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Geo-economics and power

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After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the international system witnessed a number of transformations like globalization of trade exchanges, de-industrialization of the Western World and the rise of new powers like China, Brazil and even post-Soviet Russia.

Before then the geo-economic analysis considered the enterprise as the center of the economic balance of power and was mainly focused on competition. At the present stage, this model appears not to be accurate enough to address the contradictions between power politics, market practices and territorial approaches. The chart elaborated by French strategist Christian Harbulot (PMT) allows considering other elements like power, market and territory that better address the complexity of this analysis.

The main challenge is finding a convergence between long-term business interests and state power politics strategies while taking an environmental friendly approach. The enterprises, for example, tend to have a preference for short-term policies, whereas state-led industrial policies are set on a long-term basis.

Nevertheless, there are indeed some cases in which coordination between corporate development strategies and state-led economic policies is successful: for instance, Russian state-led Gazprom as far as the choice of international markets for Russian gas supplies is concerned, and the American Boeing, that refused to open a branch for aircraft assembly in China, in order to avoid transferring sensitive technologies.

On top of business and state policies coordination problems, the economic needs of the territories do not necessarily merge with state-led or business practices, which refer to the logic of competition, like in the case of de-localizations.

The graph below (PMT) highlights the intersection between the three above-mentioned levels (power, market, territory). Its goal is providing a dynamic reading of different economic scenarios, not exclusively centered on the enterprise or on financial actors, whose decisions do not always take into account environmental contexts. This cross-referenced analysis facilitates the drafting of anticipation or corrective economic strategies.

The interpretation of power politics must take into account a political understanding of economic relations, which are promoted especially in developing countries. The interpretation of the market operations, mainly performed by entrepreneurs, must consider a certain amount of detachment from political objectives, especially in the Western world. Lastly, the interpretation of the actions of local stakeholders must consider the fact that the territory has always suffered from the aggressiveness of competition, to which territorial representatives tried to react through innovative management and appealing policies.

Another category that also influences economic decision-making is civil society that does not account to state, business or local stakeholders. Civil society’s stances are progressively boosting a broader reflection on market economy and advocating an ethical regulation of economic affairs through some forms of sustainable development.

The organization and management of strategic provisions is a fundamental feature of any discussion related to strategic economic development and the increase of state power. The strategic decision that are more often taken in order to increase strategic provisions security are: creating a special State-business committee, establishing partnership with other states, research and development investments, relaunching production capacity, adopting a recycle policy.

The creation of a State – Business commission on strategic provisions could better connect the public and the private sector so that services provided by the states in key sectors (defense, foreign affairs, industry, ecology, etc.) are available to the business sector. The Committee for strategic metals (COMES), established in France in 2011, is an example of this synergy even though its high level of specialization sometimes limits its broader efficiency.

Many of the OCSE countries, like the United States and Japan, set up a reserve of strategic raw material provisions to draw from in case of a block in supplies. However, this option presents some problematical aspects: 1) setting aside a certain amount of strategic raw materials to accumulate in the reserve can determine a lack of capital supplies for the entrepreneurs; 2) it is not really clear what is more convenient to fill the stockpile with. Accumulating low-alley materials or semi-finished products can be difficult for a country where the first transformation process of final products does not take place.

In order to keep supplies constant over time, the securitization of strategic provisions must rely on the partnership with foreign countries or companies as well. A good example of partnership could be setting up a mining site in a state possessing a given raw material and working on its production and transformation capacities through transferring capitals and know-how.  In this regard – as many businessmen highlight – the choice of the partner countries depends on geopolitical risk factors. Argentine and Brazil, for instance, are more likely to attract foreign investment compared with the Democratic Republic of Congo that is not considered as a safe country.

Investing in research and development (R&D), instead, is fundamental to find alternative solution to the substances that are either too expensive or toxic, and to decrease the quantities that are needed without affecting the performance.

Relaunching domestic production capacity contributes to the requalification of the abandoned production sites or whose value for some reasons decreased over time. This option can be challenging for a number of reasons: reopening existing plants is expensive, sometimes the know-how of a given district disappeared over the years, and it is difficult to identify what is the best business opportunity to restore (mines, transformation chains, etc.). On top of a cutting waste practices, businessman prefer to adopt a material recycling policy, especially in the automotive and aeronautical sector. However, even recycling has its downsides, like expensive and polluting processes, and cannot be considered as a determined solution because there is still some waste percentage that cannot be fully eliminated.

Nevertheless, even in a context of perfect synergy between the investments, the policies presented so far are just the starting point for the securitization of strategic provisions. A successful strategy to address this issue requires an accurate assessment and forecast of the current and the future needs of both enterprises and people of a given community. Before pursuing any kind of policy in this field, the state must necessarily have a clear perspective on its own plan for strategic provisions.

An accurate forecast should envisage future needs and the kind and quantity of the materials that are necessary for the functioning of technologies of the future. Identifying supply chains is another aspect worth considering – especially as far as rare materials are concerned – in light of the possible risks for the industrial plants.

The French government in the early ’70 adopted a similar plan after the oil crisis: assessment of future energy needs, development of technologies to cope with it (nuclear power plants), and identification of uranium supply chains and implementation of a strategy based on a reduction in hydrocarbons provisions. The creation of the COMES is part of this plan.

The issue of provisions can be observed from two different angles. Strategic provisions are mainly raw materials of which the state needs constant supply: energy sources like oil, gas, uranium and rare earth elements that are indispensable for the functioning of information technologies and communication, to “green” energy and defense technologies. The Strategy of provisions, instead, consists in the policies to be adopted to guarantee a sufficient supply of strategic materials to sustain prosperity of the French socio-economic model over time.

The enterprise is the main actor of the economy and plays a significant role vis-à-vis the economic war that is relentlessly replacing traditional conflicts in the international arena at the present moment. An example of the combination between war and economics is the fight in the acquisition of post-war reconstruction contracts, like in Bosnia and Kosovo in the ‘90s but even more in Iraq or Libya. In Africa, especially in the Great Lakes region, great powers compete between each other for the control of strategic raw materials that are vital for the future of industrialized economies.

At this stage of globalization in which the future of the economy is mainly determined by non-state actors, the presence of the State is highly put into question. Nevertheless, it would be impossible to completely cut out the state from the economy because the roles it inevitably plays in a market: client, sponsor and producer all at the same time.

