In 2021, Russia supplied 45% of all natural gas consumed in the European Union. Just four years later, that share has been cut to 12%. In raw volume terms, Europe went from importing 152 billion cubic metres (bcm) of Russian gas to just 36 bcm — a reduction that would have seemed impossible before February 2022.
That is, without question, a historic achievement. But here is the uncomfortable truth: Europe is not energy secure yet.
New dependencies have replaced old ones. A handful of member states are still quietly buying from Moscow. And a looming 2027 deadline to ban all Russian gas is looking harder to meet than Brussels would like to admit.
This article takes an honest look at where European energy security stands today — the real progress, the real risks, and what it will actually take to finish the job.
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What European Energy Security Actually Looked Like Before 2022
To understand how far Europe has come, you first need to understand the hole it had to climb out of.
For decades, Russian gas was the backbone of European industry. It was cheap. It arrived by pipeline without interruption. And it powered everything from German steel plants to Italian homes. EU leaders chose economic convenience over strategic caution — and Russia was happy to supply it.
By 2021, the numbers showed just how deep that reliance ran:
- 45% of the EU’s natural gas came from Russia
- 27% of its crude oil came from Russia
- Russian coal made up a large share of EU solid fuel imports
- Over €150 billion flowed from European consumers to Moscow every year
The Pipeline Architecture That Bound Europe to Moscow
The physical infrastructure made this dependency feel permanent. Pipelines are not like shipping lanes — you can’t simply reroute them overnight. The key arteries included:
- Nord Stream 1 — running under the Baltic Sea directly to Germany
- Yamal-Europe — crossing Belarus and Poland
- TurkStream — running through Turkey to Southern and Eastern Europe
- Druzhba — the world’s longest oil pipeline, supplying Central and Eastern Europe
These were not just energy routes. They were political levers. Russia knew it. Europe, for too long, chose to ignore it.
Why the 2022 Invasion Changed Everything
When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the EU’s energy strategy collapsed overnight. Within weeks, governments that had spent years resisting change were suddenly racing to diversify. The European Commission launched REPowerEU in May 2022 — an emergency plan to cut Russian energy fast and replace it with alternatives.
What followed was the most dramatic energy transition in EU peacetime history.
REPowerEU at Four Years: Measuring the Progress
Four years on, the results are genuinely impressive. The EU’s own review of REPowerEU, published in 2025, shows a bloc that has moved faster than almost anyone expected.
The Gas Numbers — From 45% to 12%
The headline figure says it all: Russian gas now accounts for just 12% of EU supply, down from 45% in 2022. In volume terms, that means imports fell from 152 bcm to 36 bcm.
But that’s only half the story. The EU didn’t just find new suppliers — it used less gas overall. EU gas demand fell by roughly 19% compared to the pre-crisis baseline, saving about 80 bcm per year. That reduction came from:
- Energy efficiency measures — better insulation, smarter industrial processes, upgraded boilers
- Fuel switching — power plants moving from gas to coal, oil, or renewables in the short term
- Demand restraint — households and businesses simply using less, partly by choice and partly by necessity due to high prices
What replaced Russian pipeline gas? A mix of:
- US liquefied natural gas (LNG) — shipped across the Atlantic and regasified at new European terminals
- Norwegian pipeline gas — volumes increased significantly from the North Sea
- Qatari LNG — long-term contracts signed with Gulf producers
- Algerian pipeline gas — particularly for Italy and Spain
Oil, Coal, and the Fuels That Were Easier to Cut
Gas grabbed the headlines, but Europe also made major moves on oil and coal.
- Russian crude oil fell from 27% of EU supply to just 2% — aided by the EU’s maritime oil embargo
- Russian coal imports were eliminated entirely
Oil and coal were easier to replace than gas. Here’s why: tankers can be redirected. A cargo of crude oil that previously went to Rotterdam can just as easily be rerouted from a Gulf state or Nigeria. Pipelines can’t do that. That’s why gas has been the hardest problem — and why it still isn’t solved.
The Renewable Surge Running in Parallel
While the EU was scrambling to replace Russian gas, something quieter and more important was happening at the same time: a renewable energy boom.
