China manages its logistical presence in the Middle East through a strategy of using civilian ports for long-term military purposes to safeguard its interests and investments in the Belt and Road Initiative, gradually moving towards establishing a long-term strategic presence. Here is a comprehensive analysis of how this presence is maintained and its future, based on a detailed analysis by an Egyptian researcher – As an expert on Chinese politics and the policies of the ruling Communist Party of China – of the following military elements:
- First: Analyzing the scope, structure, and significance of China’s strategic engagement across the Middle East, including defense cooperation, military training, arms transfers, security partnerships, and potential military presence
- Second: Does China conduct or participate in military training activities in the Middle East, and in which countries are these activities taking place? What is the nature and scope of these training activities, including whether they include bilateral military cooperation, joint exercises, officer training programs, or technical or operational training?
- Third: Does China have defense cooperation agreements or security partnerships with specific countries in the Middle East? And to what extent do these partnerships include defense technology transfer, assistance in modernizing the military, or long-term supply relationships?
- Fourth: Does China participate in joint military exercises or naval activities with Middle Eastern countries?
- Fifth: Does China maintain or seek to develop logistical access, port facilities, or other forms of military presence in the region?
- Sixth: What are the potential strategic motives behind Chinese military intervention in the region, including protecting trade routes, protecting investments and overseas infrastructure, securing energy supply lines, and expanding geopolitical influence?
- Seventh: Will Chinese military intervention in the Middle East remain limited and primarily utilitarian, or does it indicate the emergence of a long-term strategic military presence in the region?
- Eighth: An analytical assessment of Chinese defense cooperation and arms transfers involving Middle Eastern countries
- Ninth: Assessing regional security trends that influence Chinese military engagement
- First: Analyzing the scope, structure, and significance of China’s strategic engagement across the Middle East, including defense cooperation, military training, arms transfers, security partnerships, and potential military presence
The Middle East is witnessing a radical transformation in the nature of international relations with the rise of China’s role. Beijing has shifted from being a neutral buyer of energy to a comprehensive strategic partner seeking to enhance its political, security, and economic influence. By 2026, China’s engagement in the region will be characterized by a multidimensional structure that integrates the Belt and Road Initiative with enhanced defense capabilities and security cooperation, exploiting the relative vacuum left by the decline in American focus. The scope, structure, and significance of this Chinese engagement can be analyzed by examining the scope and structure of China’s strategic participation in the Middle East. Here, the Chinese strategy rests on three integrated pillars: Economically, this involves consolidating the Belt and Road Initiative, increasing investments in infrastructure and technology, and securing energy supplies, as China has become the largest trading partner for many countries in the region. Diplomatically, this includes launching initiatives such as the Global Security Initiative in 2022 and the World Civilization Initiative in 2023, presenting an alternative model to the West, mediating regional issues (such as the Saudi-Iranian mediation), and proposing a four-point plan to promote peace and stability in the Middle East in April 2026. From a security and military perspective: the shift towards deepening defense cooperation and transferring military technology represents a move from economic neutrality to a deliberate security engagement.
Regarding China’s defense cooperation and security partnerships from 2025 to 2026, the Middle East region has witnessed a growing defense and security partnership with China. Sino-Arab relations are experiencing significant growth and are viewed as a key element of balance amidst regional crises. China is keen on joint military training and exercises, exemplified by the first joint air exercise between China and Egypt, Civilization Eagle-2025, which included J-10C fighter jets, KJ-500 early warning aircraft, and YU-20 tanker aircraft.
In this context, the Chinese Minister of Defense emphasized in April 2026 the strengthening of defense and security cooperation within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
Regarding arms transfers, defense industries, and advanced weapons exports to the Middle East, China’s military and defense presence has been bolstered by the export of advanced systems, such as the (J-35AE stealth fighter and the export of unmanned aerial vehicles UAVs).
Despite US sanctions, Chinese companies continue to export dual-use components, including engines and electronic chips, for the Iranian drone industry. In addition to its eagerness to transfer Chinese technology to countries in the region, China has focused on supporting its allies, particularly Iran, by developing missile capabilities through reverse engineering and supplying them with machinery and components for missile programs. This is coupled with the signing of future Chinese arms deals, including China’s readiness to ship man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) to Iran.
