The War That Changed the Middle East: Iran’s Rise as a Regional Power

As Tehran moves from a doctrine of survival to one of regional influence, the balance of power that has shaped the region for decades is being fundamentally reconfigured.

The confrontation between Iran, Israel, and the United States may mark a strategic turning point in Middle Eastern geopolitics. As Tehran moves from a doctrine of survival to one of regional influence, the balance of power that has shaped the region for decades is being fundamentally reconfigured.

Iran’s shift from defense to ambition

Analysts observe the Middle East in flux, where Iran is no longer just fighting to survive; it is testing the conditions for regional preeminence. Robert Pape, an American political scientist and professor at the University of Chicago, calls this the “middle game”: Iran is moving beyond playing defense and is now building what he describes as a “resistance security belt” stretching from the Strait of Hormuz all the way to the Red Sea. Iran isn’t just hitting back anymore; it’s weaving together influence across the Persian Gulf, Lebanon, and Yemen, turning the region into a single strategic stage and a way for Iran to set the rules, not just follow them.

“We are in the middle of the game. And in this middle game, there is a defining feature: Iran is shifting from survival to ambition. And this is going to go on. Iran is on a trajectory to become the dominant state in the Persian Gulf.

IRGC’s new doctrine: a new resistance security belt. Iran is on the trajectory of becoming a hegemon in the region. A dominant power that is not worried about its survival but is in building a sphere of influence. And this is what a regional hegemon looks like.” (Robert Pape)

Why does this matter? It signals a real change in how the conflict works. Pape argues that Iran is becoming more coordinated and purposeful in its strategy, while Washington and Tel-Aviv seem stuck in a cycle of reaction. President Donald Trump just gestures without any strategy; he doesn’t believe his eyes, and tells a reluctant Netanyahu to comply with Iran’s demand, such as to stop bombing Beirut.

Iran is applying pressure where it counts: on Kuwait and Bahrain to make life harder for the U.S. military, signaling to Beirut to deter Israeli strikes, and the Red Sea to threaten global shipping and energy routes. The big idea: Iran is turning geography into strategy. This isn’t the desperation of a cornered regime; on the contrary, it’s the mark of a strategy trying to redraw the map of regional power.

Israel’s shrinking room for maneuver

In an interview, the analyst Trita Parsi makes an even sharper point about Israel: its security position is growing more fragile, even as its military operations grow bolder. Pape’s view, in another interview, is that Israel is caught in a classic escalation dilemma: if it doesn’t hit back, it looks weak and deterrence erodes; if it does, it risks fueling the very conflict that threatens its own security. Take the recent episode with Hezbollah infiltrations: military posture without a strategy, where limited incursions trigger large strategic consequences.

Israel, for all its military muscle, although its army is tired, overstrained, and in low morale, is still leaning hard on the United States as its ultimate security guarantor, but the capacity of the U.S. to sustain this role is weakening due to the military’s poor performance and the pressure from domestic public opinion. More troubling: the U.S. can’t always restrain Israeli escalation, even when it tries. The bottom line is that Israel’s military edge isn’t translating into strategic gains. Politically, things are just as tough: international support for Israel is waning (public opinion in the U.S. and around the world on how Israel is regarded is at the lowest level in its history), and Israel’s current stance is drawing more opposition than legitimacy. The charges of genocide in Gaza, the brutal, amoral behavior of its army, disrespect to international laws and norms, the brutality and criminal behavior of the settlers in the West Bank with no punishment, and the destruction of South Lebanon, similar to what was done in Gaza, are the main reasons.

This is why the war is about much more than who wins on the battlefield; it’s also about the mounting political costs. Israel’s repeated use of force risks cementing its image as a state that opts for escalation instead of dialogue and force over diplomacy. According to Robert Pape and Trita Parsi, this approach actually weakens Israel’s position by expanding the anti-Israel coalition, strengthening ties between Iran and Hezbollah, and pushing Arab countries to hedge their bets instead of firmly taking sides.

The new regional map: fragmentation, hedging, and deterrence

Trita Parsi argues that the U.S. has taken a real hit, and Middle Eastern powers are increasingly skeptical of relying on American protection. The result? They are diversifying their hedging strategies. The Gulf states aren’t marching together anymore: the UAE is allying with Israel, while countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman are turning in different directions. Some, like Kuwait, are playing it safe, while others are building deeper economic ties with Iran to reduce the risks of confrontation.

I would add that it is undeniable the role of an external force, Pakistan, a nuclear power, in the region. Besides the Saudi-Pakistan mutual defense treaty, the two countries are part of a bigger regional security arrangement that includes Türkiye and Egypt. And through Pakistan and Iran, China and Russia increase their grip in the region.

This is the “new Middle East map”: less centered on the U.S., more fractured, and increasingly multipolar. However, just because the region isn’t unipolar anymore doesn’t mean it has found a new equilibrium. The war isn’t producing a stable balance; it is being conducted amid strategic improvisation, in which middle powers, proxies, and energy chokepoints matter more than old-school alliances.

One of the most pivotal points is the Red Sea. Houthi disruptions and threats to Bab al-Mandab aren’t coadjutants; they’re now central levers of power. For Iran, this is a way to project its influence far beyond the Levant, tying together maritime security, oil flows, and American credibility into one high-stakes contest.

Conclusions

Iran is trying to establish an extended deterrence. They made clear to the U.S. and Israel that the ceasefire has to be regionwide, and Israel has to be included in it to avoid it starting new wars. Diplomacy is under pressure, but there is still a shared interest in striking a deal. For Iran, it should not be any deal; for the U.S., Trump does not have the time running in his favor. But the trust gap is now bigger, partly because Israeli sabotage has tangled up talks, and because U.S. policy mostly bends to Israeli political pressure. The uncomfortable takeaway? If diplomacy collapses, it may be because Israel has made it too politically costly for Washington to view Iran as anything other than a permanent adversary.

So what’s changed on the ground? First, Iran now has more confidence and a bigger role in shaping the region through pressure and maneuvering. Second, the conflict has exposed just how shaky Israeli deterrence really is, and the clear limits of going it alone. Third, the Gulf states, Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan are all rushing to find new security options, as they are no longer content to depend solely on the U.S.

Meanwhile, Iran, because of its strategic calculation in the use of force and the Strait of Hormuz, is on the rise, and Trump and Netanyahu dispute in public over who is in command of their coalition.

Ricardo Martins
Ricardo Martins
PhD in Sociology, specializing in international trade and geopolitics. Utrecht University.