For years, Washington hoped it could reach one big deal with Saudi Arabia. The United States would strengthen rits security relationship with Riyadh and help the kingdom build a civilian nuclear program. In return, Saudi Arabia would recognize Israel. If it worked, Washington would bring Saudi Arabia closer to Israel while strengthening its own position in the Gulf.
That plan no longer looks so simple. In July, the United States and Saudi Arabia signed a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement. President Donald Trump then sent the agreement to Congress in late August. Trump has said that the deal should only proceed if Saudi Arabia recognizes Israel. Riyadh, however, continues to insist that normalization requires a credible path toward a Palestinian state.
The important part is that the disagreement over Israel has not stopped everything else. Nuclear cooperation has moved forward anyway. That suggests Saudi Arabia may be changing the way it deals with Washington. Rather than negotiating one large agreement in which progress on every issue depends on normalization, Riyadh is trying to keep the different parts of the relationship separate.
The nuclear deal gives Saudi Arabia a good opportunity to do that because Washington wants it too. Saudi Arabia plans to develop a large civilian nuclear industry, creating an important market for American companies. The US Department of Energy has openly stressed the economic benefits of the agreement for American industry. There is also a security reason to stay involved. If Saudi Arabia is going to develop nuclear energy, Washington would rather have American technology involved than have less influence over the program.
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That makes the balance between the two countries more complicated. Washington can try to use nuclear cooperation to push Riyadh toward Israel, but Saudi Arabia knows that the United States also has something to lose if the agreement fails. Riyadh has spent years building relationships with other powers, giving it more room to resist conditions it considers too costly.
China is especially important here, but not because Saudi Arabia is abandoning the United States for Beijing. The United States remains far more important to Saudi security. China’s value is different. It gives Riyadh another major economic partner and access to technology outside its relationship with Washington. Saudi Arabia does not need China to replace the United States. Having another option is useful enough.
The kingdom has taken a similar approach to Iran. Riyadh still sees Tehran as a regional rival, but it has also tried to reduce tensions rather than remain locked in permanent confrontation. Saudi Arabia can stay close to Washington while keeping diplomatic relations with Iran. It can work with China without leaving the American security relationship. The point is not to choose a new side, but to avoid having to choose when it does not need to.
The nuclear issue makes this balancing act harder. Saudi Arabia says its program is peaceful, but Iran’s nuclear ambitions have shaped Gulf security for years. Saudi leaders have previously warned that an Iranian nuclear weapon would change their own calculations. Washington therefore has a strong reason to remain involved in Saudi nuclear development rather than risk having less oversight over where the program goes.
At the same time, the agreement raises difficult questions for US nuclear policy. Washington has long been concerned about whether Saudi Arabia could enrich uranium or reprocess spent nuclear fuel. A Congressional Research Service report explains why these issues matter for US non-proliferation policy and notes that some American nuclear agreements in the Middle East have included stronger restrictions.
Iran makes the comparison difficult to avoid. Washington has spent years trying to limit Tehran’s nuclear capabilities. Giving Riyadh greater freedom would raise questions about why a different standard should apply to Saudi Arabia. But walking away would not necessarily stop Saudi nuclear development. It could simply leave the United States with less influence over it.
Israel creates the other major obstacle. Before the war in Gaza, Saudi recognition of Israel could realistically have been the center of a wider agreement. It would have been a major diplomatic success for Washington, while Saudi Arabia could have used normalization to secure a closer American relationship.
Gaza changed that calculation. Saudi Arabia has made Palestinian statehood a much more visible part of its regional policy. In April, Riyadh again stated that peace requires the establishment of a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders. In August, Saudi Arabia joined other regional governments in rejecting efforts to block Palestinian statehood and again backed a two-state solution. Moving toward normalization without progress on that issue would now be much harder for Riyadh to defend.
Yet the wider US-Saudi relationship continues. That may be more important than the stalemate over Israel itself. Saudi Arabia still wants American technology and a close security relationship. Washington still sees the kingdom as an important partner in the Gulf. What is changing is Riyadh’s willingness to let disagreement in one area block cooperation everywhere else.
This also explains why China’s growing role should worry Washington in a more subtle way than the idea of Saudi Arabia simply “switching sides.” Beijing does not have to replace the United States to change Saudi calculations. Its presence gives Riyadh more room to negotiate. American power in the Gulf remains considerable, but being Saudi Arabia’s most important partner does not guarantee the same influence over every Saudi decision.
The nuclear agreement is therefore about more than the reactors Saudi Arabia may eventually build. It is testing whether Washington can maintain a close relationship with Riyadh when it can no longer assume that American cooperation will produce the political concession it wants most.
Saudi-Israeli normalization could still happen. Progress toward Palestinian statehood or a change in Israeli politics could make an agreement easier in the future. What looks less certain is the original idea that normalization must come before the rest of the US-Saudi relationship can move forward.
Saudi Arabia is not trying to push the United States out of the Gulf. It still has strong reasons to keep Washington close. What Riyadh wants is more control over the relationship and more freedom to disagree without putting the whole partnership at risk. If nuclear cooperation continues while normalization remains stalled, Saudi Arabia will have shown that it can do exactly that. The United States would remain central to Saudi security, but Riyadh would have more say over where American influence ends.
