When Andy Burnham entered 10 Downing Street on July 20, it was as the UK’s seventh prime minister in a decade. As the product of a turbulent domestic political climate, with the decline of the traditional two-party system and the rise of far-right party Reform UK, coupled with economic uncertainty, rising migration, and the still sore point of the UK’s 2016 decision to leave the European Union (EU), the political demands on the new prime minister are high. Added to this are the tumultuous changes taking place in global politics, with the wars in the Middle East and Ukraine, the growing rivalry between China and the US, and disruption of conventional US foreign policy priorities and alignments under President Trump. What, then, might Burnham’s accession imply for the foreign policy of this geopolitically significant country, and for global politics more broadly?
Changing the Cabinet
A clue comes from Burnham’s rotations in the cabinet, appointing John Healey finance minister in the new cabinet, wh notably resigned from his position as Defence Secretary under Keir Starmer when the Treasury refused to increase UK defence spending to 3% of GDP by 2030. This suggests that the foreign policy of the new prime minister will pivot toward increased military spending and defence investment by removing previous fiscal obstacles and cabinet divisions.
Moreover, the appointments of former Secretary of State for Energy, Ed Miliband—known for his progressivism and focus on climate change—as Foreign Secretary, and the relatively inexperienced Wes Streeting as Secretary of Defense suggest that the UK under Burnham may strive for a more active and progressive role on the international stage, while pursuing a foreign policy that feels closer to home and less elitist among the British electorate. An early indication of this is Burnham’s declaration of pursuing greater strategic autonomy and self-sufficiency within energy and AI, which could be seen as an attempt to simultaneously scale up the UK’s use of renewable energies to combat climate change, while simultaneously addressing the key domestic issue of living costs brought to the fore by the energy shock resulting from the war in the Middle East and its chokehold on global fossil fuel supplies.
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The end of the ‘special relationship’?
Burnham’s declaration also suggests that the UK will distance itself from the US, and seek alternative alignments to reduce its susceptibility to the political capriciousness of the US President. While Burnham’s predecessor tried to appease President Trump in response to the US’ imposing tariffs on its historically ‘special’ ally, Streeting has vocally condemned US-supported Israel’s actions in Gaza and called for increased sanctions, while Miliband has resisted the expansion of oil and gas exploitation in the North Sea, against the exhortations of the US President to ‘drill’ and exploit these energy sources.
A guardian of multilateralism
In addition, Miliband’s overt committment to international law, multilateral institutions, the inclusion of the global south, and emphasis on ambitious climate change policy indicates that the UK may pick up the torch as a leader for international cooperation and multilateralism that the US under President Trump has repeatedly renounced and undermined in word and action. As such, Burnham’s premiership might help preserve the tattered multilateral system. This is reinforced by Burnham’s strong commitment to deepen ties with NATO and other allies such as Canada and the EU, while diverging from a long foreign policy tradition by notably denoting the US as a ‘critical’ instead of ‘special’ partner. Thus, some analysts predict that the UK will seek to use its Chairmanship of the G20 summit next year to scale up international climate ambitions and form alternative international alignments to increase its strategic interests and security.
Domestic hurdles
Even so, it remains to see to what extent Burnham will be able to follow through on these ambitions. For one, the Labor PM faces strong pressure from labor unions to approve of the new North Sea projects for fossil fuel extraction. And with Reform UK pulling working class supporters from the Labor Party, and polling as the UK’s biggest party, Burnham cannot afford to pursue policies that appear to actively aggravate the UK’s key electoral concerns of rising unemployment and cost of living. Thus, the appointment of Miliband could be seen as less indicative of foreign policy objectives than as a tactful way for Burnham to remove the energy department’s resistance under Miliband to fossil fuel drilling, without alienating his main rival within the party. Moreover, Healey’s fiscal ambitions for the Defence Department may need to be financed by domestically unpopular tax hikes, and may thus prove politically unfathomable for Burnham by threatening to enhance popular sympathy for the populist rhetoric and promises of Reform.
The lingering specter of Brexit
Similarly, Burnham has been described as EU-friendly. His emphasis on enhancing the UK’s ‘sovereign capabilities’ aligns with European ambitions of reducing its reliance on external actors for strategic assets like critical minerals and AI and may thus pave the way for a deepening rapprochement between the UK and the EU. Thus, while Labor remains firmly against further economic reintegration with the EU in terms of a new customs union or single market, Burnham seems to open up for a deepening of strategic and security cooperation between the UK and the EU. However, Burnham must tread carefully on this issue as well; a deepening of EU cooperation, even if limited to certain issues, might pose a domestic political threat by feeding supporters to Reform’s staunch Brexit agenda.
A domestic focus
All of this points to a key consideration. Burnham has built his political career on his vision of ‘Manchesterism,’ which includes the expansion of social services and the public sector, the devolution of political decision-making to regional and local levels of government, and alleviating cost of living issues. This heavy emphasis on domestic issues and objectives suggests that foreign policy ambitions may stay on the back burner of UK politics for some time to come—or at least until Burnham and Labor may have consolidated their domestic position against Reform UK enough to feel comfortable undertaking more radical foreign policy reforms. Thus, until the next election—scheduled for 2029—the UK may remain a more introverted actor in global politics.