According to the definition provided by British historian and WWII expert Liddel Hart, setting up a “strategy” means coordinating and canalizing all the resources of a given state (political, military, diplomatic, economic, cultural) towards the outcome desired. With the end of the Cold War, the importance of the military element is progressively decreasing, while trade and economic resources became the main domain of competition between states.

This new setting of inter-state competition is also the result of the rise of new actors, the BRICS countries, alongside the West and Japan, which represent the traditional industrial powers. As far as European countries are concerned, there are some less evident elements to rely on in order to draft a more accurate plan for the future: ensuring state control on strategic sectors through providing incentives for domestic enterprises and, most importantly, aiming at economic growth, employment and gaining presence on foreign markets.  

The United States and China are the major great powers that show how state support to the private sector – especially vis-à-vis the protection of strategic sectors and promoting domestic business abroad – is not only possible but also indispensable at power politics.

An interesting feature of the French economy is the difference of treatment – and sometimes the conflict – between multinational and small/medium enterprises. Multinational corporations are the driving force of the economy and although for a long time benefited from the national industrial policies, they are currently trying to weaken the ties with the state. Small and medium enterprises are instead more rooted in the national territory but are often struggling for financing, access to foreign markets, protection of their specific know-how and acquisition of new capacities that are indispensable for their survival. The state should then play a key role in coordinate public and private sphere. However, mutual mistrust between these two sectors – although understandable – turns out to be a hurdle for development in most European countries.

In the United States the situation is quite different: strong ties between public administration, private sector, academia and think tank built up a network that strongly favors communication and obtaining information. This aspect tends to get little attention in Europe, where state power is considered as a limit to overcome rather than an opportunity to take. It is true that public institutions have a significant advantage in terms of intermediation capacities and access to information compared to the private actors. However, if oriented towards the needs of the real economy, multi-level coordination between public and private sector can provide a competitive advantage for both multinational and small/medium enterprises.

Creating competitive clusters allows to use the networks at its full capacity, helps local sharing of good-practices with regard to economic intelligence, protection of intangible heritage of information, and know-how of the enterprises. The state cannot refuse to take this pressing challenge: it must promote the access to good practices especially for small enterprises following the rules of transparency.

In recent years, investment funds became a popular topic in the debate around economic power as possible threat to the survival of western corporation model, especially as far as middle-eastern and Chinese sovereign funds are concerned. However, Chinese investments in European companies are still quite low and mainly concentrated in sectors like raw materials, energy resources and other operations that does not lead to a real control the enterprise.

In some cases, however, some acquisitions are deemed to gain technological (or other) competences, without a real interest to invest in the local development of the acquired undertaking, as the cases of Intel (investment fund with CIA connections), Carlyle Group (in the aerospace industry) and TPG (that from 2006 controls the main French company producing smart cards) demonstrate. In this framework, there are several instruments aiming at protecting State’s sovereignty, which is threatened by massive purchasing of economic activities by sovereign funds. Firstly, a screening of foreign investment in strategic fields can be put in place, especially to protect Small and Medium Enterprises. Secondly, a change of attitude is needed, in order to accept that developing countries will control more and more European companies. In these cases, however, the principle of reciprocity shall be respected.

Particular relevance has to be granted to standard and rules, which are normally set out at the international level. Accordingly, lobbying within international organizations, as the United States knows very well, is of the highest importance. Otherwise States could elaborate their own standards or invest, for example, in the International Organization for Standardization, as China is doing.

In this subject matter, the European Union is not able to “speak with one voice”. In particular, the lack of a Union’s comprehensive strategy, and thus the predominance of national interests, is particularly evident. In accordance with the Treaties, in fact, in the internal market, the protection of competition takes precedence over an effective industrial policy. In light of the foregoing, new priorities should be set out, in order to enhance the coordination that could increase the penetration in non-EU markets (especially concerning some strategic sector, i.e. the defense one) and improve the existing competition. Nevertheless, it should be noticed that these changes might not be possible without the creation of real “United States of Europe”.

The current debate often focuses on energy security, not only from an economic point of view. The need to swift from “energy security” to the “energy supply” has been underlined, as well as the importance of securing the energy flows. This is demonstrated by the so-called “oil wars”, as the two Gulf wars, the war in Afghanistan and in Libya could surely be defined. However, despite the fact that the oil supply is one of the main causes of these conflicts, delicate international geopolitical balances are crucial elements to be take into account.

Along with the control of the “black gold”, the “gas issue” should be given a great importance for several reasons. Research demonstrates that the increasing in energy demand in the next years (from developing countries in particular) could not be satisfied by oil only. Furthermore, it is necessary to find alternative solutions in order to overcome difficulties stemming from extraction techniques in newly discovered oil fields.

Accordingly, States are trying to revise their energy policy, by reducing consumption and improving the quality of their infrastructures to avoid leaks, by diversifying their energy sources, especially by increasing the use of renewable energy (i.e. wind, sun and wave power), and by controlling the use of national resources (as France does with hydropower and nuclear energy).

Moreover, security of supplies is related to raw materials, where the interplay between economic and geopolitical aspects is evident. Agricultural products, minerals and rare earths elements are only few examples.

China holds more than 90% of rare earth elements and uses this monopoly to achieve its political purposes, against Japan for instance, towards which the Chinese government applies restrictions on exports in light of their territorial disputes. Furthermore, conflicts arise in relation to abundant resources, such as cultivable lands (as it happens with land grabbing) or common goods, such as water, air, biodiversity and the genetic heritage. In this framework, countries, in a globalized word, have to deal with the scarcity of resources, caused by demographic growth, as well as by the increasing of material and immaterial trade flows, flows of goods and people, information and money. In particular, supplies are granted only when flows are safe and this implies several economic and military consequences.

On the one hand, different economic elements shall be protected: the ownership of infrastructures, the technical control of the exploitation of resources, the choice of transport routes (such as pipelines for the European supply) and the control on access routes (such as harbours).

On the other hand, security depends on military capacity to oversee production and export areas, as well as on seaway’s extension and control. Examples are the protection of the Gulf of Aden by EU’s Atlanta and NATO’s Ocean Shield operations.

