The first week of July witnessed the resumption of strikes between the U.S. and Iran after a fragile Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was reached. Continued violation of ceasefire and international humanitarian law has left peace in limbo. However, the war has opened new avenues of technological adaptation for the violent non-state actors in the region and beyond.
Non-state actors throughout history have evolved by adopting the technology available to states either through patron networks or via illicit means. The recent war in the Middle East, in continuation of the Russia-Ukraine war, has promoted development and acquisition of dual-use technology. For instance, off-the-shelf drones and FPV systems used for agricultural purposes can also be equipped with small explosives and serve military objectives. Thus, the regulatory mechanisms in vogue cannot govern the explicit supply chain of weaponry. More so, it is likely to enhance the ability of non-state actors to autonomously replenish their armaments, without directly depending on any patron network.
Furthermore, cyberspace, which does not require supply chains, has proved to be an effective option to attain strategic objectives without attracting attribution or direct retaliation. In synchronization with the military attacks, more than 60 hacktivists launched coordinated cyber-attacks against the U.S., Israel, and allied states in February 2026. The impact of such attacks ranges from espionage to technical disruption or even physical destruction of infrastructure. Despite the asymmetry in the capabilities of both sides, the extent of the attack indicates the plausible utility of a cyber-arsenal for non-state actors.
Similarly, AI-enabled weapon systems have also lowered the threshold of initiating violence for non-state actors. AI algorithms have minimized the need for intensive human force at all levels, from strategic decision-making to tactical operations. In the recent conflict, both sides exhibited effective use of unmanned autonomous systems on aerial, ground, and underwater platforms. On the one hand, the AI algorithms used to enable these technologies are not state-held secrets; rather, they are available to private entities for even non-state actors to acquire. On the other hand, more sophisticated AI-enabled technology, like air defense systems, has limitations, which the non-state actors can easily exploit to achieve their strategic objectives. For instance, a swarm of low-cost drones can overwhelm air defense systems and facilitate precision strikes. Even a missed target can expose the lapse in an AI-enabled air defense system, and it can attract the attention required by non-state actors to coerce their political agenda.
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Additionally, cheaper and readily accessible satellite capability can enhance the lethality and impact of violent attacks launched by non-state actors. There are numerous commercial platforms that provide capabilities to launch cube satellites. Non-state actors can access satellite imagery through such platforms, without any limitation, and it can readily enhance their ability to launch precision strikes.
Moreover, Iranian indigenous capability, despite longstanding sanctions in place, has highlighted the loopholes in the existing regulatory mechanism for the financial order. The use of cryptocurrency has left fissures in the global governance mechanism for terror financing. Tech-driven transactions can not only bypass FATF but also the sanctions imposed by states to contain violent non-state actors. Thus, the non-state actors can even navigate through the limited monitoring apparatus available.
Hybrid warfare, in addition to the technological sophistication, has created room for the violent non-state actors to adapt alongside the patron states. While states can attain their strategic objectives via proxies without risking direct confrontation, non-state actors also have their own incentives to advance technologically because they can attain their strategic and political objectives with minimal investments. However, once the objective of the patron state has been served, it renders the proxy a better-equipped non-state actor. Additionally, the tech-equipped weaponry is not only cheap and easy to create, but it is also efficient in inflicting an asymmetric cost on the adversary. In the case of the recent conflict, both the resilience of Iran and the reserved capabilities of its proxies have proved that investment in self-reliance is the key to resilience.
The war has not only opened avenues for non-state actors to match or even contest the hard power of states, but it has also exposed the blurred thin line distinguishing states from non-state actors. States owe their agency and legitimacy to their territorial sovereign authority and a recognized government. The war, on the one hand, disregarded the territorial sovereignty of Iran and Lebanon, while on the other hand, the domestic unrest in the U.S. and Israel has raised questions about the legitimacy of their actions as well. Furthermore, the complete disregard for international humanitarian laws by the states has inflicted a major blow to the credibility of the nation-states as the legitimate international agent against the non-state actors.
Therefore, to contain the collapse of world order and prospects of the tech-warfare spillover, responsible nation-states need to intervene as legitimate international agents. As peace is being negotiated after months of deadly warfare, the prospects of escalation on non-state fronts need to be considered. For decades, nation-states have nurtured violent non-state actors as proxies and left them unattended once their objectives are met. The chaos, henceforth, is an outcome of unregulated hybrid warfare. Thus, comprehensive and inclusive regulatory frameworks are required to monitor proxy networking and avoid tech adaptation of weaponry, beyond safe control.
