The Muscat Process: Making Dialogue a Security Capability

The hour after detection
Gulf security is usually discussed in terms of deterrence, military capability, and external partnerships. All three matter. But when a crisis begins, the deciding factor can be more modest: whether governments can talk to each other quickly, while the facts are still unclear.

During my work in diplomacy, strategic partnerships, and international negotiations, I have seen how quickly uncertainty can become a security problem. Several governments may observe the same vessel movement or the same disruption to critical infrastructure and reach different conclusions. Detection is only the beginning. What happens in the hour afterwards is harder: who communicates with whom, which information reaches decision-makers, and how quickly misunderstandings can be corrected. Managing that interval is a core element of strategic resilience.

The proposal

This is why the proposed Muscat Process deserves serious attention. Currently advanced through a Group of Friends of the Process, it envisages a continuing, regionally owned dialogue among the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), plus Iran and Iraq, with Oman as a potential facilitator. Drawing on the Helsinki experience of sustained dialogue among adversaries, it aims to establish regular political consultation, confidence-building, and practical cooperation alongside existing security partnerships.

The published proposal sets out a gradual sequence: regular consultations conducted by consensus; technical working groups and annual ministerial meetings as cooperation develops; and, with the participating states’ agreement, a small permanent secretariat in Muscat. Its role would be to maintain continuity, not to prescribe the region’s security order, and any broader institutional evolution would remain a decision for the states concerned.

Oman’s experience in maintaining channels across political divides gives it a valuable role in facilitating these arrangements, while the states of the region would determine their agenda, procedures, and pace of cooperation.

What Hormuz shows

The Strait of Hormuz offers a concrete example. In July 2026, Oman and Iran held talks in Muscat on maritime safety and freedom of navigation, agreeing to continue discussions at political and technical levels in accordance with international law. In August, their foreign ministers discussed a phased framework involving a possible temporary navigational corridor, joint mine clearance, information sharing, traffic management, and longer-term navigation arrangements. They also emphasized the importance of discussions with other regional states bordering the Gulf.

These were bilateral discussions and proposed arrangements. Their relevance to a wider regional process lies in the approach: a practical security problem was addressed through diplomatic and technical engagement, with international law as the stated basis.

A Muscat Protocol for Crisis Communication

I would strengthen the proposed process by making a limited maritime pilot its first operational priority. A voluntary, non-binding “Muscat Protocol” for crisis communication during maritime incidents and periods of heightened naval or military tension in the Strait of Hormuz could provide that starting point. It could begin with three practical commitments.

First, participating governments would designate permanent national points of contact, reachable around the clock and able to connect diplomatic and military authorities when an incident requires clarification.

Second, they would agree on basic procedures for notifying incidents and acknowledging messages. An initial notification could identify the time, location, and nature of an event; distinguish confirmed information from preliminary assessments; and request clarification. The purpose would be to establish enough shared information to reduce the risk of miscalculation while protecting sensitive intelligence.

Third, the channels would be tested through regular exercises. Officials should know whom to call, how a message is authenticated, and how unresolved questions reach the appropriate authorities before a real crisis puts the system under pressure. Oman could facilitate the development of these arrangements and, where participants agree, help relay communications when direct channels are unavailable.

This would provide an initial operational capability within a broader regional process. Participation could begin while strategic disagreements persist, with each state’s sovereignty, security interests, and obligations under international law preserved.

Predictability before trust

Operational clarity can come first, and predictability can then create the conditions in which greater confidence becomes possible. The distinction between threat perception and established facts matters here. A communication mechanism cannot make competing perceptions disappear or guarantee that every account will be accepted. It can give governments a better opportunity to question assumptions, clarify intentions, and assess an incident before deciding how to respond.

Its credibility should therefore rest on measurable performance: whether messages reach the designated officials, how promptly they are acknowledged, whether clarification procedures are used, and whether exercises reveal weaknesses that are subsequently corrected.

How the process would keep working

I would also design the process to keep practical cooperation functioning when political relations deteriorate. Consensus should establish the common framework, while rules agreed by all could allow willing states to undertake specific voluntary technical projects. A disagreement on one issue should not automatically stop work on every other issue.

Ministers should provide political direction, with national coordinators and technical groups responsible for implementation. A small secretariat could maintain contact lists, organize exercises, and track agreed actions. Confidential reviews after significant incidents, followed by an annual ministerial assessment of performance, would give the process a disciplined way to learn and improve. Participating governments would decide what, if anything, to make public.

Beyond the maritime pilot, similar habits of practical cooperation could extend to the protection of energy infrastructure and cyber resilience. Progress would depend on clearly defined tasks, agreed procedures, and results that participating states can assess.

Lessons from the Black Sea

For Romania, a Black Sea state with a direct stake in European and transatlantic security, this is not an abstract issue. Romania, Bulgaria, and Türkiye have developed practical cooperation through the Black Sea Mine Countermeasures Task Group. In July 2026, its mandate was expanded to include the protection of critical undersea infrastructure.

This cooperation rests on a different political foundation: the three countries are NATO allies. What it offers the Gulf is therefore specific. It shows how a defined security task can produce working procedures, sustained coordination, and a regional capacity that complements wider partnerships. Building comparable arrangements among states with conflicting interests would require its own patient diplomatic work.

Regional ownership

The credibility of the Muscat Process will ultimately depend on its regional ownership. The participating states would determine its agenda, procedures, and pace, while external partners could support the process where their contribution is useful and acceptable to the participants. The United States, Europe, and other partners possess capabilities, experience, and diplomatic reach that could complement regional arrangements, but the process itself should remain regionally anchored and open to all states of the region. Its value would lie precisely in creating a channel through which states with different security relationships and interests can communicate directly and manage practical risks together.

External support, such as the recent Oman-US consultations and Oman’s continuing, mostly bilateral engagement in different formats with regional, peripheral, and external players, can strengthen the multilateralization of the process, provided that it reinforces rather than substitutes for regional ownership.

Europe’s stake

Europe—likewise the wider Asian theater—has a direct stake as well. Its energy security, maritime trade, and supply chains are connected to stability in the Gulf. European support should respond to priorities defined by the participating states, including technical cooperation where requested. Reliable navigation and resilient infrastructure serve regional interests and the wider economies that depend on them.

Why timing matters

Communication channels are easiest to establish before they are urgently needed, because once governments are locked into adversarial positions, even routine contact can become politically difficult. That is why communication should be treated as part of security infrastructure: something organized, maintained, and tested before it comes under strain.

Reliable channels can help distinguish an accident from a deliberate act, clarify intentions, and reduce the risk that a defensive measure is interpreted as escalation. In doing so, they can strengthen the stability of deterrence and give decision-makers more room to act deliberately under pressure.

The strategic objective is predictability: communication that works, procedures that can be used, and practical cooperation that survives political tension. In a crisis, the time available for a decision may be measured in minutes. A regional process that helps governments use those minutes more wisely would provide a consequential security capability and a foundation for more ambitious cooperation.