A Region in Recalibration
The Middle East rarely offers stillness, but the current moment carries a particular quality of transition. The fragile and controversial Abraham Accords normalisation initiative was a proof that old hatreds do not have to endure. In 2023, Saudi Arabia started to signal a strategic hedging approach over Iran with the help of China, departing from the binary alignment route with one external power.
Meanwhile, Syria’s tortured return to the Arab League after years of exile is a sign of the pragmatism that now preignites regional statecraft. All of this is nothing to do with peace. It’s, in fact, a managed reconfiguration of states that seek to move to a new spot in a new multipolar international order in which Washington’s security guarantees in the region won’t necessarily be assumed. Today, the punchline for analysts isn’t “is the Middle East changing,” but “is it changing enough and fast enough to create a system capable of absorbing the change without falling apart on the inside or getting bombed to bits on the outside?
The Iran Factor and the Limits of Détente
Any sense of regional dynamics that cannot include Iran’s presence is not credible. Tehran is at the same time a destabilizing entity, via its non-state proxies, and a state with legitimate security issues stemming from geography, history and the constant likelihood of external coercion. Saudi-Iranian relations have reduced tensions in Yemen and proxy conflicts in some areas of Iraq, but have failed to quell the structural rivalry in the Levant and the Gulf between Riyadh and Tehran for influence.
The nuclear programme is Iran’s top agenda and a key element of regional security. A series of diplomacy has been attempted, most recently the faltering attempts to revive a replacement deal with Iran to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), without any success to create a viable framework. Israel continues to have red lines and if no agreement is reached, the possibility of military escalation still exists. Iran has been steadily building its enrichment capacity and the diplomatic period for a verifiable deal is ticking down, all while the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been documenting its progress.
A point that is overlooked in the discussion of Iran in the West is that the Iranian decision-making process is not uniform. The Islamic Republic has a complex institutional structure with factions having fundamentally different perspectives on engagement with the West, economic reform, and the benefit of continued confrontation. External parties which view Iran as an indivisible and invulnerable enemy stand to miss out on important diplomatic possibilities – albeit limited – which may still exist.
Gulf Statecraft and the Logic of Strategic Autonomy
Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Saudi Arabia in particular, are working on a purposeful project of strategic diversification. The project for economic transformation, Vision 2030, is not just an economic reform programme for Riyadh, but also an attempt to break free from the constraints of traditional Saudi foreign policy. Theoretically, a kingdom that is not as reliant on hydrocarbon incomes and American security guarantees has more room to maneuver on the international scene.
The UAE has taken a similar path, albeit with great efficiency. By cultivating ties with China, India and Russia and maintaining its security ties with the United States, Abu Dhabi has been an example for smaller Gulf states in adopting a multi-alignment doctrine discreetly. This is not the sort of non-alignment that was imagined in the Cold War. It’s a sophisticated game of hedging, based on the belief that geopolitical rivalry creates space for states ready to establish productive relationships that span geopolitical divides.
The Palestinian Question: Unresolved and Unresolvable?
No analysis of Middle East regional developments can ignore the Palestinian issue. The months that followed October 2023 and the devastating consequences of the conflict have shown just how fragile normalisation processes built on the back of unaddressed core issues are. It’s ironic and depressing, but at the time the Abraham Accords were a bet by the signatory parties that the Palestinian issue could be put on the back burner for a long time. It’s been put to the test on that bet.
The political and reputation consequences of Arab governments’ indifference to Palestinian suffering have greatly increased. In Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and the Gulf states, domestic publics remain very attached to the Palestinian cause, a cause which no government can ignore. This poses a structural tension to the heart of Arab normalisation diplomacy: the need to work for economic and security advantages of closer cooperation with Israel exists in a continuing tension with the political imperative of meaningfully promoting the cause of Palestinian rights. The regional government’s course in this balancing act will determine the sustainability of any future diplomatic structure.
External Powers and the Competition for Influence
The Middle East has been a field of external power play ever since the very dawn of its history and the present time is no exception. Beijing’s increased economic influence via infrastructure investments, energy deals, and the Belt and Road Initiative has improved its influence in China while not taking on security obligations traditionally associated with Western influence. The costs and international isolation engendered by its war in Ukraine have dampened Russia’s appetite for further military involvement in the region but the country has still some leverage in certain areas, bolstered by its military presence in Syria.
The challenge for the United States is always to get its region calibrations right, however. American public opinion is wary of “entanglements” in the Middle East, but the region’s importance for the world’s supply of energy, its location near key maritime choke points and the intersection between counter-terrorism and Middle East considerations means that the U.S. cannot pull out completely. The outcome is a cyclical pattern of partial withdrawal and reactive re-engagement which appeals to no one – and certainly not both – who are looking for reliability and who are looking for restraint.
Towards a Realistic Assessment
The Middle East didn’t have to be on a “straight line” to stability and is not destined to live in conflict. What is visible is an area of real flux, of no longer being certain about the nature of the alliances, of no longer expecting external guarantees, of no longer being able to rely on the control of conflicts that are not resolved. Meanwhile, the regional states are being more active and creative in their diplomacy than external observers might assume, and are facing structural problems (economy, inequality; population, pressure; water, scarcity; institutions, weakness) that can only be addressed to a limited degree with diplomatic skill.
For policymakers, scholars, and engaged observers, the imperative is to resist both excessive pessimism and premature optimism. The diplomatic openings of the past three years are real, even if fragile. The humanitarian crises in Gaza, Sudan, and Yemen are catastrophic, even if their resolution appears distant. And the structural transformations underway in Gulf political economies, in Iran’s domestic politics, and in the broader architecture of regional security will take years, perhaps decades, to resolve into a recognizable new order. Engaging that complexity honestly is the beginning of any useful analysis.
