Central Asia in the Global Rare Earth Race
As Washington and Beijing have escalated their trade confrontation, the rare earth sector has emerged as one of the sharpest points of vulnerability. In this context, Central Asia is gaining strategic importance as a potential alternative or complementary source of rare earths and other critical minerals. Central Asian states, especially Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, host vast reserves of rare earth elements and other critical raw materials, making the region a candidate to ease Western dependence on Chinese supplies. Western governments and think tanks increasingly frame Central Asia as a “next frontier” in global resource competition, where the U.S., the EU, and their partners seek to underpin alternative supply‑chain routes and processing hubs.
Taking these developments into account, the recent rise in high-level engagement between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan points to a broader regional shift. Central Asia is no longer positioning itself merely as a passive supplier of raw materials,vice versa it is increasingly seeking a more active and strategic role in the global critical-mineral landscape.
Notably, within the span of just one month in April, the two countries moved beyond general declarations and toward tangible action. They convened two ministerial-level working sessions focused on rare earth cooperation, agreed on a joint framework for geological exploration, and set an ambitious combined investment target of $1 billion for the development of critical minerals.
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On April 11, Bukhara Summit was held with the participation of Kazakhstan in Uzbekistan. The meeting of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev with President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev marked the transition of bilateral relations to a qualitatively new level and became an important step in strengthening the strategic partnership between the countries. Key topic discussed during this meeting was rare earth metals to ensure the sustainability of technological supply chains to strengthen the energy sovereignty of Central Asia. The leaders emphasized the significant potential of joint exploration, extraction and processing of rare earth elements, which are essential for high-tech industries, including artificial intelligence and the space sector. Given their strategic importance, this area has emerged as a top priority for bilateral cooperation.
Notably, the foundation for this cooperation was laid earlier, at the second meeting of the Supreme Interstate Council, held in Tashkent on November 15, 2025. At that time, the Presidents adopted a Joint statement and agreed to establish a bilateral working group on geology and mining of rare and rare-earth metals. This decision was also a response to global disruptions in rare earth supply chains, particularly amid U.S.–China trade tensions, positioning Central Asia as a potential alternative hub.The group was tasked with joint exploration, technology transfer, and investment attraction, launching projects worth $1 billion.
Building on these agreements, Astana hosted the first meeting of the joint working group on April 7. The meeting was chaired by Vice Minister of Industry and Construction of Kazakhstan Iran Sharkhan and Deputy Minister of Mining and Geology of Uzbekistan Rustam Yusupov. The parties discussed the development of cooperation in the field of geological exploration, extraction and processing of raw materials. Special attention was paid to the exchange of experience and technologies, the implementation of joint projects, attracting investments, as well as the development of deep processing of rare and rare-earth metals. Following the negotiations, the parties agreed to create a permanent working group and specialized subgroups with the participation of representatives of business, scientific and educational institutions.
Strategic Significance of the Partnership
Against this backdrop, it is important to consider the resource base that underpins such ambitions. The growing emphasis on rare earth cooperation between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan is not incidental but rather reflects the substantial geological and industrial potential of both countries, which positions them as emerging pillars in global critical mineral supply chains.
Today, Kazakhstan has the largest and most developed potential in the field of rare earths among the countries of Central Asia. The country already extracts 19 of the 34 raw materials classified as critical by the European Union, and its geological endowment continues to exceed expectations. The State Committee for Geology now estimates recoverable rare earth reserves at 28.2 million tons, placing Kazakhstan second globally, behind only China. Deposits of rare earths in Kazakhstan are concentrated in several major geological belts, including the Ural Range, the Kazakh Steppe, the Kazakh Highlands, as well as the Northern and Southern Tien Shan and Pamir ranges. The government has already set an ambitious target to expand geological exploration from 1.5 million to 2.2 million square kilometers by 2026, with 124 deposits designated as priority sites under the national 2024–2028 development plan. The economic results of this strategic pivot are already measurable. Exports of rare earth elements have quadrupled since 2020. Planned investments under the Integrated Development Plan for the Rare and Rare Earth Metals Industry 2024-2028 are projected to reach approximately $5.3 billion. In 2024, Kazakhstan joined the Partnership for Mineral Security, formally embedding itself in the international architecture designed to build resilient supply chains outside Chinese control.