One of the main geopolitical issues in the current debate concerns rare earth elements These include 17 elements that are fundamental for high-tech industries, even though they are used in small quantities. For instance, lanthanum can be found in electric vehicle batteries and in sonar; samarium in some missiles’ elements; gallium in night vision devices; indium in flat panels. These specific Raw materials are actually at the center of the dispute between China and the United States, which are two of the main actors in international relations of XXI century. Evidence supports the predominance of China in this field: the country holds between 34 and 50% of world reserves and produced, in 2010, 95% of rare earth elements (130,000 tonnes out of 133,000). This was possible after having progressively abandoned the exploitation of western sites and the complete integration in the global economy system. Therefore, Pekin is able to use this leverage in its dialogue with western countries, by imposing very high prices or, even worse, by breaking their supply chain. There is no doubt, however, that a problem of dependence exists and that it is not clear how to solve it. Nevertheless, China’s position seems not to be so safe. The country should become an importer of rare earth elements by the end of the current decade.

Between 2006 and 2010 China reduced its export share of these metals from 5 to 10% per year. Furthermore, their production was limited, to avoid the depletion of reserves. However, China-Japan tensions of September 2010 (following the Japanese inspection of a Chinese vessel in “contested” waters) have worsened their relationship. As a result, the Chinese Trade Minister set 30% reduction of export share.

China was trying to use rare earth metals as an economic weapon, which led to a real embargo on its exports towards the European Union, Japan (representing one fifth of its final demand) and United States, whose diplomats were able to obtain by their Chinese colleagues full assurance concerning liability in the future. This demonstrated that Sino-US relations are of the highest importance in the American politics. Currently, 87% US imports of rare earth elements come from China, while the remaining 13% is from domestic reserves.

The Chinese embargo forced the United States to implement a strategic vision that was missing so far, because of the dependence of the country form external resources. Therefore, the US needed to undertake some measures stimulating mining, refining and transformation of this kind of raw materials.. As a result, the US pursued a policy of differentiation of trade partners.

Nevertheless, the exploitation of mines in order to obtain rare earth elements is rather difficult, both at the administrative (the re-opening of one of these mines takes 9 years) and at the political level (environmental organisations are often against these projects). Molycop case represents a successful story in this field. The enterprise, in fact, owned Mountain Pass mine, which is the biggest site of non-Chinese rare earth metals in the world, and obtained in 2010 (few months after the above-mentioned diplomatic tensions with China) the authorization to relaunch the activity. Molycorp’s efforts ended at the end of 2012 and the company increased its production from 3.000 tonnes to 20.000 tonnes per year and received 531 million dollars of funds. Currently, the company is the only one that extracts these materials outside China. The step of this process will be summarised in the following paragraph.

In June 2010 Molycorp signed an agreement with Canadian company NeoMaterial, which provides technical assistance and know-how on the production of rare earths elements. Moreover, in December of the same year, Molycorp set up a joint-venture with the Japanese Hitachi, in order to create several associated enterprises producing alloys and magnets in the United States. Furthermore, Molycor signed a memorandum of understanding with Sumitomo Corporation trough which Molycorp completed its supply chain of rare earth metal-manufacturing products. These products are then delivered to Sumitomo Corporation. In April 2011 Molycorp acquired the American branch of the Japanese enterprise Santoku for 17.5 million dollars and the Estonian Silmet for 89 million dollars. Therefore, Molycorp can actually count on a network of customers that goes from the Far East to Europe.

Molycop has secured funds, mines, know-how, logistical cooperation and a network of buyers, and became the only western enterprise with a full control of the entire supply chain of rare earth elements, from the mining to the sale process . The United States could thus avoid direct conflicts with China, after the threat of embargo and the increase in prices.

Despite the fact that China could not be excluded from rare earth elements-market, its power shall be controlled, as tensions arisen in 2010 showed. The idea of an embargo in September 2010 stimulated competition and pushed western countries to diversify their supply sources. As a result, the offer increased and Chinese power decreased.

Economy

Public Council Sets New Tasks to Support Russia-Africa Relations

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In this interview with Armen Khachatryan, Deputy Chief Executive Officer and Programme Director at the Roscongress Foundation, and now a member of the newly created Public Council under the Secretariat of the Russia–Africa Partnership Forum, argues that the first Summit held in October 2019 ultimately seeks to inject a new dynamism in the existing Russia-Africa relations.

According to him, as the African continent undergoes positive transformation, platforms for dialogue between Russia and Africa are profoundly changing too. The Russia–Africa Summit demonstrated the sheer enormity of potential that exists for collaboration across various areas, and one of the outcomes of that historic event was the establishment of the Secretariat of the Russia–Africa Partnership Forum. The Secretariat further created a Public Council, the body also incorporates a Coordinating Council, Research Council and Media Council.

Speaking with Kester Kenn Klomegah early January 2021, Armen Khachatryan unreservedly stressed that building on the existing relations and all that have been achieved over the past few years, needs new platforms such as the Public Council. This Public Council aims primarily to uplift and solidly support the relations into a new stage, change perception among the public and give it an entirely new outlook into the future. Here are the interview excerpts:

A meeting of the Public Council of the Russia–Africa Partnership Forum Secretariat took place early November 2020. What were the main outcomes of the event?

It was the first kick-off meeting held last year. We determined the objectives facing the Public Council of the Russia–Africa Partnership Forum Secretariat. Specifically, these were to do with implementing the decisions of the inaugural Russia–Africa Summit and organizing the second summit, which is planned to take place in 2022. We discussed the current state of Russian-African relations in the humanitarian sphere, as well as the potential to develop them further. We also set out the council’s plan of action.

In your opinion, what social initiatives were prioritized – particularly at this time when Russia is seriously looking to focus on Africa?

Humanitarian cooperation has recently played an increasingly significant role in the development of Russian-African relations. The lively discussions at the Russia–Africa Economic Forum in October, 2019, in Sochi are testament to the importance of joint social initiatives, and to the shared desire to implement them. I believe this is with good reason, as collaboration in this area can help build an atmosphere of mutual trust. It isabsolutely essential to forge sustainable partnerships in different spheres with Africa.