The numbers tell a striking story:
- Solar capacity reached 359 GW in 2025, with 56 GW added in that year alone
- June 2025 was the first month in EU history when solar power was the single largest source of electricity — providing 22% of all power generated
- Renewables’ overall share of EU energy grew from 10% in 2006 to 25% in 2024
- The EU spent €335 billion on fossil fuels in 2025 — a huge number, but €55 billion less than the year before
This renewable surge matters for energy security, not just climate. A solar panel on a German roof or a wind farm off the Danish coast cannot be weaponised by a foreign government. That fact is not lost on European policymakers.
The Legislative Architecture Underpinning the Phase-Out
The progress has not happened by accident. The EU has built a legal framework to lock it in:
- May 2025 — The EU Commission published its Roadmap to Fully End EU Dependency on Russian Energy
- October 2025 — The Council agreed its position on Russian gas phase-out rules
- December 2025 — The European Parliament and Council struck a deal on the legal framework
- January 2026 — The Council gave its final green light to a stepwise ban
The key deadlines are now legally embedded:
- No new Russian gas contracts from the end of 2025
- Full LNG phase-out by the end of 2026
- Complete pipeline gas ban by November 2027
That is the target. Whether Europe can hit it is a different question.
Trading One Dependency for Another? The New Supplier Risk
Here’s a question that doesn’t get asked often enough: has Europe actually solved its energy security problem, or has it just rewritten the address on its dependency?
The honest answer is: somewhat both.
The US LNG Gamble — Security Swap or New Leverage Point?
The United States has become Europe’s largest single source of LNG. That’s a significant shift. But data from the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) projects that the US could supply up to 80% of EU LNG imports by 2030 if current trends continue.
Think about what that means. Europe would have swapped a dependency on Russian pipeline gas for a near-total dependency on American liquefied gas. That creates real risks:
- Price leverage — US LNG is more expensive than Russian pipeline gas was, and export volumes can be redirected by American producers to higher-paying Asian markets
- Political leverage — under the current US administration, energy exports have been used as a bargaining chip in trade negotiations with Europe
- Structural lock-in — new LNG import terminals represent decades of infrastructure commitment to fossil gas
To be fair, the situation is not identical to the Russia problem. Multiple LNG suppliers exist globally. No single cargo ship has the chokehold that the Nord Stream 1 pipeline had. But concentration risk at 80% would be a serious strategic error.
Norway’s Ceiling and Algeria’s Instability
Beyond US LNG, Europe’s other key suppliers come with their own complications.
Norway is now the EU’s single largest gas supplier by volume. But Norwegian production is near its geological ceiling — there is simply not much more gas to extract. Europe cannot grow its Norwegian supply significantly.
Algeria supplies pipeline gas to Italy and Spain via undersea connections. It works — for now. But Algeria faces real internal instability, and its relationship with the EU is complicated by tensions over migration policy. A disruption to Algerian supply would hit Southern Europe hard.
The Green Hydrogen Promise — and Why It’s Still a Distant Horizon
Europe’s long-term answer to all of this is supposed to be green hydrogen — fuel produced using renewable electricity, with zero carbon emissions and no foreign supplier to worry about.
The EU updated its hydrogen policy framework in January 2026. But the honest assessment is that green hydrogen is still years away from maturity at scale. The obstacles are real:
- Electrolysers (the machines that make hydrogen from water and electricity) are still expensive
- Hydrogen pipelines and storage facilities are largely unbuilt
- Industrial processes need to be redesigned to run on hydrogen
Hydrogen is the structural answer to European energy security. But it cannot rescue the next five years. That’s why the 2027 gas ban deadline matters so much — Europe needs to get there before the hydrogen bridge is ready.
Where the EU Is Fracturing — Member States That Are Not on the Same Page
The official EU story is one of collective action and shared purpose. The reality on the ground is messier. Not every member state is moving at the same speed — or in the same direction.
Hungary and Slovakia — The Holdouts
In February 2026, the EU was forced to call an emergency meeting to address a serious standoff between Hungary, Slovakia, and Ukraine over energy transit.
Both countries retain significant dependence on Russian gas. Their geography makes alternatives harder to access than for Western Europe. And their governments have been outspoken opponents of the phase-out timeline, pushing hard for exemptions.
This is not purely politics. The structural vulnerabilities are real:
- Hungary and Slovakia lack the LNG import infrastructure that Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy have built
- Replacing Russian pipeline gas in Central Europe requires new interconnectors that take years to build
- Energy costs in these countries are politically explosive — any price spike risks serious domestic backlash
The 2026 Druzhba Pipeline Dispute
The Druzhba pipeline — the world’s longest oil pipeline — runs from Russia through Ukraine and Belarus into Central and Eastern Europe. In 2026, a dispute over transit arrangements reignited tensions that briefly threatened oil supply to several member states.
