Beyond Expansion: Can BRICS Convert Economic Weight into Collective Power?

Authors: Janvi Singhi and Kanav Sharma*

BRICS is moving into a more meaningful phase in its evolution. Its larger membership, considerable resources, population, and markets position it as a voice for the global south. Nevertheless, the fact that the BRICS is economically big does not guarantee that it will turn into a powerful organization. The difficult question is whether BRICS will be able to use the potential of its diversified members to create the institutions and means of collaboration that will meet the needs and interests of different countries, businesses, and banks.

This is where the next chapter of BRICS collaboration will be decided. It is definitely not in need of aspiration. The main question is not whether BRICS will develop a common geopolitical approach but whether BRICS will be able to simplify the issues of cooperation for countries with divergent economic interests and institutional capabilities.

The enlargement of BRICS has brought about both a chance and an enigma. An increased number of members boosts the economic and diplomatic power of the group, but it also entails the presence of more currencies, regulations, economic systems, and foreign policy priorities. States such as India and China may share a desire to amplify the role of developing economies while being in competition with regard to trade, technology, and geopolitics. Resource-rich countries may have their priorities with respect to the manufacturing countries. Financial centers may deal with payment integration differently from countries interested in getting more monetary independence.

The key challenge before BRICS is not about making all the members agree about everything; rather, it is about creating means for cooperation between different countries in the areas where their interests coincide.

This differentiation is essential because BRICS is frequently assessed based on scale indicators, including population, economic output, energy resource reserves, and trade. While these parameters demonstrate the affiliation, the affiliation is not the key to institutional power. BRICS is still functioning as an informal coordinating mechanism and not as a supranational institution due to the absence of an establishing treaty, budget, and secretariat. The conversion of its total economic capabilities into total actions should rely substantially on its members’ coordination. BRICS needs to change its approach, so instead of pursuing expansion, it should focus on implementation.

The issue of cross-border payments can serve as an example. The necessity to improve payment processes within BRICS may be easily explained. International transactions require correspondent banks, multiple currencies, currency exchange, and several commissions. Using local currencies and interoperable payment systems may help reduce some of these expenses and create additional ways of settlements for countries.

However, establishing a new financial structure is much more difficult than just talking about it. The real barriers are technical and institutional: interoperability between national payment systems, regulatory compatibility, foreign exchange liquidity, cybersecurity, anti-money laundering and know-your-customer norms, settlement systems, and trust among the entities participating in the payment system. A domestic payment system cannot simply be hooked up to a foreign payment system without addressing these problems. This leads us to a more practical goal for BRICS countries. Instead of concentrating on the joint BRICS currency, they should work on interoperability among national payment systems.

The example of India’s UPI-PayNow linkage to Singapore shows how this principle works. Two entirely different payment systems can be interlinked without destroying their own systems. The same gap can be figured out at the level of BRICS if all necessary regulations, settlements, and risk management conditions are fulfilled. In order to understand how this can be achieved, BRICS can refer to the examples of other countries that have already applied the same logic.

The same issue of coordination can be observed in trade and supply chains as well. BRICS countries have complementary assets such as resources in energy, agriculture, manufacturing, minerals, technology, and large markets for consumer goods. However, having complementary resources does not automatically result in integrated supply chains.

Businesses need predictable customs, standards that will fit one another, reliable logistics, availability of finance, and clarity of regulation. If countries have different certification systems, digital documents, and technical standards, the theoretical advantages of a large BRICS market will not be fully realized. Therefore, standards will probably prevail over declarations in the end.

So far BRICS has spoken about cooperation of national standard organizations and overcoming technical barriers between trade. Further work is getting cooperation of national standard organizations transferred into standards that will be in demand in real business. Common standards for digital trade documents, selected product certification, customs data, payment systems, and technical standards can connect BRICS economies without full harmonization of their economies.

This method would make it easier to justify politically. There would not be a need for members to give up their power when it comes to buying a wider range of economic policies. The only thing left is for countries with technology to agree on their particular rules where technology will help provide measurable benefits.

The same goes for agricultural projects, as the BRICS countries share similar problems in the fields of food supply, climate, water conservation, and productivity. The BRICS has started pushing for agricultural research and cooperation. So, the question is not whether the BRICS countries have recognized these areas; they already have. The larger question is whether anything can be implemented across borders.

In a situation where one country has effective technology to grow crops and another one has a good way of bringing the crops to a field, BRICS has to find a way to transfer that knowledge or have an organization that can help in that transfer. There should be a value on the moves made regardless of whether formal treaties have been produced or not. This points towards a different institutional model for BRICS: modular cooperation.

BRICS needs to develop a model that allows all members to be part of the major framework and subgroups of interested members cooperating with each other in specific areas that require deep integration. Countries interested in making payments and settlements between them could organize a coalition in charge of finding and implementing technical solutions for that. Those ready to work jointly in the field of agriculture can proceed with agricultural cooperation, while others can focus on critical minerals, logistics, AI technologies, energy, and development finance.

This model recognizes one uncomfortable truth: diversity is BRICS’ asset, but it also acts as an obstacle in its functioning. In a highly heterogeneous grouping, it is impossible to expect rapid integration in view of the differences among its members. Compliance with the needs of all BRICS states only produces long negotiations and ambitious statements that do not work. Modular cooperation, in its turn, enables countries to pursue their own policy while being part of the larger framework.

Moreover, it could also establish a more trustworthy framework for testing. A limited number of members would be given the opportunity to run an initial test of payment or trading procedures, determine any legal or technological obstacles, and welcome other participants once the system is successful. The outcome would be a lowering of the chances of running into challenges that would be involved in the launch of a full project for all members simultaneously. BRICS should also reconsider its parameters of success.

Rather than concentrating on the number of members or the quantity of agreements accepted, BRICS should focus on the outcomes of its activities. There are political benefits to this strategy as well. BRICS will find it difficult to forge sustainable alternatives simply by selling them as counters in the geopolitical confrontation with the West. Governments and businesses respond not just to geopolitical signals but also to incentives. If the BRICS mechanism is cheaper, quicker, safer, and more efficient, then the chances of adoption increase.

This point is especially important for the discussion of de-dollarization. The reduction of dependence on dollar-based systems may in itself be a rational objective for some members; however, viewing de-dollarization as a success in and of itself can overshadow the distinction between geopolitics and economic efficiency. A payment mechanism can only gain credibility if banks and companies use it to solve a problem at hand.

India’s BRICS presidency in 2026 is an excellent opportunity to work on the practical implementation of the above approach. New Delhi can focus on enhancing cooperation based on interoperability and standards, collaboration of sectors, and measurable results. Instead of trying to create a homogenous group, India can create a framework where willing participants will devise their solutions for implementation by others.

Instead of striving to make BRICS like other supranational bodies, we should acknowledge the fact that, given its diversity of membership composition and structure, it is not realistic nor necessary. BRICS differentials provide a comparative advantage of allowing a mix of countries with both different political and economic systems that nevertheless share aspirations for greater policy autonomy and a voice in international affairs.

BRICS does not need to reach consensus on every issue to become successful. What it requires is to be able to determine areas where cooperation can be beneficial economically and create institutions able to do that.

Thus, the biggest problem is not the absence of power. The problem is how to convert power into capacity and capacity into institutions. If BRICS succeeds in this task, its economic capacity will transform from empty statistics into collective power. If it does not, then enlargement might improve visibility of the group, but its effectiveness would stay at the same level.

*Kanav Sharma is a Public Policy Researcher from Jammu & Kashmir with a postgraduate degree in English Literature from the University of Jammu. His interests include public policy, governance, parliamentary and strategic affairs.