The West and Russia have been entangled in prolonged, decades long tensions before. Now, with the demise of new START in Feb 2026, a treaty that legally bound both countries whose strategic rivalry has shaped the Euro-Atlantic region. START, a strategic arms reduction treaty, that was first signed in 1991, and START II that was signed in 1993. Both were eventually outmoded in 2010 signed by Moscow and Washington, which expired earlier this year. Until its expiry, it had capped both countries’ ability to deploy arms and provided extensive data exchanges and inspection mechanisms that replaced transparency with secrecy between the world’s two largest nuclear powers.
Capping on arms serves more purpose than just to stick to reducing arsenals. It clears the fog of unpredictability, miscommunication, and lessens the risks of miscalculation. Until its expiry, this treaty has apparently put chains on Russia, and the US. Now, Europe is exposed to the whims and calculations of both countries, where guardrails are disappearing when the confrontation between the said countries escalates. On top of that, recent warnings from Moscow over Kaliningrad show why it matters. The undercurrent of this shift peeks through the erosion of arm control agreement, a threat for Europe where the NATO and Russian forces sit in close proximity and a recent dispute surrounding Kaliningrad.
Kaliningrad, Russia’s most famous exclave, and a dagger at the heart of Europe. It is sandwiched between Poland and Lithuania, both NATO members. This unique placement makes it more attention demanding and prone to whatsoever change that is about to come. It causes a state of mere conjecture from both sides, as Russia uses it as a military outpost in Europe, a base for naval forces in the Baltic Sea and a location where Russia can deploy missiles in future.
At the end of September, Moscow let loose a severe warning for NATO that it would be ready to resort to nuclear weapons if the Washington-led bloc attempted to cut off Kaliningrad, and accused the alliance of a “dangerous and reckless course” that entailed “high risks of the outbreak of a direct armed conflict”, Reuters stated. And in response to that, NATO rejected all the allegations that it attempted to blockade the exclave and condemned what is described as irresponsible nuclear rhetoric.
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The concern has now surpassed the discussion of whether a blockade is plausible in future. It is that the war of words has started circulating around nuclear weapons in strategic communication across Europe. The threats that used to haunt nations have now come out of the woodwork and into the debates from both sides. This development should concern both and the rest in the region.
The policy debate often focuses on nuclear stockpiles and these recent events unfold a concern that can Europe remain stable after this change? The unsettling answer is that Europe is partially prepared for a time which has no nuclear rulebook. But NATO’s conventional deterrence capabilities upgrade since 2022 have given much leverage to Europe to defend itself. Its security cooperation has become stronger than it was ever before. Britain and France have also extended a security umbrella over the rest of the continent. Yet previous preparedness should not be confused with nuclear governance. It, now, does have substantial military might but has weaker arms-control architecture. Nevertheless, it has less transparency and fewer strategies to manage escalation. That distinction matters. Europe has almost never been included in nuclear risk talks that took place between Moscow and Washington.
Without a rulebook, Kaliningrad is not just Russia’s exclave but Europe’s fault line
These warnings that are issued by Moscow impart what lies ahead of Europe. Whether it be rhetorical assault from the heirs to the cold war rivalry, or blurring of strategic red lines. The crux of the matter is not that Europe is entering uncharted waters with a looming nuclear threat, but is that it is transitioning into that time without a clear book of rules that have prevented misunderstanding in the past, if at all. The fact that START did not eliminate rivalry but it gave rules with teeth. Compliance was not optional. In the current landscape, Europe is learning to walk in a time without arm-control guardrails, it has long relied upon. Along this, the INF Treaty, Europe drew a deal of comfort from its presence and has been collapsed since 2019. Therefore, the conventional arms control regime in the region has worn out.
The only nuclear powers that Europe has are France and the United Kingdom. Recently, efforts began to solidify Franco-British nuclear cooperation and showcased growing tension among European countries regarding long-term deterrence and strategic autonomy. While, Russia demanded the inclusion of British and French arsenal in the future disarmament talks between Washington and Moscow, because they form part of Europe’s broader strategic balance. In principle, the argument seems valid. Yet their inclusion incurs practical difficulties. Despite the fact, their arsenals are smaller than those of Russia and the United States. France deliberately designed a deterrent to remain outside the US-Russian arrangements. While Britain’s nuclear posture remains integrated into NATO deterrence structures having national control over its use decisions. Their involvement in the negotiations would possibly add complexity into the existing process.
Russia sees this inclusion necessary for strategic balance but European governments may view it as an attempt to jeopardize NATO’s nuclear posture or future complications in the agreements. Both readings could contain some reason underneath and become a zero-sum game. As the proverb goes:
When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers.
In sum, neither it requires believing Russia’s account of events, nor does it require believing NATO. It requires taking the fact into account that a period of no treaty, no rules would instill ambiguity that itself has the capability to pose danger and unrest. Even though the previous rules books were imperfect but had made the intentions from both sides clear. Europe is not faced with the choice of firmness and engagement, instead it needs both and before the next crises, not during it.
