For decades, geography gave Russia an enormous advantage in Central Asia. Much of the region’s trade with Europe travelled north through Russian territory, while pipelines, railways and Soviet-era infrastructure kept the five former Soviet republics closely connected to Moscow. Today, however, Central Asian states have more alternatives.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has accelerated attempts to develop trade routes that bypass Russian territory.
Kazakhstan is now investing heavily in the Middle Corridor, a trade route that crosses the Caspian Sea before continuing through Azerbaijan and Georgia toward Europe. In February, the World Bank approved an $846 million guarantee intended to mobilise
$1.41 billion for rail improvements along Kazakhstan’s section of the route. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has given projects like this a new urgency.
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But bypassing Russia does not necessarily mean escaping great-power dependence. China has simultaneously become an increasingly important economic partner, while Turkey, the European Union and the United States have expanded their own relationships with the region. So the real question is whether Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are becoming better able to choose between these partners on their own terms.
Russia’s influence is still difficult to escape. Kazakhstan may be developing routes across the Caspian, but a majority of its oil exports still depend on routes through Russia, particularly the Caspian Pipeline Consortium to the Black Sea. That dependence became particularly visible as attacks repeatedly hit CPC infrastructure in 2025 and 2026, with drone attacks reducing its oil loadings by around a fifth in July 2026. Kazakhstan has been trying to expand alternatives such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, but Reuters reported in 2025 that only 5.9% of its oil exports bypassed Russian ports.
Elsewhere, the connection is more about people. Millions of Central Asians work abroad, with Russia remaining an especially important destination. Tajikistan shows how deep that relationship can run. According to the World Bank, remittances were equivalent to 49% of Tajikistan’s GDP in 2024, with strong economic activity and wage growth in Russia helping drive the surge. The World Bank also estimates that 92% of Tajik migrant workers were in Russia as of 2023. A slowdown in the Russian economy can therefore be felt directly by households thousands of kilometers away.
Russia also remains embedded in the region’s security architecture. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are members of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan remain outside it. Although Moscow’s old position has weakened, the economic and security links built over decades have not disappeared
One way of reducing Russia’s influence is simply to find another way around it. For Kazakhstan, that means looking west across the Caspian Sea. The Middle Corridor moves goods through Azerbaijan and Georgia before reaching Turkey and Europe, avoiding Russian territory altogether. The World Bank estimates that the right investments and efficiency measures could triple freight volumes and halve travel times along the route by 2030.
Europe has been willing to put money behind that idea. When the leaders of the five Central Asian states met their EU counterparts in Samarkand in 2025, the two sides agreed on a strategic partnership. Brussels announced a €12 billion Global Gateway investment package, with money going toward transport, energy, critical minerals and digital connections. Another €10 billion has already been mobilized internationally for transport projects in the region.
Turkmenistan faces a similar problem with its gas, only in the opposite direction.
Instead of Russia, China buys most of it. Former president Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, who remains influential in the country, said this year that diversifying gas exports was a
“primary goal.” One possibility is a Trans-Caspian pipeline carrying Turkmen gas west through Azerbaijan and Turkey. The idea has been around for decades, however, and political and commercial obstacles have repeatedly kept it from becoming reality.
This is where diversification gets complicated. The Caspian gives Central Asian countries another way around Russia, but some of their other alternatives lead toward China.
Beijing is already difficult to ignore. Trade between China and the five Central Asian states passed $100 billion for the first time in 2025, according to China’s Ministry of Commerce. Data from the Eurasian Development Bank show that Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan had attracted the largest stocks of Chinese investment in the region by mid-2025, at $11.4 billion and $10.7 billion respectively. Chinese investment has also expanded beyond extractive industries into manufacturing and energy.
Some of those projects could reshape the region. Construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway began in 2025 after decades of discussion, giving Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan another connection to Chinese markets without passing through Russia.
Beijing has also pushed for better roads, border crossings and rail connections with Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. At the China-Central Asia summit in Astana last year, Xi Jinping and all five Central Asian leaders signed a treaty deepening their relationship, alongside agreements covering trade, minerals, industry and connectivity.
But the relationship is hardly equal. China’s Ministry of Commerce reported exports of $71.2 billion to Central Asia in 2025 against imports of $35.1 billion. Turkmenistan is the clearest exception because its enormous gas exports give it a trade surplus with Beijing.
Even there, however, dependence works both ways: China gets a major source of gas, while Turkmenistan relies heavily on a single customer. This makes China different from Russia, but not necessarily Moscow’s replacement in the region.
Beijing can offer investment, markets and infrastructure that help Central Asian governments reduce their reliance on Moscow. The question is how much independence those same governments can retain once Chinese trade, capital and infrastructure become harder to replace.
For now, this looks more like diversification than a clean break from Russia.
Kazakhstan can send more goods across the Caspian while still relying heavily on Russian pipelines. Tajikistan can deepen ties with China while millions of its citizens remain connected to the Russian economy. Turkmenistan has reduced its dependence on Moscow for gas exports, only to become heavily reliant on Chinese demand. None of these relationships can be replaced overnight.
What has changed is the ability of Central Asian governments to avoid choosing only one.
Kazakhstan can work with Russia on security while developing transport links toward Europe. Uzbekistan can attract Chinese investment without joining the Russia-led CSTO. Turkmenistan can sell gas to China while continuing to explore routes across the Caspian.
Rather than moving away from Moscow’s orbit and into Beijing’s, the region’s governments are trying to keep several options open at once. Although this strategy has its limits, it gives Central Asian states enough alternatives to make it harder for any single outside power to dictate their choices. In other words, they have more room to move within Russia’s shadow
