China’s Red Sea Strategy: How Ports Could Expand Beijing’s Maritime Influence

China’s growing presence in Red Sea and Horn of Africa ports could shape future maritime security, sea lanes and military balances across the region.

The Chinese presence in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa ports and projects is deeply significant, given its connection to trade and supply chains and its potential to grant China future influence over maritime security, shipping lanes, and military balances. This Chinese presence in Red Sea and Horn of Africa ports and projects carries profound strategic implications that extend beyond simply securing current trade interests and supply chains. It clearly reflects a desire to shape future military and security balances in this vital region. This presence falls under Beijing’s grand strategy known as the Belt and Road Initiative (Maritime Silk Road), and its dimensions and future implications can be analyzed as follows:

1) Connection to Trade and Supply Chains (Economic and Geoeconomic Dimension):

China’s actions cannot be separated from protecting the lifeblood of its economy. The Red Sea and the Suez Canal represent the main artery for the flow of Chinese exports to Europe and a vital transit route for Gulf and African energy imports destined for Beijing. The implications of this economic presence are evident in:

– Structural acquisition of ports: Chinese companies (both state-owned and private) contribute to the development, operation, and management of a strategic port network stretching from Ain Sokhna, Port Said, and the Suez Canal Economic Zone in Egypt, through Port Sudan, to Djibouti and Mombasa in Kenya.

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– Securing supply chains: This expansion grants Beijing significant flexibility in managing the flow of goods and protects it from external shocks or any future Western attempts to impose an economic blockade.

2) Impact on maritime security and military balances (geopolitical and security dimensions):

– Evidence confirms that Chinese ambitions are not limited to trade. Beijing adopts the maritime power theory, which necessitates a parallel military presence to protect its vast economic interests and prevent the region from becoming an isolated Western lake. This is evident in several aspects:

–        Comparing the impact, its manifestations, and its strategic implications in terms of military bases and deployment, the Djibouti naval base (established in 2017) is China’s first overseas military base. This base grants Beijing the ability to project power, monitor the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and intervene rapidly to protect its citizens and interests. Regarding the (dual-use) nature of ports: This refers to the possibility of using them for both civilian and military purposes simultaneously. There are concerns that they could be transformed into military ports in times of conflict, tension, and disputes and used as leverage or bargaining chips, as in the case of Taiwan.

– Here, we find that China’s massive investments in commercial ports are designed to accommodate dual use. This means that civilian ports managed by Beijing can be transformed into logistical support centers and docking points for warships belonging to the People’s Liberation Army Navy during times of crisis or war.

– Regarding China’s efforts to counterbalance American and Western influence, its presence in the Red Sea aims to break the historical monopoly of Western powers (the US and France) and their allies in these waterways. This move is considered an indirect strategic response to American pressure and the extensive military presence in the South China Sea.

–        Furthermore, in terms of building regional security alliances, the Chinese are increasingly involved in providing security support, combating piracy, and selling military equipment to countries in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, thus strengthening Beijing’s role as an alternative security guarantor in the region.

– In this context, China utilizes economic tools, such as financing infrastructure projects, roads, railways, ports, and energy projects, to build long-term strategic influence in Africa. Such economic partnerships can be transformed into political and security leverage. China is heavily employing economic tools and infrastructure investment as a cornerstone for building long-term strategic influence in Africa, as clearly demonstrated by its massive Belt and Road Initiative.

In this context, China’s economic partnerships and development projects can gradually transform into instruments of political and security influence through several strategic mechanisms, including:

1) China’s economic influence tools (major projects):

China focuses on vital sectors that grant it indirect control over the backbone of the African economy, such as

– Transportation and logistics: through China’s financing and construction of key seaports, such as the (Doraleh port) in Djibouti, and massive railway networks, such as the (Mombasa-Nairobi line) in Kenya.

– Energy and infrastructure: through China’s construction of hydroelectric dams, power plants, and telecommunications networks (dominated by major Chinese companies, such as Huawei).

2) How does the economy translate into political influence for China?

– There is a well-known American and Western accusation against China known as the debt and economic dependency dilemma: On the one hand, China provides massive loans without political conditions (unlike the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and Western financial institutions). However, when some countries are unable to repay, they are forced to restructure the debt in exchange for political or sovereign concessions or grant China long-term management rights to vital infrastructure (a practice known strategically as debt-trap diplomacy). This is what China is constantly accused of in the West and the United States.

– Mutual diplomatic support: China leverages its economic weight in Africa to ensure that African countries (a significant voting bloc at the United Nations) vote in favor of its sensitive issues, such as the One China policy (the Taiwan issue), and defend Beijing’s human rights record.

3) How does China’s economic influence translate into security and military influence?

– This can be achieved through:

– Protecting Chinese investments as a pretext for military presence: With the increasing volume of Chinese investments and citizens in Africa, Beijing justified its need to establish its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017, citing the need to protect trade routes and combat piracy.

– Arms exports and training: China has become one of the largest arms suppliers to African countries. This coincided with joint military training programs and the construction of military colleges in some African countries, deepening loyalty and security dependence on Chinese technology.

– Chinese private security companies: Chinese private security companies have begun to emerge to protect oil sites, mines, and infrastructure projects in troubled regions of Africa.

Therefore, we conclude that the Chinese presence in Africa is a clever combination of soft power and economic influence and gradual military influence. It began as a pressing need to secure trade and supply chains, but over time it has transformed into a geopolitical tool that grants Beijing significant leverage and a proven future ability to influence maritime security and shipping lanes. This presence guarantees China a key role in shaping international military balances in one of the world’s most sensitive and conflict-ridden regions.

Dr.Nadia Helmy
Dr.Nadia Helmy
Associate Professor of Political Science, Faculty of Politics and Economics / Beni Suef University- Egypt. An Expert in Chinese Politics, Sino-Israeli relationships, and Asian affairs- Visiting Senior Researcher at the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies (CMES)/ Lund University, Sweden- Director of the South and East Asia Studies Unit