Serbia Has Voted for Change. Is Brussels Ready for It?

Although Serbia's new parliament has not yet convened, one of its incoming MPs has already asked for the contracts for Expo 2027 to be examined.

Although Serbia’s new parliament has not yet convened, one of its incoming MPs has already asked for the contracts for Expo 2027 to be examined. Sanja Frić wants an independent commission to review major projects, including those approved under Aleksandar Vučić. If Serbia is moving closer to Europe, Frić’s idea may carry more weight than another statement from Brussels. By questioning how Belgrade makes decisions, the Student List won an election. Now it must decide whether those questions will continue to be raised when its own members hold power.

The movement began after sixteen people lost their lives when a canopy at Novi Sad railway station collapsed in November 2024. Students wanted to examine the renovation records and discover who had approved the work. When no answer was found, anger grew. The protests evolved into a challenge to the government. Vučić’s party lost its parliamentary majority after the 25 October election, when the Student List secured 140 of Serbia’s 250 seats. Although this was absolutely a rejection of Vučić’s style of government, it would be incorrect to also view it as an attempt to sever ties with Beijing or Moscow.

For years, Vučić was viewed in Brussels as the person capable of keeping negotiations over Kosovo going. Even after criticising his democratic record, European officials returned to him when further talks were required. There were reasons to keep contact with the government in power. The issue was that working with Vučić began to look almost the same as working with Serbia. While the EU warned that his government was weakening the institutions it wanted Serbia to develop, Vučić could convince supporters that foreign leaders needed him. That has all changed after the Student List’s victory. It is less clear what Brussels will do now.

The Student List does not propose the foreign-policy shift that some Europeans may have expected. Its programme states that the EU is Serbia’s most important economic partner but does not explicitly promise membership. It also does not endorse Kosovo’s independence and has ruled out sanctions on Russia. This is not a contradiction. The movement succeeded in uniting people with different views on these matters because its campaign focused on Serbia’s government at home. Supporters did not need to agree on Serbia’s place in Europe to agree that officials should be held accountable for their decisions.

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Moscow has already contacted the election winners. On 12 November, Student List representatives met the Russian ambassador in Belgrade, and the embassy reiterated that Russia backs Serbia over Kosovo. The incoming government also inherits the problem of NIS, the Russian-controlled company that operates Serbia’s only oil refinery and has been affected by US sanctions. Serbia still depends heavily on Russian energy. This will slow the pace at which Belgrade can change course, regardless of who takes office. Russia may lose its close ties to Vučić without losing the reasons Serbia continues to cooperate with it.

China’s interests are connected to a part of the Student List’s campaign. Chinese companies participated in the wider railway project that included Novi Sad. That does not mean they have been found responsible for the canopy collapse. It does, however, raise questions about how the contracts were managed. Beijing has said it is willing to cooperate with the new government, but that cooperation may now involve more questions about how projects were awarded. European companies should face similar inquiries. Otherwise, a movement centred on accountability could end up deciding which foreign investors deserve special treatment, much as the previous government did.

This is where Brussels can act. It does not need to force Serbia to stop working with China before supporting more transparent public bidding. Does it really need to wait for a Kosovo agreement before recognising improvements in Serbia’s courts? The EU already links funding to reforms. Its Western Balkans Growth Plan allocates around €1.6 billion to Serbia, with €167.6 million released by November. Rather than making another general promise about a European future, Brussels could explain which reforms would unlock further funds and how it would check that those reforms had actually happened. That would give the students something concrete to work towards.

Joining the EU is more difficult. The Commission’s report of 4 November found no substantive progress in Serbia’s accession negotiations during the period it assessed, which ended before the election. The Commission still considers Cluster 3, dealing with competitiveness and inclusive growth, technically ready to open. But it cannot make that decision alone; the member states have to agree. The overall pace also depends on the rule of law and progress in normalising relations with Kosovo. Serbia’s refusal to align with EU sanctions against Russia creates another obstacle. Winning an election does not remove those conditions, even if Brussels is pleased with the winners.

Although the students’ beating Vučić remains an important step for Serbia, Serbia still lacks a formed government. Looking into contracts will not mean much if the results are kept secret or the courts remain under political pressure. But the EU should be able to recognise changes when they happen without treating every foreign-policy disagreement as a reason to stop everything else. If the new majority really starts opening up public spending and strengthening the institutions that oversee it, Brussels will need to explain what that progress means. Serbia has been negotiating membership since 2014. After all those years, another friendly meeting will not be enough.

The difficult possibility for Europe is that a government elected on accountability may be harder to deal with than Vučić was. It may not agree to a deal over Kosovo, or it may push for public debate on issues that used to be handled privately. That would not automatically mean democracy had failed or that Serbia was moving away from Europe. It could simply mean Brussels is dealing with a government that has to answer more directly to its own voters. Whether Europe can work with that situation matters more than whether it misses the predictability of the leader those voters rejected.

Sofia Bartolani
Sofia Bartolani
I’m originally from both Rome and the US, and I’m currently based in Seoul, South Korea for my studies. I study Politics, Philosophy and Economics at LUISS University in Rome, and I’m mainly interested in international security and geopolitics, as well as the current role of AI in international relations.