In terms of priorities, areas in which we have traditionally collaborated include education, healthcare, culture, the environment, safety and security and so forth. All of these fields possess enormous potential for Russia and Africa to work together, and our country is ready to share its experience and expertise on mutually beneficial terms. Unlike some other countries, Russia wants a strong Africa with genuine sovereignty and a competitive economy. With this in mind, I would place particular emphasis on education. From my point of view, Africa’s most valuable asset is not its natural resources, but its people.

Young people currently make up a significant percentage of the population across the African continent. And that figure is going to increase further still. The population of the continent has already passed the 1.3 billion mark, with a median age of about 20. Around 60% of the population are young people under the age of 25. And according to forecasts, by 2050 the elderly will account for just 9% of the population. Given these numbers, we not only need to increase quotas for African students looking to study in Russia, but also open branches of our universities in African countries. That would allow us to offer a Russian education to many more African students as well as establish student exchange programmes.

By all appearances, aspects to do with education and professional training – and issues of humanitarian nature – are currently being examined in keeping with the course that has been delineated. Do you think that civil society should be involved in extending the reach of public diplomacy between Russia and Africa?

There is no doubt that collaboration between Russia and Africa should extend across the board, and take place at various levels. It should not be limited to ties between government officials and members of the business community. In any country, ordinary citizens make up the majority of the population, and for countries to collaborate effectively with one another, there needs to be an understanding of their perspectives and wishes. Therefore, as we look to establish direct ties and foster an environment conducive to regular dialogue with the people of various African nations, it is vital to involve civil society more closely.

It would appear sensible to provide more opportunities to people in Africa in terms of volunteering and doing internships at large Russian companies that are looking to build their presence on the African continent. The aim would be for these people to potentially be offered jobs at the companies’ African branches. Human resources need to be at the heart of our efforts, given their potential role in strengthening ties in both industry and science.

For our part, the Roscongress Foundation, as a socially oriented non-financial development institution, is open to proposals and is ready to provide assistance in promoting Russia’s image in African countries. This includes through organizing business, cultural and sporting events. As far as this is concerned, I imagine that the Foundation will receive support from Russian embassies and Rossotrudnichestvo’s offices in African countries.

Do you envisage any problems during attempts to better leverage Russias soft power and to strengthen public diplomacy in Africa? Do you view competition from other foreign players as a challenge?

I don’t think it’s entirely appropriate to use the term “soft power” in this instance. In this regard, I am of the same opinion as Yevgeny Primakov, Head of Rossotrudnichestvo. The term I take issue with is “power”, which implies pressure of some kind. We have no intention of pressurizing anyone. We are in favour of equal relations with all of our partners, and this includes African nations. In particular, we are guided by the principle of “African solutions to African problems.”

Obviously, there is competition, but I would not call that a challenge as such. Our main objective is not to compete with someone, but to offer our own perspectives on certain issues, communicate our values, and build a positive image of Russia in the eyes of people in Africa. Let me explicitly reiterate here, we are not exerting power in any way. People in Africa will have the benefit of several alternative perspectives, and will be able to choose the approach they feel is closest to them. This, in my opinion, is the principle of equality and mutual respect.

Of course, there are things that are hampering efforts to implement a systemic Russian humanitarian policy in Africa. For example, Rossotrudnichestvo has only eight offices across Africa’s 54 nations. It would appear that Russian-African ties would benefit from Russia opening new diplomatic missions in the region. If we want Russia’s voice to be heard on the African continent, special attention needs to be given to this issue.

In terms of the media landscape, what steps need to be taken to improve the work done by various outlets? How can we better inform society about events in both parts of the world? Why, for example, news in Africa rarely reported on in Russia?

In terms of working with the African continent, I believe that raising awareness on both sides is one of the most important issues we face. It is difficult to talk about joint ventures, for example, to develop the SME sector, when the African continent remains so little known in Russia, and in Africa, there is only a vague notion of what Russia is. The Russia–Africa Summit and Economic Forum played a crucial role in addressing this, as did the 2018 FIFA World Cup. That event saw many people from Africa visit Russia for the first time. They were able to see with their own eyes what our country is like, instead of being presented an image by the Western media. People were following events using various information resources.

These events played a huge role in helping to shape the media landscape. However, this exchange of information needs to be done on a more permanent basis. It’s worth pointing out that in today’s world, awareness can be raised in more ways than just via the media. Given the spread of social media, the student exchanges I mentioned earlier could, over time, play a much more important role in cultivating Russia’s image than conventional media channels. However, in order to achieve this, it is vital to work with young people in both Russia and Africa.

Going back to conventional media, I believe that first of all, Russian news agencies need to expand their network of correspondents in Africa. That would allow our journalists to work with primary sources, rather than rely on material put together by foreign news agencies. It will also be important to get Russian and African journalists working together, for example, through placement programmes, master classes, roundtables and so forth.

To answer the question on news in Africa being reported on in Russia, things are developing. Telegram channels dedicated to the African continent are appearing, for example, so it is possible to stay up-to-date with key events. One organization which is doing much to leverage Telegram channels is the Association of Economic Cooperation with African States (AECAS). Its members include the Roscongress Foundation, which has considerable experience in developing and implementing humanitarian initiatives. AECAS is also currently working to build an integrated space for people in Russia and Africa to obtain information. This appears to me to be a very promising area. Admittedly, when it comes to large news agencies, the problem is that there are not enough events to report on which would garner widespread interest. However, I am in no doubt that as Russian‑African relations develop further, things will improve in this area.

The second Russian-African Public Forum took place in November 2020. In his welcome address, Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov said that amendments needed to be made topolicy initiatives in order to respond to changing realities in Africa. What was he referring to, and what is your take on “changing realities” in Africa?

First of all, I would say that the African continent has undergone an enormous transformation over the last few years. Across all areas, Africa has become much more profoundly involved in the economic processes driving globalization. Partners in Africa are implementing a programme to ease the movement of goods, capital and people, and to employ new technology in business and marketing. This has made the African economy more open and attractive to foreign investors.

The first Russia–Africa Economic Forum in Sochi served as yet another clear demonstration to the Russian and global community that the African economy is becoming more organic. It served as proof of Africa’s increasingly significant role in the global economy. Indeed, the continent has a direct bearing on global growth, and on progress in science and technology. Africa’s economic ties with the rest of the world are certainly no longer solely about supplying raw materials and being a market for finished products.

