On May 28, 2025, Cambodian and Thai soldiers clashed in a brief gunfight along the disputed border in Northern Cambodia/Northeast Thailand along the Chong Bok border. The armed clash has so far led to two confirmed deaths from the Cambodian military. The recent round of clashes is the latest between the Southeast Asian nations since the coming to power of the Puea Thai-led government in late 2023. The military conflict is the most recent in a series of disputes that center around temples along the Cambodia-Thailand land border and islands along the countries maritime border. Simmering nationalisms, always just beneath the surface, have reignited. The Thai government has been late in responding, while Cambodia is attempting to internationalize the dispute.
Territorial Boundaries Between Cambodia and Thailand
The two Southeast Asian countries share both a land and maritime boundary. The land boundary is 798 kilometers in length. The border begins in the tri-nation area between Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand and runs to the Gulf of Thailand. Presently, only 155 kilometers are still in the grey area, having been delimited but not demarcated, with the rest fully demarcated. The maritime boundary is not demarcated, and negotiations between the disputants have been few.
Recent clashes center around the Ta Muen temple complex, which consists of a number of temples, including Ta Muen Thom, Ta Muen Tod, and Ta Muen Kwai. The temples lie in an area that has not been delimited between the two nations. The agreement between Cambodia and Thailand provides Thailand with effective control over the temple complex and adjacent areas. Furthermore, the agreement allows for unarmed Army Rangers (ทหารพราน) from both countries to facilitate tourists and civilians to access the temple complex seven days a week between 9:00 and 15:00.
Escalations and Military Clashes
An uneasy but seemingly durable peace had existed since 2009 at the temple complex. Recently, in February 2025, Cambodian villagers began visiting the temple and singing the Cambodian national anthem, causing temperatures to rise. Governor of Mean Chanyada province, Oddar Meanchey, further encouraged villagers to head to the temple and sing patriotic songs. The heated exchange involved a high-ranking Cambodian military commander who appeared to be with the villagers, which provoked an exchange of words and subsequent diplomatic activity to quell tensions. Given the high-level officials engaged, Thai officials questioned whether this was a localized incident or part of a larger process to escalate tensions.
After a brief pause, clashes erupted on May 28 when military units of both armies engaged in a short firefight, resulting in the death of two Cambodian soldiers. Since the clash, both sides have withdrawn 200 meters, while reinforcements numbering in the thousands have been sent.
Attempting Internationalization and Realities
Since the clashes of May 28, former PM Hun Sen has been active online, posting opinions that some on the Thai side consider to be inflammatory. Hun Sen has accused the Thai side of encroaching on Cambodian land, murdering Cambodian soldiers, and reminiscing about other Khmer temples in Thailand. He has further intimated that the conflict could escalate to be a Gaza; the bilateral 2000 MOU framework is outdated, with the Cambodian parliament having resolved to send the issue to the ICJ.
Presently, both countries have agreed to meet in Phnom Penh on June 14 under the rubric of the Joint Boundary Committee, which will not discuss the current dispute. In the meantime, Cambodia continues to threaten Thailand with an ICJ case. The internationalization of the issue is important as it appears to be the objective of the Cambodian side and deserves attention, as this question will dictate the future direction of the dispute.
The disposition of a possible International Court of Justice (ICJ) dispute settlement is historically bound and grounded in international law. The Temple Case concerning Preah Vihear Temple began in 1959, with judgment rendered in 1962 by the ICJ. Prior to the conclusion of the case, Thailand rejected jurisdiction; however, the Thai side participated in the original case. The previous participation is the reason Thai officials were present and argued the case in the final ICJ judgement in 2013 after nationalist tensions flared under the Aphisit government.
Under international law, the ICJ has compulsory jurisdiction via Article 36 of the ICJ statute. Article 36 provides ICJ jurisdiction in four circumstances.
1. The interpretation of a treaty;
2. Any question of international law;
3. The existence of any fact that, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; and
4. The nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.
Given that there is no treaty between the two counties concerning the territory, point 1 can be dismissed. Point 2 would be a lead from the previous but concerns issues such as use of force, breaches of sovereignty, and sovereign immunity, which at this point are not extensive. Point 3 cannot be established, as there is no formal legal agreement other than the 2000 MOU, which binds the parties to negotiate towards an agreement, which they have not. Furthermore, the current Point 4 is moot, as no obligation can be ascertained, as no agreement has been reached.
The ICJ has compulsory jurisdiction on treaties to which states are parties, issues of international law, and issues of international law to which states consent. Since 1960, Thailand has rejected ICJ jurisdiction and will continue to do so in the future. States cannot be forced into ICJ proceedings, as participation must be consensual.
Likely Motivations and Implications
There are two likely motivations for Cambodian provocations in this instance, and the answer lies in domestic politics. Recent tariffs announced by the Trump administration on ‘liberation day’ put Cambodia at the top of the list with a 49% tariff. Cambodia was one of the first countries to respond and offer concessions, but this will not offer enough to spare the poor country. Exports account for 40% of Cambodia’s GDP, with the USA representing 27% of the total. Even a reduced tariff of 10% will hit the Cambodian economy and workforce hard. Labor and political unrest are possibly on the horizon.
PM Hun Manet is still young, newly elected, and lacking his father’s political power and clout. In the recent generational turnover of Cambodian politics, General Tea Seiha took over the Ministry of Defense from his father, Tea Banh. Tea Seiha appears to lack the iron will of his father, and there is factionalism in the military.
Former PM Hun Sen has been conspicuous on Facebook. This demonstrates a clear divide, with Hun Sen driving politics from the Senate and Minister Mentor. It is commonly known that the current clash consisted of soldiers brought in from outside of the local area on the Cambodian side. It is further understood that these regiments are under the command of Hun Sen, who still exercises significant influence in political affairs.
The likely motivations for this escalation are within the realms of Cambodian political economy. Fanning the flames of nationalism is helping to rally support on the Cambodian side of the border. Primary factors on the Cambodian side are economic headwinds, which may cause uncertainty for regime stability given the recent handover of power, and seem to be the primary factors driving the events.
Concluding Thoughts
PM Hun Manet has not done much of note since taking office and is facing economic difficulties and uncertainty. One militating factor is the lack of an effective Cambodian opposition, which has been shattered since its near electoral victory in 2013. If there were an opposition, the risk would be far higher. As of this writing, the Cambodian army has reinforced its positions with over 10,000 troops and heavy weapons, while Thailand has closed all border crossings.
A bombshell dropped on June 18 when Hun Sen released a recording of private conversations between himself and Thai PM Paethongtarn, which now threatens Thai government stability. The second largest party in the government coalition has withdrawn, and public pressure is building rapidly for the Thai PM to resign.