This coincided with the consolidation of the Chinese military presence at the Djibouti naval base in the Horn of Africa, a region of vital importance to Chinese interests. The People’s Liberation Army base in Djibouti, established in 2017, serves as a cornerstone of the Chinese presence near crucial Red Sea shipping lanes. This is further evidenced by China’s naval activities in the region and across Africa, where the Chinese navy projects power through guided-missile destroyers like the (Zibo and frigates in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea).
Herein lies China’s ambition: Beijing seeks to build a broader military presence to protect its economic interests, despite the challenges of limited joint operations far beyond its borders. The significance and objectives of China’s strategy lie in ensuring energy security, guaranteeing the safe flow of oil and gas, a significant portion of which transits through the Middle East. This is coupled with China’s consistent advocacy for multipolarity, challenging American hegemony in the region and striving to establish a less liberal world order. Furthermore, the Belt and Road Initiative, aimed at securing massive infrastructure investments, is crucial, as Chinese security cooperation with Middle Eastern, Gulf, and African countries is seen as a decisive factor in the continuation of Chinese projects in the region. With Beijing attempting to fill the void, it is fostering the perception that it is the most reliable partner in Middle East diplomacy.
Based on the preceding analysis, we understand that by 2026, China will have established itself as a major power in the Middle East. Its engagement comprising diplomacy, economics, and defense cooperation reflects a long-term strategy to alter regional dynamics, compelling countries in the region to reassess their strategic alignments.
- Second: Does China conduct or participate in military training activities in the Middle East, and in which countries are these activities taking place? What is the nature and scope of these training activities, including whether they include bilateral military cooperation, joint exercises, officer training programs, or technical or operational training?
Yes, China is increasingly involved in military exercises and activities in the Middle East region, and these activities are part of its comprehensive military diplomacy aimed at strengthening the strategic partnership with the countries of the region, according to data for 2024-2026. Among the most prominent countries where Chinese activities are conducted is Egypt. China has conducted air and naval exercises, with April 2025 witnessing the first joint air exercise, dubbed Civilization Eagle 2025. In addition, China has conducted other military maneuvers with Saudi Arabia, known as the Blue Sword exercises.
The joint naval exercises are a significant milestone, with the third iteration (Blue Sword-2025) held in October 2025 in Jeddah and Jubail. China also participated with Iran in the annual Maritime Security Belt exercises 2025/2026, alongside Russia, in the Gulf of Oman near the (Iranian port of Chabahar). China also hosted military forces from the United Arab Emirates for the joint air exercise Falcon Shield-2024 in Xinjiang (an exchange exercise).
Regarding the nature and scope of Chinese training activities, they are characterized by a focus on realistic live-fire exercises and special forces training, including: (exercises Joint exercises), particularly Chinese naval exercises with countries in the region, focus on maritime security, counter-piracy, search and rescue, and inspection and seizure operations (VBSS).
Examples include the Blue Sword exercises with Saudi Arabia and the Maritime Security Belt exercises with Iran and Russia. Chinese air exercises, such as the Civilization Eagle 2025 exercises with Egypt, included air maneuvers, aerial refueling, and rescue operations. Bilateral military cooperation (special forces) is also ongoing, with the Blue Sword exercises with Saudi Arabia focusing on counterterrorism. Chinese special operations training is also increasing, encompassing remote warfare, sniping, live-fire tactical exercises, and hostage rescue.
China also offers several officer training and military education programs. High-level visits are conducted to exchange training expertise, such as the visit of a high-ranking Chinese military delegation to the (Egyptian National Defense Academy) in November 2024 and to Oman in June 2024. The aim is to enhance operational integration and standardize combat concepts between Chinese forces and their counterparts. Arabic. With (technical and operational training), Chinese elite military exercises include the integration of unmanned systems (drones) and air defense operations drills.
Accordingly, China focuses its exercises on enhancing interoperability, training for operations in complex environments, and securing maritime trade routes while attempting to avoid direct involvement in regional conflicts.