The incident was a reminder that Russia still holds physical leverage through infrastructure that hasn’t been replaced. Even as the EU moves to ban Russian gas, the Druzhba pipeline remains operational — and politically contested.
France, Spain, and the Contradiction of Resumed Russian LNG Purchases
Perhaps the most awkward story of 2026 is this: both France and Spain were reported to have resumed purchases of Russian LNG by March 2026. This happened even as EU officials were declaring the phase-out a success.
Why? Because spot-market LNG trades — one-off purchases rather than long-term contracts — are much harder to police than pipeline deliveries. When Russian LNG is cheaper than American LNG, utilities and traders will buy it if the law allows it. The EU’s new rules are designed to close this loophole, but enforcement remains a work in progress.
This is not hypocrisy, exactly. It is the political economy of energy: cheap fuel is hard to refuse when households are struggling with energy bills.
The Energy Poverty Dimension — Who Bears the Cost of the Transition
That brings us to one of the most underreported aspects of European energy security: who is paying the price of the transition?
The answer is clear, and it’s uncomfortable. Energy costs have risen sharply, and lower-income households — particularly in Central and Eastern Europe — have been hit hardest. This is creating real political pressure:
- Far-right and populist parties across Europe have seized on high energy bills as proof that the green transition is an “elite project”
- Governments in Hungary, Slovakia, and beyond have used energy affordability as political cover to resist phase-out timelines
- The EU’s REPowerEU plan includes energy efficiency measures and support for vulnerable consumers — but implementation has been uneven
Energy security is not just a foreign policy question. It is a social justice question too. And the EU has not fully answered it yet.
The Affordability Crisis and the Future of European Energy Security
Zoom out from the Russia-specific argument, and a bigger challenge comes into view: European energy is simply too expensive for European industry to remain globally competitive.
High Prices, Industrial Competitiveness, and the China-US Gap
Despite spending €335 billion on fossil fuels in 2025 — a number that should stop us in our tracks — European industrial energy prices remain significantly higher than in the United States or China. The sectors most exposed include:
- Steel — energy accounts for a large share of production costs
- Chemicals — including fertilisers, which are critical for food security
- Cement — a massive consumer of industrial heat
- Aluminium — one of the most energy-intensive materials produced
American and Chinese producers face nothing like these costs. That gap is not just a business problem — it is a strategic vulnerability. If European industry is uncompetitive, the EU’s industrial base hollows out. And a hollowed-out industrial base makes the bloc more dependent on imports — including energy-intensive goods from countries with no interest in European security.
The EU’s Clean Industrial Deal and Affordable Energy Action Plan are designed to address this. The argument from institutions like Bruegel is compelling: the fastest route to affordable energy is the full renewable transition, not a return to fossil fuels. Domestic renewables have zero fuel costs once built. But that long-term logic is hard to sell to a manufacturer facing this quarter’s energy bill.
Why the Renewable Transition Is the Structural Answer
Here is the simple truth that gets lost in the political noise: the only energy that cannot be weaponised is energy you generate yourself.
A wind turbine in the North Sea does not answer to Moscow, Washington, or Doha. A solar panel on a factory roof in Bavaria does not fluctuate in price based on decisions made in the Oval Office. Europe’s long-term energy security depends on scaling this up as fast as possible — and the data shows it is already accelerating.
What still needs to happen to complete this transition:
- Massive grid investment — the EU’s electricity grid needs to be upgraded to carry renewable power from where it’s generated to where it’s needed
- Cross-border interconnectors — more links between national grids improve resilience and reduce price spikes
- Long-duration energy storage — batteries and other technologies to store solar and wind power for when the sun doesn’t shine and the wind doesn’t blow
- Demand flexibility — smart meters, industrial scheduling, and dynamic pricing that shifts consumption to times when renewable power is abundant
None of this is science fiction. All of it is technically feasible. The question is whether Europe moves fast enough.
Can Europe Hit the 2027 Deadline?
The EU has set a clear target: a complete ban on Russian gas imports by November 2027. So — is it going to happen?
