European countries spent €115 billion on defence equipment in 2025, but only about a quarter of that spending involved joint purchases. The question is whether the EU’s new financing plans will make it easier for governments to buy together.
When armies work together, their equipment has to work together too. If one country’s systems need different parts or training, a joint operation can become harder to support. Buying nationally may feel faster during a shortage, but it can leave governments with equipment their partners cannot easily use or maintain. Countries do not need identical armies. They do need to think about compatibility before placing large orders. For example, a vehicle may be ready to deploy, but partner forces may not have the parts needed to keep it running.
Defence budgets are rising quickly. The European Defence Agency expects that trend to continue, but higher spending alone cannot solve the problem. What matters is whether new purchases fit into a shared plan or add to the differences between national forces.
The €800 billion figure attached to the EU’s Readiness 2030 plan can sound like one large European defence fund, although the money comes through different routes. Much of the figure reflects room for national governments to increase their own defence spending. Another part comes through Security Action for Europe (SAFE), an EU-backed loan programme.
Stay ahead of the geopolitical week.
MD Briefing delivers expert analysis across five global fronts — the Indo-Pacific, energy, geoeconomics, European security, and the Middle East — every Monday morning. Free.
That distinction matters. National spending remains under each government’s control, and any borrowing stays on its national budget. With the SAFE loan programme, the Commission borrows money and lends it to member states, which must repay it. The EU can help finance shared purchases, but most of the plan still depends on governments choosing to use the money together.
The EU has also loosened its budget rules through a temporary measure called the national escape clause. It gives governments more room to increase defence spending without immediately facing the usual deficit limits. But it does not erase the cost or move a country’s debt to Brussels.
More budget flexibility does not put countries on equal footing. A government with room in its budget can commit to new equipment more easily than one already under pressure. In a joint purchase, partners also have to agree on when they can pay, which can make coordination harder.
The ammunition shortages that followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine showed why joint orders can appeal to governments. In 2023, the European Defence Agency set up a joint procurement plan so countries could pool orders. Within a year, every EU country and Norway had joined. The agreement made it easier to buy artillery shells together, but each government still decided what it needed and when. The emergency gave countries a clear reason to cooperate; it may be harder to sustain that cooperation once the immediate pressure eases.
SAFE tries to encourage governments to go further. To use its loans, countries generally have to make purchases with at least one other participating state. That gives them a reason to coordinate early, when they are choosing what to buy. Still, governments may disagree over the equipment or how soon they need it. They may also favor different suppliers. The loan rule can bring them to the table, but it cannot guarantee they reach a shared order. Even after they do, each country still has to follow through on its part of the contract.
Joint orders can give manufacturers a clearer idea of what governments will need. Separate orders may arrive unpredictably or be too small to justify expanding production. Companies need signed contracts before they commit to making more. That means purchasing decisions affect not only what armies receive, but also how quickly manufacturers can supply it.
The EU has encouraged joint buying for years, but its target for joint equipment purchases is voluntary and governments have not consistently met it. Each country has its own military needs and defence industry to support. Common orders take time because governments have to agree on the equipment and when it will be delivered. A national order may be quicker and gives leaders more control, even if it leaves forces with systems that are harder to maintain together. There is also a domestic cost to cooperation. A shared contract can mean production takes place outside a country’s borders, while ministers face pressure to support local employers. That helps explain why leaders may still prefer national orders.
There is also a question of control. Defence remains a national responsibility, and governments are cautious about giving Brussels a say in what their militaries buy. Shared borrowing raises another question: why should one country help pay for equipment another will use? The current plan avoids much of that argument by keeping most spending national. That leaves EU institutions with limited influence over the purchases, even as they try to encourage cooperation.
The new funding may make joint purchases easier to finance, but it leaves governments in charge of what they buy. Whether that changes how Europe equips its armed forces will depend on the contracts countries actually sign. If they keep buying separately, higher budgets alone will not solve the problem.