- Third: Does China have defense cooperation agreements or security partnerships with specific countries in the Middle East? And to what extent do these partnerships include: defense technology transfer, assistance in modernizing the military, or long-term supply relationships?
Yes, China is forging security partnerships and growing defense cooperation with specific countries in the Middle East, transforming from a mere arms supplier into a strategic partner in modernizing militaries and transferring technology. Beijing is focusing on comprehensive strategic partnerships with key regional powers (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Iran), capitalizing on these countries desire to diversify their arms sources and reduce their dependence on the United States, particularly in the areas of drones and air defense. These Chinese partnerships include the transfer of defense technology and the localization of Chinese industries in the region. China is actively pursuing the transfer and localization of defense technology, a cornerstone of its cooperation with Gulf states, through deals to supply Chinese drones (unmanned aerial vehicles), such as the close cooperation between the UAE and China, especially through the (EDGE Group).
To localize drone technologies and develop joint production programs. Deals involving Chinese ballistic missiles, such as providing military assistance to Saudi Arabia in building facilities for the production and maintenance of ballistic missiles, and the localization of Chinese aviation in the region through the signing of memoranda of understanding between Saudi Arabia and Chinese companies to localize space industries.
In addition to Chinese assistance and support in modernizing Gulf and Arab armies, China focuses on providing the region’s militaries with advanced capabilities they lack due to Western export restrictions. China also offers several initiatives in air defense and electronic systems. Saudi Arabia seeks advanced Chinese expertise in air defense, particularly the Silent Hunter anti-drone system.
This is in addition to joint Chinese military exercises in the region, such as joint naval and air exercises with (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran). China also provides military training to countries in the region on modern warfare management, with a focus on training in electronic warfare technologies and command and control.
These Chinese military relations include long-term supply relationships, where China employs a comprehensive arms transfer strategy centered on the sale of drones and smart weapons, such as the Wing Loong-2 and Wing Loong-3 drones, to Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
China is also attempting to sign joint production contracts to manufacture (CH-4 drones) in Saudi Arabia, aiming to establish a regional maintenance and production hub. Furthermore, China exports fighter jets to Gulf and regional states, including deals to export attack trainer aircraft to the UAE. China’s most prominent partners in the Gulf are Saudi Arabia, which focuses on joint missile and drone production and has a strong presence at the World Defence Exhibition, and the UAE, which focuses on transferring Chinese artificial intelligence and drone technology and cooperating in the space sector. The UAE is considered a comprehensive strategic partner of China. Egypt is among the first Arab countries to sign comprehensive strategic partnerships with China and cooperates militarily with Beijing. Iran is also a strategic partner for China, with China being described as vital to the development of Iran’s drone industry.
It should be noted that despite this expansion of Chinese military cooperation with countries in the region, China still avoids offering direct security guarantees (such as permanent military bases) like those offered by the United States, preferring to focus on selling equipment and technology.
- Fourth: Does China participate in joint military exercises or naval activities with Middle Eastern countries?
Yes, China is increasingly involved in joint military exercises and naval activities with Middle Eastern countries, working to bolster its military presence in the region as part of its broader strategy to secure energy routes and expand its influence. Among the most prominent Chinese activities and exercises with countries in the region are: the Maritime Security Belt exercises (with Iran and Russia), in which China regularly participates in this annual trilateral naval exercise in the Gulf of Oman. The 2026 edition (Maritime Security Belt 2026) commenced in February 2026, with the participation of Chinese destroyers and special forces. Also noteworthy are the Civilization Eagle exercises between Egypt and China, with the Chinese Ministry of Defense announcing the first joint air exercise with Egypt in April 2025, dubbed Civilization Eagle 2025. Furthermore, China’s military cooperation with the UAE is significant, as China announced its first-ever joint military exercises with the United Arab Emirates in China in 2023, marking a qualitative shift in its military relations in the Gulf.
This coincided with growing Chinese naval activity in the Arabian Gulf region. The year 2026 witnessed an increase in the Chinese navy’s presence, including the deployment of intelligence vessels and advanced Chinese destroyers, such as the Type 055 class, to the Gulf of Oman and the Strait of Hormuz, according to Israeli and international reports.
