Chinese intelligence and security agencies view the crackdown on influence thuggery and the arrest of Sabry Nakhnoukh by Egyptian security forces in June 2026 as a vital step to ensure the stability of Chinese investments. This is achieved by reducing the activities and influence of (intermediaries and parallel entities) operating outside the official security apparatus. The aim is to lower business costs and mitigate the risks of external economic blackmail from rival powers seeking to exploit these parallel security entities to restrict and threaten Chinese operations, activities, and investments, as well as the safety of Chinese citizens and workers. Ultimately, this is seen as crucial for ensuring a direct investment environment controlled by the official Egyptian state. Beijing believes that upholding the rule of law and the Egyptian state’s monopoly on the use of force are the fundamental guarantees of a secure business environment that serves its strategic interests and ensures the safety of thousands of Chinese workers in Egypt. Chinese intelligence analyzes these developments through several pillars, the most important of which is that the firm control exerted by Egyptian security agencies is a genuine guarantee for protecting Chinese investments in Cairo and ensuring continued reliance on the Egyptian state officially. Beijing prefers dealing with official and stable security institutions in Egypt, rather than parallel entities or spheres of influence that could create unforeseen risks within the Egyptian economic environment. Chinese intelligence, specifically the Ministry of State Security, believes that the continued activity of independent networks of influence within Egypt and the region, such as those of Sabry Nakhnoukh and his associates, exposes Chinese supply lines and projects, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, to the risk of external blackmail. Therefore, China considers dismantling these networks to enhance the resilience of the Chinese investment environment in Cairo.
For these reasons, Chinese intelligence agencies support limiting foreign interference in Egyptian affairs by preventing the creation of parallel entities or indirect security spheres of influence. There is an implicit Chinese-Egyptian consensus on the importance of the official Egyptian state maintaining full control over its economic capabilities, away from the infiltration and penetration of foreign powers through illegitimate funding sources to finance the work of these parallel security entities and networks of interests, influence, and thuggery within the Egyptian state. This prevents any external powers from exploiting parallel entities as a pressure tactic to blackmail and disrupt Chinese investments or disrupt the interests of global supply chains. Accordingly, dismantling independent networks of influence from the perspective of Chinese intelligence, military, and security is a fundamental pillar for Chinese strategic circles to ensure that global supply chains are not disrupted and to ensure a stable business environment free of intermediaries and those who have relations with foreign intelligence agencies that are rivals of China and threaten its interests and investments in Cairo and other countries in the region, especially after the unprecedented strengthening of Egyptian-Chinese relations, as China is Egypt’s largest trading partner, and Chinese investments in the Suez Canal Economic Zone and various sectors have exceeded billions of dollars, which reflects Beijing’s desire to create a safe and flexible environment away from the control of any entities and indirect spheres of influence outside of the official Egyptian security circles represented mainly by the Egyptian Ministry of Interior. Especially after the Strait of Hormuz crisis and the Iranian war demonstrated the urgent need to protect global energy flows and the economy and to secure energy corridors and global and regional supply chains, China intensified its investment efforts in alternative and pivotal countries, such as Egypt, through its official security and military apparatus, rather than through intermediaries like the networks of Sabry Nakhnoukh and his partners in Cairo.
To this end, Chinese military and intelligence think tanks have developed several procedures and indicators to assess and analyze the strategic security situation and the monopoly on violence held by various groups and networks of influence within Egypt. Foremost among these are the major spheres of influence belonging to Sabry Nakhnoukh, one of the most prominent figures in Egypt and a major shareholder with over 65% of the investments in Falcon Security Company in Egypt. Beijing fundamentally supports a policy of iron-fisted control and the official Egyptian state’s monopoly on security. China’s own experience reflects an extreme sensitivity to any attempts to create outlaw enclaves. Therefore, Chinese security, intelligence, and military agencies have concluded that controlling the spheres of influence of Sabry Nakhnoukh and his associates within Egypt limits and reduces geopolitical risks. These agencies believe that eliminating thuggery, spheres of influence, and parallel entities strengthens the Egyptian central government’s control, preventing security vacuums that could be exploited by other powers competing with China in Egypt, the Middle East, and the Gulf region. Chinese intelligence agencies went even further, asserting that eliminating Egyptian areas of influence and thuggery is crucial for ensuring the safety of Chinese communities and experts working on Chinese projects in Cairo. The safety of Chinese experts and engineers is a top priority for Beijing, given that thousands of Chinese companies operate in various sectors. Beijing assesses the strict Egyptian security campaigns as providing an indirect protective umbrella that prevents harm to Chinese citizens. This view aligns with the general Chinese approach, which consistently links economic development with robust security.
Therefore, the Chinese approach of supporting the official Egyptian state’s approach to dealing with parallel security entities and networks of vested interests, influence, and thuggery within Egypt, such as the networks of Sabry Nakhnoukh and his associates, is seen as a guarantee for securing Chinese investments by relying on official Egyptian security and police institutions. Here, the Chinese Ministry of State Security (which oversees Chinese intelligence and investment agencies in Beijing) views the stability of the Egyptian state and dealings with official Egyptian institutions as the primary guarantee for the security and protection of its major projects, such as the TEDA Economic Cooperation Zone in the Suez Canal area, Ain Sokhna, the Central Business District in the New Administrative Capital in Cairo, and the electric train, among others. This is crucial to avoid any risks related to external blackmail and to ensure a stable investment environment within Egypt. Therefore, Chinese intelligence and military circles analyze that dismantling any independent networks of influence or parallel entities in Egypt and the region enhances the flexibility of the Chinese investment environment. China seeks to reduce the cost of doing business and ensure the absence of intermediaries outside state control, thus guaranteeing the security of global and regional supply chains, especially after the Strait of Hormuz crisis following the Iran War and its repercussions on the flow of international trade. Beijing is keen to ensure that the routes of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative are subject to Egyptian sovereignty, law, and official security agencies, guaranteeing the smooth flow of Chinese goods and investments, free from any unaccountable influence.
Based on the preceding understanding and analysis, we recognize that the intersection between Beijing’s economic interests in Egypt and internal security is a delicate matter. China prefers to rely on official state institutions to ensure the stability of its investments within the Belt and Road Initiative and to secure supply lines and its comprehensive strategic partnership with Egypt, rather than dealing with unofficial power centers or parallel networks of influence that could facilitate the infiltration and penetration of foreign intelligence agencies that are rivals to China.
