The November 3 midterm elections delivered a major setback to President Donald Trump and the Republican Party. Democrats regained control of both chambers of Congress, securing victories in traditionally Republican states such as Texas, Kansas and South Carolina. The results reflected widespread frustration with the administration’s handling of the economy and its ongoing war with Iran, positioning Democrats to exert greater influence over Washington’s legislative agenda during the final two years of Trump’s presidency (Ax et al., 2026).
For European governments, the outcome raises questions about the future of transatlantic relations, particularly American support for Ukraine. Democratic lawmakers have expressed their intention to restore assistance to Kyiv, although Trump retains considerable authority over foreign policy and can veto legislation passed by Congress (Zengerle et al., 2026).
The election may offer Europe an opportunity to strengthen cooperation with Washington, but it does not guarantee a change in American policy. How much can the new Congress accomplish, and will its efforts be enough to restore European confidence in the United States?
The incoming Democratic majority could give Ukraine a stronger voice in Washington. According to Reuters, Democratic lawmakers in both chambers intend to make renewed assistance to Kyiv a priority when the new Congress convenes in January 2027. Congress has not approved a major new Ukraine aid package since Trump returned to office in January 2025, leaving Kyiv increasingly dependent on European support (Zengerle et al., 2026).
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With control of both chambers, Democrats could advance new funding legislation, negotiate military assistance through defense spending bills and investigate the administration’s handling of existing aid commitments. Their Senate majority would also give them greater influence over the confirmation of senior officials responsible for implementing American foreign policy (Council on Foreign Relations, 2026).
However, passing legislation does not guarantee that Ukraine will receive additional assistance. Trump can veto bills he opposes, and overriding a presidential veto requires a two-thirds majority in both chambers. Democrats would therefore need substantial Republican support to overcome his objections. Although some Republican lawmakers have previously supported Ukraine aid, securing enough votes remains uncertain (Zengerle et al., 2026).
Even if Congress approves new funding, the administration will retain considerable influence over how assistance is delivered. The election has improved Kyiv’s prospects in Congress, but the practical effects will depend on whether congressional Democrats can turn their majority into legislation that the White House is willing, or legally compelled, to implement.
For Ukraine, the timing of any renewed American assistance is just as important as the amount provided. Russian attacks on energy infrastructure and civilian areas have intensified ahead of winter, increasing Kyiv’s demand for air-defense systems. On October 26, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy complained that Ukraine had waited nearly a month for Washington to authorize deliveries of missiles for its Patriot and NASAMS systems. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio acknowledged that some interceptors might have been delayed, although he denied that the delay was politically motivated (Reuters, 2026a).
Washington subsequently approved a $2.1 billion sale of 500 Patriot PAC-3 interceptors on October 30. The proposed sale could significantly strengthen Ukraine’s air defenses, with funding coming partly from European allies. However, Reuters reported that the missiles have yet to be manufactured and may not arrive until the early 2030s. Ukraine
has therefore requested faster deliveries from existing American stockpiles (Stone et al., 2026).
European governments have attempted to fill some of these gaps. Through NATO’s Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL), allies can purchase American-made weapons for Kyiv. Britain, for example, committed £100 million in September to help supply air-defense equipment before winter (UK Ministry of Defence, 2026).
These developments highlight a problem that a Democratic Congress cannot immediately solve. Even if lawmakers secure additional funding, Ukraine’s ability to defend its cities depends on production capacity, delivery schedules and decisions made by the administration. For Kyiv, a promise of future assistance offers little protection against missiles arriving today.
European officials have reacted to the Democratic victory with cautious optimism. EU officials hope that a more sympathetic Congress will improve cooperation on Ukraine, particularly in securing deliveries of American weapons. According to Euronews, European diplomats have expressed optimism about renewed military assistance, while acknowledging that the election does not eliminate their disagreements with the Trump administration (Jones, 2026). However, some European officials fear that Trump’s domestic defeat could make his foreign policy less predictable. With Congress
increasingly hostile to his legislative agenda, the president may concentrate on international affairs, where he retains greater freedom to act.
Almut Möller of the European Policy Centre warns that European governments could find themselves caught between a supportive Congress and a White House pursuing its own diplomatic objectives, especially concerning Russia and Ukraine (Möller, 2026).
European governments could also expand their contacts beyond the White House. Armida van Rij and James Green of the Centre for European Reform argue that European governments should develop closer ties with Congress, individual American states and future political leaders. Such relationships may not produce immediate policy changes, but they could help preserve transatlantic cooperation beyond Trump’s presidency (van Rij and Green, 2026).
Nevertheless, Europe cannot base its security planning on the outcome of American elections alone. Greater investment in European defense capabilities and closer coordination among NATO’s European members remain necessary, regardless of which party controls Congress. The Democratic victory may improve the political atmosphere, but rebuilding trust will require consistent American commitments rather than another favorable election result.
The Democratic takeover of Congress offers Ukraine renewed hope for American assistance, but its impact will depend on whether lawmakers can overcome opposition from the White House and deliver meaningful support
For Europe, the election creates an opportunity to work with a more sympathetic Congress while reinforcing the need for greater defense independence. European governments cannot assume that one electoral victory will reverse the uncertainty of recent years.
The midterms have changed the balance of power in Washington. Whether they can also restore America’s credibility as a reliable partner will depend on what happens after the new Congress takes office.
