their benefit, in the framework of their own interests, have become stronger. If we deal with this approach, we can take responsibility for part of the political game in the region and see the impact on the political trends and trends in the region. Accordingly, our defensive strategy will also be regional. Based on the approach that the question in the above lines once again reminds us, why our tentacles have been so weak in getting weak signals? If we even admit that these probabilities have been investigated in the think tanks, then there should not have been any signs of public diplomacy.
Indeed, the rapid growth of a group of insurgents who does not consider itself to be bound by any international law, and which has been taking part in large parts of eastern Iraq and western Syria, over a period of several months, the total size of which is in the country’s size and size Britain, cannot be justified in the form of spontaneous and radical group movements. Accordingly, if we accept that countries in the region, such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, are somehow drawn from the curvature of the transfer of power, financial support and military equipment, should I accept that their policies as influential powers in the region Maintaining stability and balance of power has changed? Is Saudi seeking gendarme in the Gulf region? Is Turkey looking to revive the Ottoman Empire in the region? Does the Qatari government seek huge financial resources to become an influential pole in the region? Does this mean that the discourse of the twentieth century, in which Israel was the most pivotal enemy, has been altered, and the reorganization and redefinition of the regional map of the region with the triangle of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey have been on the agenda of these countries? Where is the position of Iran? What role is Iran to play? Should security policy focus on preserving domestic security, or the importance of regional unilateral security shrinking into Iran? If the maintenance of impartiality is not fulfilled, how much should participation in the process affect the events, in what way, should our strategy be set up?
The point here is that if ISIL, which is free from any kind of adherence to any international treaty and treaty, is the executive arm of this policy of emerging powers in the region, and then the situation will be a little more complicated and complicated. ISIS has, as it has shown, exerted its greatest energy in its area of influence and influence, in other words, ISIS’s policies are largely outspoken and the least attention has been paid to the satisfaction and welfare of the citizens of their occupied territories, which could be potential for Iran is very dangerous. Because of it provides not only the incentive for this group to violate the borders of Iran, but also the possibility of its actualization at all.
As evidence suggests, ISIS is not committed to any international treaties and norms in the war, and basically believes its war with the Western domination system in the world. So, given the attractiveness of this group among Muslims in different levels of power in Central Asia, and in particular Pakistan, and even Syria, the ISIS’s scenario of unusual and massacre weapons, such as nuclear, chemical and microbial weapons, is unlikely to happen. That realization can completely change the playing field.
Whether ISIS met with its supporters and sponsors can also be decisive in determining Iran’s security strategy. Is this alliance between these countries and ISIS a temporary and short-term solution or a long-term strategy? In the first assumption, with the provision of relative stability in the territory of this group, the challenges and conflicts will flood the Arabian countries of the Persian Gulf in the south and Turkey in the north. In the latter case, ISIS will play the role of a puppet or a puppet element of Iran’s regional rivals who can challenge the western borders of Iran by provoking religious motives.
What is important that the possibility of occurred these challenges is all, simultaneously and in the near future. And this also greatly adds to the complexity of the issue. On this basis, it is well worth the point that Iran’s security strategy is very smart, flexible and operational. In addition, Iran’s national security considerations have been subject to various developments, which can be summarized as follows from the transformation of the “extravagance to the introspection” from the “ideological approach and pure devotion to more realism”, from the “Ummah-axis to Iran-centered” From “simplicity to complexity”, and from the “Threat to Threat – Opportunity in the International System”. In these developments, we are paying more attention to the need for a balance between the implications and limitations of national security considerations.
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