The socioeconomic growth we are witnessing, together with the global economy’s accelerated transition to a new wave of tech innovation, has meant that Africa’s role and position in the global economy has shifted significantly. The continent is also becoming an important growth pole in terms of global demand. Consumer spending on the continent has already reached US$ 680 billion. According the World Bank, this figure is set to grow to US$ 2.2 trillion by 2030.

As the continent undergoes this transformation, platforms for dialogue between Russia and Africa are profoundly changing too. The Russia–Africa Summit demonstrated the sheer enormity of potential that exists for collaboration across various areas. It was a historic milestone for Russian-African cooperation. One of the outcomes of the event was the establishment of the Secretariat of the Russia–Africa Partnership Forum. In addition to a public council, the body also incorporates a coordinating council, research council, and media council. Never before in Russia’s modern history has there been such a serious mechanism for bringing together expertise and best practices from all sides and across all areas. It is set to act as a foundation to develop all aspects of Russian-African partnership, and to effectively position Africa’s transformation, which we briefly discussed earlier.

The high-level summit also led to the establishment of the Association of Economic Cooperation with African States, which will serve as a platform to strengthen business ties between Russia and Africa.

The situation is so diverse – politics, economy and culture – in Africa. In your opinion, what are the best pathways for promoting policy initiatives, as well as the social aspects of diplomacy with Africa?

That is quite important, but I don’t think we should try to identify a single “best” or “universal” pathway. It’s important to understand that Africa is a diverse continent – every country is unique, and requires an individual approach. And that’s before we consider that methods and initiatives that are employed in one region of the world – for example, Europe – are not at all necessarily appropriate for countries in Africa. We need to meticulously analyse each initiative, and be sure to draw the greatest possible benefit from them.

Generally speaking, there needs to be a focus on working with people, and in particular, with young people in Africa. These efforts should be based upon the needs of the population. And as I mentioned earlier, the pathways to achieving our aims could look very different from one another. Africa, just like Russia, is blessed with a wealth of extremely young talented people: some make films, others dance, others draw. But that’s not the important thing. What’s important here is to do everything we can to connect the lives of people in Africa with our country –we show that Russia is ready to help develop their talents. After all, these people could well become the thought leaders of the future, as well as ambassadors for Russian-African relations. These people could help foster a positive image of Russia in their respective countries. We are ready to engage and cooperate with intergovernmental organizations, civil society and African partners, work constructively to consolidate the results from the first summit and what both Russia and Africa further set inthe joint declaration in Sochi, in October 2019.

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Economy

The role of economic warfare in understanding contemporary geopolitics

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Despite Fukuyama’s theses, the traditional war is not over: especially in Europe, from the former Yugoslavia to Ukraine. As for economic relations between states, these – with all due respect to the Austrian school – do not amount to “soft trade”. Indeed, as early as 1990, Edward Luttwak heralded the age of geoeconomics when Bernard Esambert published The World Economic War. German surpluses against French deficits, weak dollar against strong euro, difficult negotiations between the United States and the European Union on the subject of the transatlantic treaty, the world yesterday as today is an arena. Economic warfare is so pervasive that expression is a victim of its success. It is therefore necessary to precisely define this new theoretical and practical object, to evaluate its real scope and its mode of action.

It should be clear, looking carefully at the contemporary dynamics, to affirm that economic war is the daughter of globalization

Although economic warfare in the broadest sense of the term is not new, its contemporary form has relatively recent roots. We can consider that after the Second World War, with the revival of an international monetary system and the signing of the GATT agreements in 1947, the rules for commercial competition between largely national economies were established within the Western bloc. Thus, the economic struggles that have taken place in recent years have been confined to an arena of limited size.

Furthermore, when Bernard Esambert published Le Troisième Conflit mondial in 1968, he traced the contours of an economic war with positive virtues: not only did this “soft” war replace the real war in the West, but it was also a stimulus for industrialized countries, engaged in a profitable competition for all. Furthermore, the Cold War forced the nations of the Western bloc into a de facto solidarity that further limited the effects of their economic rivalries.

It was precisely this balance that was upset in 1991 with the fall of the USSR and the end of communism. From that moment on, nothing stood in the way of the capitalist and free trade model which, until then, represented only one of the two economic systems at work on the planet. Now the arena is global and hardly anyone challenges the rules of the game, but at the same time the end of the war does not bring down the politics of power; it moves them from the military and geopolitical terrain (clash of blocs, peripheral conflicts, etc.) to the economic and commercial terrain (rivalry between powers over resources, the struggle for market share, etc.). According to Luttwak, “in the future, fear of economic consequences could settle trade disputes, and certainly more political interventions motivated by powerful strategic reasons.” If Luttwak probably underestimated the importance that geopolitical issues would maintain, he underlined the new dimension of our globalization: that of economic competition between nations Far from thinking like the men of the Enlightenment that trade softens morals, it believes that trade is only one of the modes of war when its armed side weakens.

Winners of the Cold War, the United States was in fact the first to take stock of the change that the world was going through. Basically, the Cold War gave them the opportunity to subsidize entire segments of their economy.

But if at the beginning of the 90s, the geopolitical argument collapsed, the economic discourse remains in all its purity. In the same year, Secretary of State Warren Christopher officially declared that “economic security” was to be elevated to the top foreign policy priority of the United States of America.

In other words, the winners of the Cold War have officially declared economic war on the rest of the world. The perspective is certainly largely liberal; everyone has their chances and can win this game, but the discourse is ambiguous because it is tinged with the defense of national interests. In the end, it mixes both liberal and mercantilist rhetoric, principles hardly compatible in the eyes of economists but perfectly legitimate for politicians.

In order for a country to be fit to fight in economic warfare, it needs a state, that is – Esambert would say – a resolute warlord, who knows the profession of arms and who reduces the morale and spirit of conquest to the economy.

Yet in the 1980s and 1990s, in the era of neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus, the state had been mistreated; it was seen as an obstacle to economic development and therefore President Reagan was not afraid to say that “the problem is the state”. Financial globalization, the transnationalization of companies, the intensification of international trade have rung the death knell for this relic of the past. Not only has the state resisted the neoliberal potion, it is now making a comeback. The state continued to play its role of overseeing the private space by creating a favorable legal, fiscal and infrastructural environment for the economy. In our current context, states have also taken on the role of military leaders, to conquer markets and resources, both to secure their power and to enrich their businesses and their fellow citizens.

