What East Asia’s Tech Industry Loses with Jensen Huang

Jensen Huang’s departure has sent shockwaves through the global AI industry.

Jensen Huang’s departure has sent shockwaves through the global AI industry. The epicenter may be in the United States, but the tremors in East Asia—especially Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea—are no less severe than in Silicon Valley. The entire Nvidia-centric supply chain has, until now, been in the same boat as Huang.

Without him, Japanese, South Korean, and Taiwanese markets quickly lost their upward momentum and mostly closed lower. U.S. stocks briefly plunged amid rising U.S.-China tensions in AI chips. Many expected Chinese equities to rally, yet A-shares opened higher and then fell. The reason is simple: China’s supply chain is deeply tied to Nvidia, especially in AI server chassis, PCBs, optical modules, liquid cooling, packaging materials, and testing.

East Asia’s exposure to Huang has been concentrated in hardware—chips and data center infrastructure. But these suppliers also serve AMD and Broadcom. So, at the order-book level, even if Nvidia’s orders weaken, demand from its rivals may rise, much as U.S. markets have already begun to reflect.

What East Asian suppliers fear most is not whether Nvidia survives, but whether Huang’s departure has also taken away the AI industry’s boom.

Stay ahead of the geopolitical week.

MD Briefing delivers expert analysis across five global fronts — the Indo-Pacific, energy, geoeconomics, European security, and the Middle East — every Monday morning. Free.

Here, boom, bubble, and mirage are nearly synonymous.

U.S. analysts eager to protect the narrative argue that Huang’s personal scandal will not “prick” the AI bubble. There is some logic to that view: sustaining the current investment cycle serves the shared interests of America’s AI giants. But the situation is not so simple.

As the most profitable AI company, Nvidia has effectively been transfusing liquidity into its peers through its profits, credit, and commercial arrangements. The goal is to entrench the ecosystem built around its technology and secure a dominant position. That strategy, in turn, depends on keeping the investment environment hot.

Yet such “transfusions” are risky. If Nvidia’s CEO lacked ambition and a willingness to take bold bets, the current boom would not have emerged, would not have lasted, or would not have reached this scale.

Huang’s so-called “founder premium” was precisely that combination of ambition and risk appetite. It was both gold and a self-detonating device. If the macro environment turns, the same model can produce credit downgrades, bad debts, and a deeply unattractive balance sheet—even while the company remains profitable.

Circular financing, customer guarantees, equity stakes in major clients, boundary-pushing investments, pre-emptive capacity commitments, and an aggressive organizational style—all of these are the gambler’s moves of a founder betting on dominance. Success sends the company soaring; failure brings a sharp fall.

It is easy to imagine how anxious Huang’s major customers, partners, and guaranteed counterparties must now feel. In short, the deep-pocketed patron who showered money and provided cover has fallen. Those urgently needing free cash flow cannot help but panic.

The bad news does not stop there. The U.S. midterm elections have already complicated the outlook for data centers. For other AI giants and their supply chains, this primary cash-generating machine may keep running, but it will no longer “spit out cash” as smoothly as before.

According to U.S. energy research firm Cleanview, 41 percent of the nation’s planned power transmission lines are located in states whose newly elected governors support pausing them.

Admittedly, the Democratic Party’s real stance toward data centers is not as sharp as during the campaign season. But voter resistance has been ignited, making compromise difficult.

The key question is whether Huang’s downfall signals that Washington intends to exert deeper control over Nvidia, turning it into part of an institutionalized military-industrial complex. If so, the main issue for East Asian supply chains is whether military orders can replace any decline in data center demand.

The answer is not hard to guess: they cannot.

For China’s supply chain, the implication is clear. If the Trump administration uses “national security” to blunt opposition in Congress, a militarized Nvidia would have to decouple from Chinese suppliers as much as possible.

For Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, military AI demand differs sharply from data center demand: order volumes are smaller, regulation is stricter, and the supply chains are not interchangeable. If events move in this direction, the supply chain will undergo a reshuffle, with greater uncertainty in the near to medium term.

Huang was widely seen as “China-friendly” and as the gatekeeper of re-export trade. Chinese AI companies faced fewer obstacles—and more regulatory gray areas—when indirectly accessing Nvidia products. His departure therefore amounts to closing many of those routes.

Chinese firms may still seek alternative channels. The difficulty will rise, but a gray market may not disappear entirely. Supply-chain decoupling is different: it involves legitimate business on a significant scale, and can easily be thrown onto the U.S.-China strategic bargaining table.

Can a successor still follow Huang’s playbook? Very unlikely. This is not just an industry event; it is also a political one. If Huang is a political casualty, his strategic path is likely to be erased. The possibility that he could rule from behind the scenes appears even slimmer.

In other words, Nvidia is no longer the Nvidia it once was. The AI industry’s development will face “system lag” as multiple political, regulatory, and commercial frictions accumulate.

This is certainly not an episode that can be whitewashed by saying “Huang’s personal life will not drag down the entire industry.” It is a turning point, with more—not fewer—uncertainties ahead.

For East Asia’s supply chains, the fear is not the rise and fall of a single company, but a sudden shift in the broader environment. Losing Jensen Huang may well mean losing a golden era.

Yen Mo
Yen Mo
Yen Mo, a freelance writer. He is a commentator on current affairs in Taiwan and has written extensively in the China and Taiwan media, focusing on political affairs in Taiwan, China and the United States, as well as analysis of the technology industry. Email:decdive[at]gmail.com