In recent years, Kazakhstan is also currently carrying out a large‑scale effort to introduce artificial intelligence technologies for storing, systematizing, and effectively using geological data. Almost 97% of the total volume of primary geological information has already been digitized. The full digitization and systematization of all geological information in Kazakhstan is scheduled to be completed by the end of 2026. This approach accelerates data search and analysis, improves accessibility for investors and research institutions, and makes it possible to more accurately identify promising sites containing rare‑earth and other critical minerals, thereby increasing transparency and the investment attractiveness of Kazakhstan’s mineral sector.
Uzbekistan also plays a significant role in the development of the rare earth industry in Central Asia and ranks among the world’s top five uranium producers. Major deposits are concentrated in the Almalyk, Aitima, and Handize regions, and more than 30 types of metals have been identified across the country. Yet for years, those resources sat largely underdeveloped for lack of capital. Nevertheless Tashkent has moved aggressively to close the investment gap and establishing itself as a regional center of the mining industry. President Mirziyoyev has made his ambitions explicit, setting a target of $500 million in rare earth project development and backing it with diplomatic actions. In April 2024, Uzbekistan signed memoranda with the European Union on cooperation in critical and rare earth minerals, aimed at aligning technical standards, investment frameworks, and sustainability requirements while positioning Uzbekistan as a potential alternative supplier to China‑linked value chains. Later that year, in September 2024, a similar memorandum was concluded with the United States, embedding Uzbekistan into Washington’s critical‑minerals‑partnership architecture and opening channels for technology transfer, joint geological studies, and U.S.‑facilitated financing. By February 2025, Uzbekistan had deepened cooperation with Malaysia in mineral resources and microelectronics, including high‑purity silicon and ultra‑pure graphite, two materials that are indispensable for semiconductor manufacturing and advanced battery technologies. This partnership was designed to help Uzbekistan move up the value chain, linking raw‑material extraction to downstream electronics and clean‑energy industries rather than remaining a mere exporter of unprocessed ore.
Moreover, in 2025 alone, Uzbekistan announced 76 projects totaling about 2.6 billion dollars across mining, processing, and technology‑intensive segments of the critical‑mineral sector. This scale of investment signals not incremental progress but a deliberate industrial leap, aimed at rapidly building integrated hubs for rare earth and critical‑mineral production that can serve both regional and global high‑tech supply chains.
Geopolitical Tensions and the Limits of Strategic Autonomy
The optimistic view of Central Asia as an emerging autonomous center in global supply chains of critically important minerals nevertheless requires a more sober assessment, taking into account the complex geopolitical reality. The simultaneous presence of the United States, the European Union, and China in the region is not only an expansion of opportunities for partnership between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, but also a manifestation of the growing competition between the great powers, in which the Central Asian countries risk becoming a field of rivalry rather than independent actors setting the agenda.
Competition from external players is already structurally ingrained in the region’s mineral sector. The US Mineral Security Initiative, which Kazakhstan joined in 2024, is directly aimed at forming supply chains outside Chinese control. The memoranda of the European Union with Uzbekistan, in turn, are aimed at bringing the regulatory framework in line with European standards and reducing dependence on chains linked to China. China, on the other hand, maintains a stable position in the extractive and processing industries of Central Asia, has significant infrastructural influence within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative and is able to exert pressure through pricing mechanisms and market access, tools that Western partners cannot always use in a comparable way. As a result, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan do not so much choose between neutral partners as they are forced to balance between competing institutional systems, each of which assumes its own conditions for political coordination and exit costs.
This leads to a more fundamental issue: the risk that dependence is not eliminated, but only redistributed. For decades, the Central Asian countries have operated under a model of dependent integration, supplying raw materials to external processors and producers with minimal internal added value. The stated goal of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan is to exit this model by moving up the value chain to recycled metals, battery components and high-tech products. However, the capital, technology and access to end markets necessary for such a transition are still concentrated among the same external actors that are currently seeking to strengthen their presence in the region. If Western companies and institutions become key investors in rare earth metals processing infrastructure, Central Asia risks facing a new form of dependence structurally similar to the previous integration into externally controlled value chains, subordination to external technological standards and vulnerability to partner priorities that do not always coincide with regional development objectives.
Thus, the key question is whether Central Asia is capable of acting as a truly independent strategic actor, or whether it is just a matter of diversifying the circle of external patrons. A multi-vector foreign policy aimed at maintaining a balance between major powers has long served Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as an effective tool to protect themselves from external pressure. However, in the context of increasing block competition, the space for genuine neutrality is shrinking. Every agreement with Washington or Brussels is fixed in Beijing, as well as every infrastructure agreement with Chinese capital is under the close attention of European capitals. Paradoxically, the success of the Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan partnership in attracting competing external actors may not weaken, but rather increase external pressure on the region’s political and economic choices.