In fact, the state has a certain number of prerogatives or capabilities that companies are naturally lacking. The state can think long-term, finance long-term when companies prefer the short or medium term. Furthermore, it can implement expensive tools at the service of its companies to distinguish the sectors of the future, the fields in which they have an interest in investing; in short, the state has a far better view of the battlefield than any of its troops. The Japanese example of the MITI has a paradigmatic value, as demonstrated by the pioneering studies of the Paris school of economic warfare directed by Christian Harbulot.

It is also the state that guides the dynamics of tomorrow by setting goals: thus, the Lisbon strategy that the EU member countries adopted in 2000 intends to make the Union “the first knowledge economy” by 2010 by explicitly linking this goal to that of full employment. Only a state can tackle these kinds of tasks, the scope of which far exceeds the financing capabilities and motivations of a business.

States don’t wage wars without troops. These are businesses, large and small.

But what does all this mean specifically?

First of all, it concerns a simple but at the same time extremely delicate question in an era of globalization: the nationality of companies. Isn’t it an illusion to say that more and more multinational companies, owned by foreign capital, are American?

Indeed, economists have shown that, despite the logic of transnationalization, the idea of “corporate nationality” is not obsolete. First, because a number of strategic companies are protected by states: directly when they are shareholders indirectly when they are guarantors their independence from foreign companies. We recall, for example, that in 2006 the Bush administration forced the Dubai Port World company to sell to AIG International the management of the six large American ports carried out by the P&O company that DPW had purchased. Likewise, advertising firm China National Offshore Corporation was prevented in 2005 from acquiring the US company Unocal. What does this mean if not that states easily recognize national companies, even if their capitalization is now international?

In short, even in the era of the “Global Players”, we can speak of nationality of companies.

Secondly, we can assimilate the present large companies, even more so the multinationals, to the legions of the late Roman Empire; mixed, variegated, composed of Roman cadres and barbarian troops, they are nevertheless the army of the Empire. Today’s companies, despite their global character, still maintain a national foothold. Furthermore, the recent Peugeot bailout around an alliance between the family, the French state and the Chinese manufacturer Dongfeng illustrates well that the idea of a national company did not die with globalization, it is only more complex than in the past. .

Returning to contemporary economic warfare this can be read as a traditional conflict, with its war objectives. The first is to defensive carette: saving industrial jobs. This challenge has become an obsession as relocations or subcontracting to low-wage countries are draining our industrialized countries.

Why this obsession with industrial jobs in our outsourced world? It is because our post-industrial societies, in the sense that most of the GDP no longer comes from the secondary sector, are no less industrialized than they have ever been. Not only do industrial jobs generate tertiary employment, but there are also many that require a qualification. Bernard Esambert speaks of an “industry-service symbiosis” to designate this pair formed by the high-tech industry and the service sector that accompanies it. Losing the former to the advantage of the new industrial powers means losing the latter and risking regress, not to mention the risk of unemployment or underemployment, which no democracy can bear in the long run. Advocates of economic warfare therefore believe that industrial employment must be defended and even maintained . Beyond the economic debates about their cost-benefits, the destruction of jobs is difficult to accept in the eyes of voters and, therefore, decision makers.

The other objective of the war, decisive for the states, is no longer defense but the conquest of markets and scarce resources. Economic warfare scholars have clearly demonstrated the intensification of the war for the control of natural resources, mainly for the control of hydrocarbons.

Perhaps nothing better than this example illustrates in the eyes of its proponents the obviousness of economic warfare: oil is a scarce and limited resource. Every drop gained by one is lost by the other. Therefore, as it is the basis of development, it is necessary for each state to ensure a secure and continuous supply. The inexorable struggle that the United States and China are waging for African oil but also for the other resources of the subsoil of this continent is an example of this. Absent in Africa 25 years ago, China is now the third largest trading partner after the United States and France; for two thirds it imports oil, but also metals, cotton and precious stones.

This war for natural resources is the scene of a reversal of the balance of power between Western countries on the one hand and emerging and / or developing countries on the other. The rise of China, of the BRICS, the rise of sovereign wealth funds in the Arab oil exporting countries would demonstrate this. In economic warfare, resources are powerful ammunition. And everything suggests that this conflict will escalate.

The International Energy Agency estimates that energy needs will increase by 50% by 2030, in part due to Indian and Chinese growth. The search for raw materials will in fact become a crucial issue for the States. As early as 2007, the Committee on Critical Mineral Impacts on the US Economy published a report in which it lists eleven minerals that are particularly crucial to the American economy due to their scarcity, their need in high-tech industries … the more coveted, is rhodium, used in particular in catalytic converters, and found in Russia but also in South Africa, a much better ally than Moscow. Rare metal, today it is the subject of struggles in which states and multinationals fight side by side. As guarantor of the national economy, each State is called upon to draw up, in its own way, a list of the resources that are or will be essential for it.

The “scarce resources” also include companies that today more than ever are falling prey not only to their private counterparts but also to governments. As such, the crisis has facilitated the entry into the capital of very large companies in the countries of the South through powerful sovereign wealth funds. The large investment funds of the United Arab Emirates, in particular Dubai and Abu Dhabi, have invested extensively in favor of the economic crisis in prestigious companies in difficulty: EADS, AMD, Sony, Citigroup … The Chinese sovereign fund holds almost 10% by Morgan Stanley. As for the Singapore fund, it entered the equity of Merril Lynch at the same level. Here we find the idea of revolution in the North / South hierarchy: winning in the economic war is not a legacy. The newcomers are shaking up the old hierarchy. Saudi Arabia is estimated to be responsible for 5% of US GDP thanks to wealth creation made possible by the use of Arab oil. Suffice it to say that Riyadh has a strategic advantage over its powerful economic partner.

Finally, there is a scarce and strategic commodity that constitutes a relatively new objective of the war: information. It is now important that companies and states know their opponents, their exact technological level, their strategy, in order to be able to anticipate them. Sometimes we speak of cognitive warfare to refer to the advanced weapon of economic warfare. In fact, the acquisition of information with high added value is also essential for the development of the tango economic activity as much as the accumulation of financial capital and the coordination of human skills. If states now want to help their companies gain market share, they must equip themselves with economic intelligence programs, otherwise they will lag considerably behind in a form of struggle that appears increasingly crucial as all the immense theoretical and operational work done by Ecole du guerre economique founded by Chrustian Harbulot.