What Needs to Go Right
For the 2027 target to be met, several things need to fall into place:
- New LNG capacity must come online across the bloc, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe
- Gas interconnectors between member states must be completed, so LNG arriving in Western ports can reach Eastern consumers
- Renewable build-out must continue at current pace or faster, reducing overall gas demand
- Member-state compliance with the new phase-out regulation must be enforced, including on Hungary and Slovakia
- Demand restraint must be maintained — the 19% reduction in gas use achieved so far must be protected and deepened
None of these are impossible. Most are already underway. For the majority of EU member states — particularly Western and Northern Europe — the 2027 target is achievable.
The Wildcards That Could Derail the Timeline
Two big external factors could upend even the best-laid plans.
1. A US-brokered peace deal in Ukraine. If the war in Ukraine ends under terms negotiated with US involvement, there may be significant diplomatic pressure on the EU to resume Russian energy imports as part of an economic normalisation package. Some member states would welcome that cover. Whether the EU holds the line will be the defining test of its strategic independence.
2. A severe cold winter. A particularly harsh winter could drain European gas storage reserves faster than planned, forcing emergency purchases from any available source — including Russia. This has happened before. It could happen again. The EU’s storage regulation helps, but it is not a guarantee.
Beyond these, there is also the critical infrastructure risk. The 2022 Nord Stream sabotage — still not fully resolved — demonstrated that undersea pipelines and cables are genuine military targets. The EU and NATO have both flagged this as a serious vulnerability. Any future attack on European energy infrastructure could reshape the security calculus overnight.
Europe Has Come Too Far to Turn Back
European energy security has been fundamentally transformed since February 2022. That is not spin — it is fact. Cutting Russian gas from 45% to 12% of EU supply in three years is a genuine geopolitical achievement. The legislative framework is in place. The renewable energy transition is accelerating. And for the first time in decades, Europe is building the infrastructure it needs to generate, store, and share energy on its own terms.
But the job is not finished, and pretending otherwise is dangerous.
New dependencies on US LNG are forming faster than anyone planned. Hungary and Slovakia are still holding out. France and Spain are quietly buying Russian LNG even as Brussels declares victory. And across Central and Eastern Europe, households are struggling with energy bills that make the politics of the green transition genuinely difficult.
True European energy security is not achieved by swapping one foreign supplier for another. It is achieved when European homes and factories run on energy that Europe generates itself — from wind, sun, and eventually green hydrogen. That is the destination. The 2027 gas ban is not the finish line. It is a milestone on a much longer journey.
The next 18 months will be decisive. Watch the 2027 deadline. Watch Hungary and Slovakia. Watch whether the renewable build-out continues at pace. And watch what happens if a Ukraine peace deal lands on the table with Russian gas attached to it.
Frequently Asked Questions
1. Is Europe still buying Russian gas in 2026?
Yes — though significantly less than before. The EU has cut Russian gas from 45% of supply in 2022 to around 12% today. However, some countries — particularly Hungary and Slovakia — continue to receive Russian gas via pipeline, and some Western European countries reportedly resumed spot-market purchases of Russian LNG in early 2026. A full legal ban on Russian gas is targeted for November 2027.
2. What has replaced Russian gas in Europe?
Europe has replaced Russian gas through a combination of three main strategies: importing more liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the United States, Qatar, and Norway; increasing pipeline gas from Norway and Algeria; and reducing overall gas demand by roughly 19% through energy efficiency, fuel switching, and demand restraint. Renewables — particularly solar — have also grown significantly, reducing how much gas is needed in the first place.
3. Why are some EU countries struggling to phase out Russian energy?
Geography and infrastructure are the main reasons. Countries like Hungary and Slovakia are landlocked, far from LNG import terminals, and historically more dependent on Russian pipeline routes. Building the interconnectors and new supply routes they need takes years. Energy affordability is also a factor — in Central and Eastern Europe, households spend a higher share of their income on energy, making price spikes politically explosive.
4. What is the biggest long-term threat to European energy security?
The biggest long-term threat is trading one dependency for another. While Europe has reduced its reliance on Russia, it risks becoming overly dependent on US LNG — with the IEEFA projecting the US could supply up to 80% of EU LNG imports by 2030. The only durable answer to European energy security is accelerating domestic renewable energy production — wind, solar, and eventually green hydrogen — so that Europe’s energy supply cannot be disrupted or weaponised by any foreign government.
This article was published in July 2026 and reflects data current to that date. Key sources include the European Commission’s REPowerEU 4-Year Review, the EU Council’s January 2026 press release on Russian gas phase-out rules, the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA), the Clingendael Institute, and Bruegel.
