On October 26, 2026, former Singaporean MP Calvin Cheng posted an infographic about Indonesia’s internet dependency and added a single word, “Potong?” He shortly thereafter asserted that Singapore was a civilized and law-abiding nation and would not do so. However, the upload has already touched a sensitive nerve. It emerged just days after Jakarta cut gas supplies to Singapore amid tensions over haze from forest and peatland fires.
From smoke to gas
Smoke from Sumatra and Kalimantan has once again blanketed Singapore and Malaysia. In recent weeks, Singapore has issued legal notices to 10 Indonesian companies suspected of being involved in the fires, while Malaysia has said it will raise the issue at the ASEAN meeting in Manila. On October 21, President Prabowo opened a plenary cabinet session with a call to protect natural resources. A day later, Minister Bahlil Lahadalia stated that he would evaluate energy export contracts and do not hesitate to stop exports to countries that do not respect Indonesia, without mentioning the names of the countries.
On October 24, SKK Migas reduced gas exports to Singapore by 31 million standard cubic feet per day, 15 million from Natuna and 16 million from Sumatra. The official reason is the electricity needs of Batam, Bintan, and Sumatra. The amount is not large. The figure is around 9 percent of piped gas exports, according to Reuters. And 14 percent, according to Bloomberg calculations, because the calculation basis is different, while the Singapore energy authority calls it less than 2 percent of the country’s daily gas needs. Prime Minister Lawrence Wong also stated that Singapore expects all parties to fulfill their commitments.
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The close timing of Bahlil’s statement and the cuts naturally raises suspicions of political motives, but these have not been proven, as the official reason concerns domestic electricity. Certainly, the volume is small, making the move more of a signal than a material pressure. Jakarta also took a similar path in 2011, when the idea of halting gas exports to Singapore was ultimately softened to simply changing the supply source.
How dependent is Indonesia on Singapore?
It was at this point that Cheng’s post found its target. In June 2026, Komdigi’s Director of Digital Infrastructure Strategy and Policy, Denny Setiawan, stated that 90 percent of Indonesia’s internet traffic depends on Singapore. That figure measures data traffic, not the number of cables, and the GeoCables platform notes that all 72 of Indonesia’s submarine cables, both domestic and international, connect to Singapore. Cellular, the reasons are mature data centers and cheaper transit costs, while Monash University observers say this dependency is difficult to avoid due to geographic proximity and the large investment in building new lines.
This means that the dependency was largely shaped by market logic, not by Singapore’s design. This distinction is important because the ability to disrupt and the intent to do so must be assessed separately. For the purposes of this paper, diplomatic tensions stemming from forest and land fires and energy supply are the triggering factors, dependence on cables running through Singapore is the intermediate link, and the vulnerability of Indonesia’s internet connectivity to geopolitical pressure is the end result. This causal chain remains hypothetical and has not yet been proven by data.
Minister of Communication and Information Technology Meutya Hafid answered that most of the cable lines landing in Singapore pass through Indonesian waters and that the disconnection would threaten to cripple 80 percent of Singapore’s own connectivity. This last claim has not been independently verified, but the logic is clear: the disconnection would be detrimental to both parties.
If the cable breaks
A single cable outage typically only increases delays and forces traffic to be rerouted to other cables. A simultaneous outage of several major cables would impact access to cloud services, overseas data centers, and cross-border transactions. Indonesia’s internet won’t be completely shut down because domestic networks and alternative routes remain, but international capacity could plummet.
Taiwan provides a small glimpse of its scale. After two cables connecting the Matsu Islands were severed in 2023, the island relied on the microwave network until repairs were completed by the end of March. According to Domino Theory, the microwave capacity is only about a quarter of the cable’s capacity, and sending a repair ship across the Indo-Pacific could take up to 30 days. The lesson is that slow recovery is as dangerous as the cable itself.
What the law of the sea says
The international law of the sea or UNCLOS guarantees the freedom of all countries to lay submarine cables. Article 58, paragraph 1, provides for that freedom in the exclusive economic zone, and paragraph 2 applies Articles 88 to 115 there, including Articles 112 to 114, which specifically regulate cables. Article 79 grants similar rights on the continental shelf, and coastal states must not obstruct cable installation or maintenance except through reasonable measures for resource exploration and pollution control from pipelines, although it retains the right to impose conditions on cables entering its territory or territorial sea. Article 113 requires each country to punish cable damage by ships flying its flag or its nationals, and Article 114 imposes repair costs on the owner of a cable that damages another cable. The full text can be found at the official text of UNCLOS.
The problem is, this provision was written to protect cables from physical damage at sea, not to regulate a country’s decision to shut down traffic at a landing station within its territory. Article 113 also applies outside territorial waters, namely in the exclusive economic zone and the high seas, while protection in territorial waters is based on national law. Therefore, UNCLOS does not give Singapore the right to cut Indonesian cables, but it also does not provide a complete shield for Indonesia. The legality of action against facilities in Singaporean territory depends on its national law and the operators’ contracts. Indonesia itself is bound by Article 51, paragraph 2, which requires archipelagic states to respect other countries’ cables already in their waters, so similar retaliation is not an option.