In short, our time is woven of contradictions; on the one hand, the states hold an official speech supporting, sometimes with nuances, a multilateralism supported by the main international institutions such as the UN, the WTO, the IMF. On the other hand, everyone can see that the states are developing quite different reasoning. The imperative of solidarity in the financial field advocated by the G20 t new response to the need not to lose market share in a context of tension. In the midst of the crisis, the logic of competitiveness requires the conquest of foreign markets.

It is up to Christian Harbulot to have clearly shown this shift from Cold War Manichaeism to the multilateral economic war that states are waging today. According to him, the ally / opponent pair replaced the partner / competitor one. This transformation of possible alliances is accompanied, according to Harbulot, by a reorganization of the field of partners and competitors in geographical terms. The two blocks of the Cold War would have succeeded three blocks: the first is the degraded space of the Western world from which we can possibly extract the United States, the second is the expanded room for maneuver of the new powers, the third, finally, is space of survival of other countries. Each of these spaces follows very different power strategies. Furthermore, the members of each block are not necessarily allies as we have just seen.

Therefore, any peremptory statement becomes impossible. The United States and China are waging a relentless war over Africa’s resources. But China, through the purchase of US Treasuries, is the country that allows the United States to live on credit. Another example, China and Taiwan are political enemies but economic partners.

If economic warfare is a struggle, it is based on weapons and countermeasures. In covert warfare, a large number of tools count as weapons. The first of all is undoubtedly training: in our constantly changing societies, initial training helps create a workforce or managers prepared for change.

Likewise, the importance given to research is fundamental. Since 2010, China has more researchers than the United States, although the latter enjoy, thanks to the practice of brain drain, the sharpest minds on the planet. In this context, public-private collaboration is fundamental: in the United States, the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 provides that patents financed with public funds – by universities or public research centers – are assigned mainly in the form of exclusive rights to private companies American.

In other words, in the eyes of states in economic warfare, the search for patents is truly a national affair, a guarantee of productivity, a decisive weapon in the perspective of a trade struggle between nations. These tools are at the service of competitiveness, this ability to face competition on external and internal markets. As for the attractiveness – which could be understood as the competitiveness of a territory – it is the object of particular attention by many states that the disputes between the European Commission and Ireland regarding Apple have brought to light.

The ultimate hidden weapon of warfare is economic intelligence. It is similar both to a weapon, which anticipates the enemy’s movement to surprise him and steal his victory, but also to a defense tactic because it anticipates enemy moves, practicing disinformation for example. The United States is the main player in this information war. We now know that the NSA, initially created in a counterintelligence logic during the Cold War, would have used the Echelon network to know the position of the European Union in 1994 during the final negotiations of the Uruguay Round. In 2014, the New York Times revealed that the agency had spied on an American law firm defending a foreign country in a trade dispute with the U.S. Information has become one of the key issues of the economic war.

As states move from covert warfare to open warfare, weapons change. These attacks can take the form of geoeconomic retaliation in response to a geopolitical crisis; this is for example the case in the fruit and vegetable embargo between the European Union and Russia.

Voluntary import restrictions also amount to retaliatory measures. The well-known example of the restrictions imposed by the United States on Japanese cars in the 1980s testifies to the violence of the conflict. Faced with rising Japanese car sales, Washington sought to protect the “Big Three”. Rather than proceed unilaterally, the US government has asked the Japanese to limit their exports. Tokyo preferred to negotiate this perfectly anti-liberal measure rather than run the risk of even more unfavorable restrictions being imposed: this is the voluntary restriction agreement of 1980.

A series of disputes between states led to the adoption of tariff peaks in retaliation; for example, the United States decided in January 2009 to triple tariffs on Roquefort in response to a ban on exports of hormone-containing beef in Europe. In each of these cases, the best offense was the defense.

When worried about avoiding frontal conflicts, states prefer an alternative approach which is to facilitate the assault of their companies on foreign markets. For this reason the political power is an ardent promoter of its companies. This ancient practice has been systematized in the United States in the form of “commercial diplomacy”. This is based on three principles: preparing the ground by liberalizing trade with the destination country; use economic intelligence, industrial and commercial intelligence to provide American companies with all the data on the ground to be conquered; finally, to set up ad hoc structures such as the War room. This offensive public strategy is entirely in the service of the private corporations that are the strength of the United States. It is in the same perspective that Washington has increased the number of bilateral free trade treaties: with most of the countries of Central America in the 2000s, with Morocco in 2006, South Korea in 2010.

Finally, there is one last weapon that, individually, is now almost the prerogative of a few emerging countries: sovereign wealth funds. Although they deny themselves, these funds take hold in sometimes strategic groups and help guide their strategy.

To cope with these dangers, those involved in economic warfare have developed policies that resemble shields or even counterattacks. In a context where customs barriers are historically low, there are other means to preserve its market: export subsidies, standards, favoritism given to national companies in one form or another (think of the Small Business Act which reserves some public procurement for SMEs) In short, all means are good.

So it is with money, which has long been – and continues to be – a defensive weapon in the hands of states, especially in the form of devaluation. The UK gave us a recent example of the geo-economic use that could be made of a currency: at the height of the crisis, London let the pound slip while the euro remained strong. In this way, British exports were stimulated. We could reproduce the analysis for the yuan or even the yen at a time when Shinzo Abe has launched a policy of monetary expansion.

For large Western states, it is primarily about protecting their markets at a time when old-fashioned protectionism is almost outlawed. For emerging countries, the stakes are different: by increasing the number of regulatory sources (state, international, private, public, etc.), they weaken the universal legal system designed by the dominant states. Paradoxically, the desire to unify world trade has led to a legal fragmentation of the latter.

The rules of trade have become a battleground in a few decades. Witness the emergence in France of the notion of “economic patriotism”. Spread out in 2005 by Dominique de Villepin, then Prime Minister, the doctrine of economic patriotism is based on the idea that it would be up to the state to defend companies considered to belong to strategic sectors. In practice, success is mixed: while Suez was married to GDF in 2008 to deal with a potential takeover by Italy’s Enel, Arcelor was absorbed by Mittal.

