Trump’s economic strategy has widely been tied into the weaponisation of tariffs. The US-China trade war, beginning in 2018 during Trump’s first term, culminated in tariffs on American and Chinese goods worth a total of $735 billion, as of August 2020. Trump’s second administration continued the trade war, with American tariffs hitting 145% and Chinese tariffs 125% in April 2025. The tariffs on China have since decreased since then, although the scope of Trump’s tariffs beyond the US-China rivalry has remained cutting. Brazil has been in hot water over both of Trump’s administrations – his latest maneuver calls for 25% tariffs on a wide range of Brazilian goods. In response, Brazil’s President Lula da Silva has been spearheading MERCOSUR trade deals with alternative trade partners. He spoke with Xi Jinping recently on “expanding cooperation in strategic and high-technology areas.” Brazil is also in talks with South Korea to strengthen economic ties. In addition to this, the MERCOSUR-Singapore Free Trade Agreement recently came into force, further facilitating trade between Brazil and Singapore. Trump’s protectionist policies have aided in diversifying the Brazil’s market scope, having fundamentally pushed it towards Asian alternatives.
Brazil-US trade
According to the US Census Bureau, the US has exported goods worth $21.718 billion to Brazil throughout 2026 so far, with Brazilian imports totalling around $13.949 billion. The US exports raw materials ranging from rubber to minerals, and also refined oil products to Brazil. Brazil’s exports to the US mainly constitute crude oil and metals. According to the US Energy Information Administration, throughout 2026 (till May), Brazil exported a net 357,000 crude oil barrels per day (bpd) to the US. In the same period, the US exported 938,000 bpd of refined products, including hydrocarbon gas liquids, unfinished oils, motor gasoline, and other fuels. The US buys 3% of its total petroleum imports from Brazil. Given the lucrative nature of the trade relationship, it would have been beneficial for both countries to enter a free trade agreement. However, instead of freeing up trade pathways, the Trump administration has continually tariffed the country, putting the relationship under strain.
In early 2025, the Trump administration tariffed steel and aluminium imports by 25% worldwide, hitting Brazilian exports in the process. The Brazilian government, however, did not place reciprocal tariffs, stating that Trump’s strategy was not aimed at Brazil. In August 2025, the US placed 50% tariffs on a variety of Brazilian goods, claiming that the Brazilian government under Lula da Silva was committing politically motivated human rights violations. Brazilian media touted it as a maneuver against BRICS, the organization that sought to act as an alternative to Western hegemony and the power of the US dollar. Trump’s latest tariffs on Brazil hit goods at 25%, causing Brazil to seek World Trade Organization (WTO) arbitration against unfair American tariff targeting.
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Pivoting to Asia
After the latest 25% tariffs on Brazilian goods, Lula da Silva and China’s Xi Jinping have been in talks to strengthen bilateral cooperation and facilitate a trade deal between MERCOSUR and China. MERCOSUR, or the Southern Common Market, is spearheaded by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela, with other South American members as well. Brazil’s commitment to expediting the China partnership comes paradoxically after years of resistance to such a partnership. The primary variable underneath this sudden shift is the tangibility of the American tariff strain, prompting Brazil to look elsewhere for a reliable collaborator.
Brazil is also looking to South Korea as an alternative, evidenced by the 27th July meeting between Lula da Silva and South Korean President Lee Jae Myung aimed at reinforcing Brazil-South Korea economic and strategic ties. The contentious meeting paved the way for the entry of Brazilian beef into South Korean markets, earlier stalled due to Brazil’s inability to meet South Korea’s sanitation standards. Now, Seoul is committed to sending a “sanitary certification mission” to Brazil to facilitate the beef trade.
Singapore also entered into a free trade agreement with Brazil under the MERCOSUR-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (MCSFTA), signifying a commitment to tariff-free trade between the countries. Brazil’s primary exports to Singapore lie in fuels and metals, valued at $468 million in May 2026, while Singapore exports circuits and other technology, valued at $86.7 million. The FTA will expand Singapore’s sphere of firms in Brazil and further open the Singaporean market to Brazilian oil.
Conclusion
Trump’s protectionist tariff strategy has indiscriminately pushed Brazil towards Asian markets, prompting a shift towards countries like China, South Korea, and Singapore. The lack of an economic vacuum means that, despite America’s stringent attempts to cause Brazil’s market decline in the US, it can actively seek out alternatives that also go against American interests.
