In recent years, Vietnam has been promoting railway infrastructure development projects as an essential part of its strategy to modernize the economy and integrate into the regional supply chain. Notable among these are two major projects that the government has placed high hopes on: the 1,541 km North-South high-speed railway worth 67 billion USD and the Lao Cai-Hanoi-Hai Phong railway of nearly 391 km with a total investment of more than 8.3 billion USD, which was just approved in May 2025. Both projects not only reflect Vietnam’s development aspirations but also demonstrate the complex geopolitical problem that Hanoi is having to choose between China, Japan, and the United States as its support partner.
Most Vietnamese people would prefer Japanese or European contractors because of their reliability and long-standing experience. However, China is no new player in this field. Beijing’s railway footprint in Southeast Asia is no slouch. Under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China sees railway projects as a strategic lever in Southeast Asia. In 2021, Laos inaugurated a Chinese-funded high-speed railway connecting Vientiane to Kunming. Now, China has every opportunity to replicate this model in Vietnam.
During President Xi Jinping’s state visit to Hanoi in April 2025, the two countries agreed on many strategic connectivity issues, conducting feasibility studies on two new intermodal railways: from Fangchenggang (Guangxi) to Hanoi and from Shenzhen to Haiphong. China pledged to fund the entire research phase and wants to integrate these lines with the China-Laos-Thailand railway network, aiming to increase its influence in mainland transport in Southeast Asia. In particular, China also expressed its intention to provide capital and technology for the Lao Cai-Hanoi-Haiphong route, a strategic transport route that will shorten the flow of goods from southwestern China to Vietnamese seaports. Technically, China has the capacity to build high-speed railways in complex terrain and at 30–40% lower costs than Japan or Europe.
Will Vietnam accept technology from China?
Despite China’s goodwill, Vietnam remains cautious. The North-South high-speed railway project is a prime example. After more than a decade of debate, the Vietnamese National Assembly has reached a consensus on Resolution 187, approving the project by the end of 2024, with a budget of more than 67 billion USD.
However, Vietnam’s history of railway construction has seen projects that took “a decade” to complete. This time, instead of being completely dependent on foreign contractors like the Cat Linh–Ha Dong line (implemented by China, famous for many delays and cost overruns), Vietnam is pursuing a model of “domestic-foreign cooperation.” Domestic enterprises such as THACO (Truong Hai Auto) or VinSpeed (VinGroup) are encouraged to cooperate with partners from Japan, Korea, or Germany to acquire technology, improve domestic capacity, and reduce dependence.
Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh has emphasized that development must come from core competencies, including technology transfer and domestic capacity development. For Hanoi, an issue that must be resolutely ensured is that infrastructure development must go hand in hand with sovereignty protection. Because of Vietnam’s geography, with its long but narrow shape in Central Vietnam (Central Vietnam), this is also a vital traffic route that is easily cut off even by natural disasters, thereby closely related to the issue of national security.
So far, Vietnam has neither rejected nor completely accepted the use of Chinese technology in high-speed railways. For the Lao Cai–Hai Phong–Hanoi railway, the possibility of applying Chinese technology is quite high due to regional connectivity and China’s willingness to provide preferential loans and support feasibility studies.
However, this does not mean that China will be present in key North-South high-speed railway projects. Meanwhile, routes such as the urban metro in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City can flexibly prioritize suitable partners to ensure quality and trust. The Vietnamese Ministry of Transport recently affirmed that it will prioritize partners with high safety standards and financial transparency. The criteria are often associated with reputable contractors from Japan or European countries rather than China. However, the costs associated with Japanese technology are also very high. Partners from Korea and Germany are also actively proposing cooperation options, giving Vietnam more options.
The biggest issue now is not just the choice of technology or investment costs, but also Vietnam’s overall strategy in balancing among major partners. In the near future, Vietnam will need a transparent, internationally competitive bidding mechanism, with a focus on independent assessment of long-term efficiency, not just initial costs.
Hanoi will always maintain strategic balance.
Vietnam’s “railway diplomacy” strategy cannot be separated from the long-standing goal of “strategic balance” in its foreign policy. Hanoi does not want to be seen as leaning towards either side. Although China is a major trading partner of particular importance to the economy, the history of border conflicts and ongoing maritime disputes make it difficult for Vietnam to fully trust a partner that poses political risks.
On the contrary, if Vietnam leans too much towards the United States or its partner Japan—an ally of the United States—it may face backlash from Beijing and affect other areas such as border exchanges, tourism, or economic cooperation.
Hanoi’s strategy is therefore layered, ensuring compliance with its foreign policy doctrine called “Bamboo Diplomacy,” which is built on a historical foundation of opposing external interference and promoting national interests. Thus, Vietnam is willing to accept China’s limited role in regional interprovincial railways serving imports and exports, such as Lao Cai–Hai Phong (where both sides benefit), but firmly maintains its initiative in routes such as the North–South arterial line of national security importance.
In conclusion, high-speed railways are not only a matter of domestic or regional transport corridors but also the clearest manifestation of geostrategic orientation. Vietnam will not choose China for every high-speed railway route, but it will not completely eliminate the possibility of cooperation, especially in routes that connect the region with China, when capital, progress, and geopolitical factors are suitable. Each choice of technology partner, capital source, and technical cooperation sends a message about Vietnam’s political orientation in the context of increasingly complex US-China competition. As China increasingly promotes cross-border infrastructure integration, Vietnam needs to carefully consider the balance between utilizing external resources and maintaining strategic autonomy. The future railway network will not only be routes built with steel but also roads built with the spirit of demonstrating the resilience of the Vietnamese people in the midst of the regional geopolitical vortex.
