India’s defence forces vision 2047 reflects a broader transformation in its concept of strategic autonomy. Traditionally associated with nonalignment and the preservation of decision-making independence, strategic autonomy is increasingly being reinterpreted through the lens of power projection and geopolitical influence. India is evolving from a postcolonial power focused on strategic restraint into an aspiring major power willing to employ military capabilities in pursuit of broader geopolitical objectives. This shift is reinforced by PM Modi’s evolving Middle East policy, which no longer treats the regions merely as a source of energy security and remittances, but as a theatre for strategic projection and security partnerships. Against the backdrop of the KSA- Pakistan defence agreement, India’s expanding regional role may accelerate bloc politics in the Middle East.
In March 2026, Indian Defense Minister released a document, Defence Forces Vision 2047, outlining the futuristic objectives of the Indian Army. What makes this document different, from previous reform initiatives, is the recentering of force in Indian foreign policy. It indicates that strategic autonomy is not merely a defensive plan but becoming proactive and power projective. As the foreword notes, the objective is to build a ‘world-class military’ capable of securing India’s interests and asserting its place in the emerging global order. It transforms strategic autonomy from ‘autonomy through distance’ to ‘autonomy through capability and power’.
In India’s ‘Greater Indo-Pacific’ vision, the Middle East acts as a geostrategic hub accounting for trade corridors, energy security, and expatriate ties. Since 2014, Modi government has been engaged in multi-alignment, avoiding bloc politics. However, when the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) was announced in 2023, New Delhi began considering the Middle East as a connectivity Hub, geopolitical theatre, and a security environment ties to India’s rise, making the Middle East a part of India’s extended strategic space.
In May 2026, India and UAE signed a strategic defence partnership, which aims at deepening defence industrial collaboration. Both countries will cooperate on innovation, advance technology, training, maritime security, and information exchange. Defence cooperation will increase between UAE and India along with intelligence cooperation. Besides, defense diplomacy through joint exercises, military visits, and peacekeeping will enhance trust and cooperation between two countries.
The importance of India-UAE partnership extends beyond bilateral relations. It increasingly complements the broader strategic logic of the I2U2 framework, which links India, the UAE, Israel, and the US through cooperation in technology, connectivity, and logistics. Although I2U2 is not a formal military pact, it highlights an emerging minilateral architecture that links economic integration with strategic coordination. As New Delhi deepens defence cooperation with the UAE while simultaneously advancing initiatives like IMEC, it is becoming embedded within the wider network of partnerships that seek to shape the future of regional order.
Another important aspect of this partnership is the strategic petroleum reserves, which will enable India to store its oil reserves in Fujairah, UAE. Fujairah is the largest oil refinery and a storing hub of the UAE, located outside the strait of Hormuz. In the US-Iran war, Iran launched missiles and drones causing harm and exposing the vulnerability of the facility. Against this backdrop, storing India’s reserves would not only create energy interdependency but also increase long-term stakes to protect the infrastructure and maritime routes. As the Defense Vision 2047 highlights dealing with emerging conflict spectrum, New Delhi will inevitably protect those reserves, maritime routes and infrastructure.
In addition to it, this partnership represents a flexible alliance without treaty obligations. For instance, this agreement does not contain any clause that an attack on one is an attack on the other, like Pakistan-Saudi Arabia defence agreement. New Delhi would not like to sign a deal like Pakistan-Saudi Arabia because it would put itself in the rivalry between the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Likewise, trade relation between New Delhi and Riyad makes it unlikely for the latter to sign a formal defence deal with the UAE. While India’s exports to Saudi Arabia were to the tune of $12 billion in FY25, its imports, mainly comprising petroleum products, were more than $30 billion.
Simultaneously, the emergence of an alternative alliance comprising KSA, Pakistan, Turkiye, and Egypt reflects the formation of competing alignment structures in the Middle East. Although India and UAE partnership does not constitute a formal alliance, it contributes to the emergence of competing alignment networks in the Middle East. As India expands its security role through defence cooperation, intelligence sharing and maritime security initiatives. Other regional and extra-regional actors may respond by strengthening alternative security partnerships, reinforcing bloc-like alignments and intensifying strategic competition across the Middle East.
To sum up, India is not abandoning the strategic autonomy, it is redefining it for an era of competitive multipolarity. Through economic and strategic initiatives, such as I2U2, IMEC, and India-UAE, and the objectives outlined in the Defence Vision 2047, New Delhi is transforming strategic autonomy from a doctrine of non-alignment into one of proactive engagement and power projection. Under this framework, limited security partnerships suit India’s interests because they preserve flexibility in strategic alignments while expanding its influence beyond South Asia. The India-UAE partnership illustrates this evolution by enabling New Delhi to remain free from binding alliance commitments while simultaneously becoming a stakeholder in the security architecture of the Middle East. However, as India deepens its regional security engagement amid the emergence of competing strategic alignments, its growing role may also contribute to the consolidation of bloc-like politics in an increasingly fragmented Middle Eastern order.
