Adam P. Liff’s book is a concise yet conceptually rich contribution to the study of the Taiwan Strait. It argues that the US allies are more autonomous, which is empirically convincing but not fully causal. While the book challenges US-centrism, it retains some pro-US framing and exaggerates the allies’ autonomy. It also downplays the institutional constraints and, particularly, China’s coercive nature and mutual economic dependence. The book offers strong comparative descriptive analysis but lacks predictive theorizing and modeling.
The introductory chapter situates the Taiwan Strait within intensifying US–China competition and examines the growing involvement of US allies. It distinguishes China’s “One China principle” from the US “One China policy” and presents strategic ambiguity as a transferable policy model while providing useful historical context since 1949. Chapter two demonstrates how US allies developed deliberately ambiguous positions that enabled unofficial engagement without formal recognition, arguing that these allies often “blazed trails” later followed by Washington. It also highlights the institutionalization of unofficial ties.
Chapter three examines regional allies, particularly Japan, Australia, and South Korea. Japan is convincingly presented as the most proactive ally and the linchpin of a Taiwan contingency due to its proximity, technological capabilities, economic strength, and international stature. Australia is portrayed as a cautious but increasingly securitized ally, raising questions about the extent of its strategic prioritization of Taiwan. South Korea’s hesitation is attributed primarily to the North Korean threat. However, this interpretation appears potentially biased, as it underplays the strategic importance of Chinese power in Taiwan for South Korea. More importantly, the chapter does not answer the central policy question: Will these allies actually fight for Taiwan? The discussion remains largely descriptive and fails to translate US objectives into concrete operational commitments.
Chapter four examines European allies, showing how they maintain the diplomatic status quo while expanding economic, political, and limited security engagement with Taiwan. This decoupling of recognition from engagement illustrates Taiwan’s growing internationalization and Europe’s increasing emphasis on a rules-based order. Yet deeper engagement may simultaneously increase uncertainty and escalation risks if China interprets it as tacit recognition of a new status quo.
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Finally, Liff argues that US allies play a major role in preserving Taiwan’s international space and stability. The book’s key contribution is moving beyond US-centric analyses. However, it arguably overstates allied agency by underestimating structural constraints imposed by US security assurances and Chinese coercion. Consequently, allies appear less as independent actors and more as constrained agents operating within great-power competition.
Key Weaknesses of the Book
US allies and the Taiwan Strait employ an analytical approach that is largely descriptive, rather than predictive, and therefore has limited predictive power. The book focuses primarily on legal-diplomatic accounts and underplays the role of military contingency planning, deterrence modeling, and war-gaming—all critical components for the analysis of the Taiwan Strait. It also fails to integrate the major theoretical paradigms (offensive realism, deterrence theory), thus reducing its explanatory power. The book offers a selective use of evidence, under-theorizes questions of economic interdependence and trade relationships with China, and under-explores instances where allies have supported US leadership. Second, it has biased statements and narrative-driven claims. It also fails to engage with alliance hierarchy or dependency theory, important topics for explaining asymmetrical alliances.
Moreover, the study is notably lacking in hard security analysis, such as military balance analysis, war games, and deterrence calculations, making it less relevant to a policy-oriented or think tank audience interested in the predictive power of the study on how actors will behave in a crisis. The text also exhibits a subtle normative leaning towards the liberal international order, with its focus on rules-based approaches and solidarity with democracy, which adds a dimension of value-laden judgement and undermines analytical objectivity. Finally, while China is depicted as a passive actor, its status as a key driver in the region—particularly through its coercive diplomacy—should be more thoroughly explored. It successfully addresses the question of “Who is important?” in the Taiwan Strait but fails to examine the more pressing question of “Who will do what in a crisis situation?”
Critical Insights from the Book
One of the book’s prominent weaknesses is its conflation of policy flexibility and strategic autonomy, which is unhelpful. The term “flexibility” is frequently used in the book, indicating the author’s approach leans more towards a response to constraints rather than to independent strategic choice in a US-driven international order. The argument presented in the book, that “allies contribute to policy innovation,” seemed more occasional rather than structural. As most are bound by alliance structures that constrain independent agency! Likewise, the European alliance and its engagement in the Taiwan Strait is often conflated with normative engagement, so that what is claimed to be strategic engagement is more likely indicative of symbolic deterrence with shallow operational capacity.
The term “allied agency” is itself normatively overstated and underspecified, with no clear indicators, such as defense commitment, economic influence, or crisis management capability. Although this book has done a good job of detecting the increasing multilateralization of the Taiwan issue and the changing global awareness of Taiwan’s role as a collective security issue, it has ultimately failed to answer the most important question: how will allies respond in a crisis? Lacking scenario analysis or a critical appraisal of ally decision-making in conflict scenarios, the study offers a detailed mapping of positions but tells us little about strategic realities.