Why dependency isn’t necessarily a weapon
This is where the concept of weaponized interdependence comes in handy, not as an end in itself, but as a tool for identifying vulnerabilities. Farrell and Newman demonstrate that the global network is not flat. Some nodes are far more important than others, and the state that controls them can use them in two ways: by controlling the flow of information or by blocking access to others. Dependence only turns into bargaining power when four conditions are met: the node is under the jurisdiction of one state, that state is able and willing to act, the opposing party has no cheap way out, and the costs of acting are less than the benefits.
Applied to this case, the first condition is partially met because the landing station and data center are located within Singapore. The third condition is also met in the short term, as building a new route is expensive and only a handful of companies are interested in opening one. However, the second and fourth conditions are weak. There has been no signal from Singapore, and Cheng himself has rejected the idea. The costs are also high because Singapore’s greatest asset is its reputation as a neutral and trustworthy hub.
Bargaining power also doesn’t move in one direction. Indonesia has a large market for gas, although its gas position is shrinking. Singapore is reviving; about 95 percent of its electricity comes from gas. However, liquefied natural gas imports will surpass half by 2024, and Indonesia’s pipeline contracts expire in 2028. Therefore, Indonesia’s vulnerability is better understood as a latent capacity rather than an actual threat. The policy’s value lies in reducing the third condition by increasing the number of solutions.
What can be done now
The following recommendations are intentionally simple, use existing instruments, and can be initiated without waiting for new studies.
First, open more internet outlets. Imagine the Indonesian internet as a city where almost all goods enter through a single port. As long as the port is running smoothly, there are no problems, but a single disruption can bring the entire city to a halt. Komdigi has actually drawn up a road map to open a new international gateway via Manado, eliminating the need for traffic from eastern Indonesia to pass through Singapore. The roadmap also includes plans to build at least two cable landing stations on each major island, which is the point where submarine cables ascend to the mainland and connect to the land network, and an open landing concept shared with multiple operators to reduce costs. Komdigi has stated that it prefers to provide incentives rather than take over the industry. The proposed step is to transform the roadmap from a plan into a ministerial regulation, complete with a phased deadline and a minimum percentage of eastern traffic that must pass through a gateway other than Singapore. New cables that continue to land in Singapore should not be considered diversification, as they simply add routes without reducing dependency.
Second, prepare backups outside of cable for services that cannot die.This backup isn’t intended to replace the cable but rather to keep its most essential functions alive while the cable is being repaired. Two relevant technologies are microwaves, which are radio signals between towers that work well over short distances but have low capacity, and low-Earth orbit satellites, which orbit close to Earth and are therefore faster and can reach remote areas. Taiwan plans satellite receivers at 700 locations with a budget of around 18 million US dollars to maintain government communications during emergencies, while Indonesia has already been using low-orbit satellites for hard-to-reach areas. So what needs to be done is to establish a list of critical services, such as the national payment system, referral hospitals, and disaster command centers, then require each to have a backup connection and test it regularly. The coverage must be narrow, as satellites can only replace a small portion of cable capacity.
Third, accelerate recovery and strengthen law enforcement.The broken cables cannot be returned without a special vessel, and the vessels are often held up by matters of permitting entry into territorial waters, as noted. Domino‘s Theory: The European Union is setting an example. In June 2026 the European Commission funded two regional cable centers worth 5 million 800 thousand euros and opened a 40 million euro fund to increase repair capacity. Regional cable hubs are where countries share monitoring and coordinate response to disruptions. Indonesia and ASEAN could start with a simple version. For example, expedited permits for repair vessels, a single point of contact when cables are damaged, and information exchange between countries. Laws are necessary, but not sufficient. The captain of the Hong Tai ship in Taiwan was sentenced to three years in prison, but the May 2023 law changes did not play a role in the decision. Meanwhile, the NUS study noted that ASEAN countries’ regulations are still fragmented, so uniform implementing regulations for Article 113 would be very helpful.
Fourth, separate the cable issue from the smoke and gas issue.All three have different actors and resolution paths, and mixing them up only increases the risk of misinterpretation. A joint statement by the two countries’ communications ministers that the cable is beyond dispute would be nearly costless and quick to produce. Indonesia could propose it at the ASEAN meeting in Manila, which Malaysia believes will be a forum for the haze issue. This move also benefits Singapore, as its reputation as a neutral node is the most expensive asset to restore if damaged.
It doesn’t take cutting cables to unsettle a nation. A single word from a politician is enough to remind us that 90 percent of Indonesia’s internet traffic relies on a single node in a neighboring country. There’s no evidence that Singapore intends to use this as a weapon, but the vulnerability is real and can be mitigated. Since the capabilities of others cannot be controlled, Indonesia’s most realistic option is to expand its own solutions.