Looking at the world today, it is tempting to provocatively conclude that war has a bright future; economic warfare of course, but also traditional warfare. But there is also a more dramatic scenario, namely that tomorrow’s economic wars can degenerate into armed conflicts.

In short, yesterday as today, historical reality is an ocean of forces that are opposed to each other, in a dynamic that determines a perpetual flow that now leads to ascent now to decline.

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Economy

Pakistan Maritime: Shipping Policy of 2020

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The ‘Blue Economy’ is a rising idea which energizes better stewardship of our sea or ‘blue’ assets. The blue economy goes beyond viewing the ocean economy solely as a mechanism for economic growth. In the ‘business-as-usual’ model, enormous scope industrial countries have seen the improvement of their sea economies through the exploitation of oceanic and marine assets – for instance through delivery, business fishing, and the oil, gas, minerals and mining ventures – regularly without a view with the impacts their exercises have on the future wellbeing or efficiency of those equivalent assets. In Pakistan, the Ministry of Maritime Affairs is leading the concept of Blue Economy. The Blue Economy division presents numerous venture openings in the Maritime Sector. Pakistan National Shipping Corporation (PNSC) is a National flag carrier. It appeared by a merger of National Shipping Corporation (NSC) and Pakistan Shipping Corporation in 1979. The mission of PNSC is to give dependable and proficient delivery administrations to abroad and Pakistan’s seaborne exchange, keeping up relationship of uprightness and trust with clients, accomplices, workers, shielding interests of partners and contributing towards advancement of national economy, society and the earth. One of the most important sector in Maritime Sector is Shipping industry.

In 2019, the administration unveiled the new shipping policy, supplanting the two decades old structure, and declared a scored for impetuses for the extension and advancement of maritime. The administration had declared another expense motivating force strategy for Pakistan-based shipping organizations to diminish reliance on foreign vessels. Expansion of more Pakistan-enlisted ships with contribution of private segment would help decrease cargo cost by around $5 billion paid to the foreign delivery organizations. This activity would produce greater business open doors for sailors in the nation. The Minister said hydrocarbon cargoes imported by government associations and state-controlled undertakings, including petroleum, high sulphur furnace oil, low sulphur furnace oil, high speed diesel, liquified petroleum gas, unrefined petroleum, and coal, would be imported on free-on-board premises through PNSC-claimed vessels. Ali Zaidi uncovered that new government-to-government Liquified Natural gas (LNG) import agreements would be haggled on free-on-board premises and shipments would be made through PNSC-possessed or PNSC-chartered vessels.

The Advisor of Minister of Maritime affairs Razzak Dawood declared Maritime as Strategic Industry, he also mentioned that the shipping industry remained neglected for many decades after nationalization which is absolutely correct but the government had to face the criticism by many experts of the related field. As they believe that the government never shared and asserted any substantial focuses for Maritime Industry, as referenced commonly previously, many experts believe that the government never shared any proper pathway or any substantial plan for the progress. Government do announce that ships will register with the announced incentives till 2030, but how many ships MoMA is expecting to register? There are no tangible numbers for Maritime time Industry. The biggest drawback or criticism government faced was on Shipping policy 2019 that they did not mention shares of National Shipping from CPEC, which was quite shocking. Also, there was not a single word about reviewing Shipping Act 2001 or updating it which is the backbone of Maritime Policy Making. The Global leading Maritime Professional Mudassar A. Iqbal openly criticized the policy in a way that MoMA is failed to prepare an effective ‘Maritime Policy’.

Pakistan’s geographic location is important to discuss here, with its 1000 km long coast, situated at the focal point of Indian Ocean, Pakistan is a significant littoral state. In any case, Pakistan has dismissed its duties towards this part for as long as decades. This obliviousness and disregard have conjugated this expected goldmine to only an unused spot. Its neighbors like India, Bangladesh and China have used their marine assets ideally and are proceeding to do as such. As per 2019, Pakistan’s sea income projection remains at 183 million dollars which is far not as much as that of Bangladesh and India who remain at 5.6 and 6 Billion $ individually.

Imran Khan government is working progressively towards Maritime Affairs, On August 07, 2020 Federal Minister for Maritime Affairs Ali Zaidi announced new Shipping policy, under which the vessel enlisted in Pakistan will be excluded from custom obligation, annual expense and deals charge till 2030. According to new policy Pakistani flag carrier vessel will likewise have first berthing directly at the port. In new Shipping Policy many new incentives have been provided to private shipping companies because of new incentives government believe that three to four shipping companies will soon purchase vessels in the nation, including that the new shipping strategy will likewise facilitate fishermen. Ali Zaidi stated. “Another relief for all the private sector is the reduction in the Gross Tonnage Tax (GRT), given that shipping companies agree to accept freight charges in Pak Rupees and not in the greenback. This incentive has been approved in the finance bill of 2020-21.”

Under the new marine arrangement, the state bank has permitted the Long Term Finance Facility (LTFF) for the boats and vessels, which was prior accessible to exporters. “This will assist speculators with purchasing every single drifting vessel including towing boats, dredgers, load vessels and even the fishing boats to acquire the drawn out obtaining at three percent from the banks.” The MoMA has higher expectation that new policy will help Pakistan to upgrade Marine industry.

To overcome Marine Hurdles here are the few recommendations. Awareness between decision makers and among local people. The nonattendance of institutional changes at administrative and provisional level shall be overcome. Technology and equipment’s should be modernized for investigation in marine life. Marine related exploration and preparing is required to be re-evaluated. Exporters lean more towards nearby market as opposed to one abroad on account of the red tape. This will be overwhelmed by reinforcing arrangements regarding sea. Lack of normalized rehearses, as per an investigation distributed by the German Institute for Standardization, 84% of the worldwide organizations’ severe normalized method, in any case, lamentably Pakistan is not one of them. Pakistan wins $1bn from IT part while India produces $12bn yearly. If we need oceanic segment to arrive at its latent capacity, we must follow these normalized pathways. The infringement of ocean rules and Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing will be taken under scrutiny and deep sea policies shall be commenced. The question remain will this Shipping policy 2020 prove to be effective?

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