The nature of warfare has changed dramatically in the 21st century. As per Baughman, advances in technology, cyber capabilities, economic interdependence, and information networks have expanded conflict beyond traditional battlefields. Contemporary competition increasingly involves a combination of military and non-military instruments, blurring the distinction between war and peace. Within this changing security environment, China’s concepts of unrestricted warfare and hybrid warfare have attracted growing attention among scholars and policymakers. These concepts emphasize the use of diverse tools of national power, including military capabilities, cyber operations, information campaigns, legal measures, and economic influence, to achieve strategic objectives.
This article examines how China employs a combination of military and non-military instruments to pursue its strategic goals. It explores the maritime and cyber dimensions of China’s hybrid warfare approach while also considering competing interpretations of these developments within contemporary security studies.
Some American strategic analysts argue that China’s long-term objectives include challenging US influence in the Western Pacific and increasing its regional leadership rolewithin Asia. However, interpretations of China’s intentions vary among scholars and policymakers.
Because China’s armed forces do not possess complete conventional military parity with those of the United States, some analysts argue that hybrid warfare may offer Beijing a more effective means of pursuing its strategic objectives than direct military confrontation. As a result, some analysts argue that China’s perception of strategic vulnerability has encouraged the development of asymmetric approaches to security. According to political experts such as Ivan Arreguin-Toft, every war fought in the last 200 years in which the stronger opponent was at least ten times more powerful, the “underdog” triumphed nearly one-third of the time. Furthermore, when underdogs refused to play by Goliath’s rules, they prevailed, even when everything we think we know about power says they shouldn’t.
In essence, by breaking the rules, Davids can still achieve inconceivable feats versus Goliaths on the battlefield. With no traditional military balance of power with China and the U.S., China realizes that hybrid warfare, which draws on the experiences of Russia and Iran, might be more effective than outright confrontation in protecting its national interests. This strategy, according to Andrew Shearer, would include taking advantage of the “grey zone” of the West’s binary concept of “war and peace” and the use of paramilitary, coast guard, or militia forces, as well as the application of all elements of national power, including sophisticated cyber operations, economic carrots and sticks, and legal and political warfare. (Shearer, 2017) China’s notion of “unrestricted warfare” was influenced by the 1999 book Unrestricted Warfare by Air Force colonels Wang Xiangsui and Qiao Liang. The notion of “three warfare” was endorsed by China’s Communist Party Central Committee in 2003: media warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare. (Tony Corn, 2010) Media warfare focuses on swaying international and domestic public opinion, psychological warfare disseminates specific information to disrupt an enemy’s decision-making capability, and legal warfare uses domestic and international legal systems to assert Chinese claims and limit operational freedom. (Michael Clarke, 2017)
Hybrid Warfare: Maritime
China’s marine hybrid warfare, which is similar to the grey zone strategy, incorporates aspects of the “salami slicing” or “cabbage strategy,” coercive diplomacy, and the deployment of the three warfare techniques. This method provides achieving incremental aims while avoiding a significant military response, confusing an opponent’s response options. (Paul, 2016) It corresponds to the geographical thinking of a Chinese weiqi/Go master, who seeks dominance through gradual expansion rather than decisive conflicts. This technique varies from that of Western chess masters, who seek to dominate opponents by board dominance. As a result, Lai warns against playing go with the chess mindset. ” (Allison, 2017). Shearer argues that China’s actions in the East and South China Seas demonstrate the practical application of hybrid warfare techniques, although the effectiveness and long-term consequences of these actions remain subjects of debate. After the Philippines announced plans to upgrade the island’s runway, China used its Navy, Coast Guard, and Maritime Militia to sail around Thitu Island in 2017. This prompted China’s “cabbage strategy,” which involves encircling the area with various types of ships in order to assert jurisdiction and control. (Erickson, 2016) The United States’ negative perception of China’s maritime hybrid warfare has led to a military buildup, with the Pentagon and Japan defining the threat in 2018 and advocating for the expansion of the US Navy fleet, particularly the number of more advanced and larger unmanned systems. Senator John McCain and the Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments have supported the expansion of such unmanned technologies. (Romaniuk, 2017)
Hybrid Warfare: Cyber
In 2015, China established the Cyber Warfare branch of the army, with the Cyberspace Administration of China in charge of boosting cybersecurity, policing online material, and growing the digital economy. Jianna (2019) China’s military activities also make use of advances in artificial intelligence and quantum computing. According to CrowdStrike, a US cybersecurity firm, China launched the most cyber-attacks on US computer networks in 2018. China, on the other hand, accuses the United States of being a “cyber-predator with a notorious track record of violating other countries’ interests and rights.” The United States military is concerned about advanced cyberattacks on key infrastructure and has warned hackers that shutting down the electrical grid may result in conventional warfare.
According to reports cited by several analysts, Chinese-linked cyber actors were accused of obtaining sensitive information related to the development of the Boeing C-17. Chinese officials have frequently rejected allegations of state-sponsored cyber espionage. Within three years, Chinese hackers had gained the essential data, and China showcased a replica of the Boeing C-17 known as the Y20 Cango plane at the 2014 air show. A Chinese business created it.
The same thing is happening in America. Edward Snowden referenced conversations between Chinese leaders in a document published by the US, claiming that American hackers had broken into the largest Chinese mobile company, “Huawei,” and installed a special programmer that allowed them to listen in on or view every audio or video chat.
Chinese hybrid warfare is intensifying: Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon
Sun-Tzu additionally stated that “one who excels at warfare first establishes himself in a position where he cannot be defeated while not losing any opportunity to defeat the enemy.” China’s ascent as a power requires it to improve its hybrid warfare capabilities by employing techniques such as downplaying or withholding information about its marine and cybersecurity infrastructure, defense budget expansion, and civil-military cooperation. As paramilitary forces and the People’s Liberation Army Navy engage in hybrid warfare to impose China’s maritime claims, the state is not forthcoming about its objectives regarding the development of these weapons. Since 2010, China has more than doubled the number of big patrol vessels in the Coast Guard, making it into the world’s largest Coast Guard force capable of performing simultaneous, lengthy offshore operations in numerous contentious areas. (Military and Security Developments (Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2018)
Conclusion
So the nature of war has changed, and there is no distinction of what is or is not the battlefield. This borderless battlefield defines that war is not confined to the military sphere and has been impacted by technology and globalization. The gap between warfare and non-warfare has almost completely closed, and the lines separating soldiers and non-soldiers have now been dissolved. (Baughman, 2022) Whether you are launching missiles or throwing rocks, the fundamentals of combat remain the same. Technology merely increases capability and lethality. Many scholars assert that China is increasingly utilizing a combination of military and non-military instruments of national power to accomplish its strategic objectives. However, there is still some disagreement regarding the extent to which these activities follow a coherent doctrine of unrestricted warfare or mirror border trends in the current strategic competition. Some analysts have seen these strategies as efforts to challenge elements of U.S. influence and complicate the development of effective countermeasures. While the tools and domains of warfare continue to evolve, many scholars maintain that the basic nature of war, competition over political objectives has largely remained the same.