The objectives of the Chinese military presence lie in protecting Chinese energy interests. Through its ships in the Sea of ​​Oman and the Gulf of Aden, China aims to secure its oil imports, especially after the increase in maritime disruptions in the region, and to bolster its Belt and Road Initiative investments. The Chinese military presence is considered a natural extension of its expanding economic influence in the region.
Here, China presents itself as a security alternative, as some countries in the region seek to reduce their exclusive dependence on American military technology through cooperation with China. It is noteworthy that Chinese cooperation focuses heavily on naval aspects and air exercises, with Beijing avoiding formal defense commitments and concentrating on dialogue and diplomacy to de-escalate regional tensions.
- Fifth: Does China maintain or seek to develop logistical access, port facilities, or other forms of military presence in the region?
Yes, China is actively maintaining a growing military presence and aggressively pursuing the development and expansion of strategic logistical access and port facilities in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond, as part of a long-term strategy to enhance its power projection capabilities and protect its commercial and maritime interests globally. This Chinese presence is not limited to traditional military bases; it also utilizes a dual-use (civil-military) model for commercial ports developed by Chinese companies. A prime example of this Chinese presence in 2026 is the Djibouti base (a People’s Liberation Army Support Base), China’s only official overseas military base. Established in 2017, it has been upgraded to include an aircraft carrier-capable berth and can accommodate up to two brigades of troops, thus bolstering China’s naval capabilities in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden.
In addition to the (Chinese naval base in Reem), Cambodia, which is undergoing significant expansion and funding from China, new facilities were opened in April 2025, including a deep-water pier and a dry dock. This gives China a strategic foothold in the Gulf of Thailand, near the disputed South China Sea. American and Western concerns may be heightened by the potential use of this base by the Chinese navy.
The Chinese navy is also focused on building and developing string ports of pearls (dual-use civilian-military ports). China seeks to secure access to commercial ports that can be converted for military purposes when needed, such as the Pakistani port of Gwadar, which gives China direct access to the Arabian Sea.
The People’s Liberation Army has also been developing the (port of Kyaukphyu) in Myanmar, which connects China to the Bay of Bengal via pipelines, and the (Chinese port of Hambantota) in Sri Lanka, which serves as a strategic location for China in the middle of the Indian Ocean.
The Chinese navy has been keen to expand its presence in the Pacific. In 2025, it increased its operations and exercises beyond the First Island Chain, including maneuvers near Australia and New Zealand, reflecting an ambition to intensify China’s presence in the Southwest Pacific.
This Chinese naval presence relies on a civilian-first, military-later strategy. China leverages the Belt and Road Initiative to build ports and implements a civil-military integration that allows the Chinese military to utilize this infrastructure. Structural designs and maintenance facilities incorporate capabilities to support warships, ensuring a rapid response when needed, essentially converting them into military bases when required.
- Sixth: What are the potential strategic motives behind Chinese military intervention in the region, including protecting trade routes, protecting investments and overseas infrastructure, securing energy supply lines, and expanding geopolitical influence?
Analyses and publicly stated Chinese strategies indicate that China’s military intervention in the Middle East and North Africa is not aimed at direct hegemony as a replacement for the United States, but rather at pragmatic militarization to protect its vast and growing economic interests within the framework of a militarized development strategy. China’s main strategic motives are to protect trade routes and maritime passages, and to secure vital waterways. Here, China relies on securing maritime shipping routes from the Arabian Gulf through the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean to China. China is keen on maintaining a permanent naval presence; since 2008, it has maintained a continuous naval presence (three warships) in the Gulf of Aden to protect commercial vessels from piracy. China is also keen on controlling chokepoints, and here it seeks to secure the (Strait of Hormuz and the Bab El-Mandeb Strait), which are vital for its trade, especially after recent unrest.
In addition to its commitment to protecting overseas investments and infrastructure (the Belt and Road Initiative), China has invested hundreds of billions of dollars in infrastructure (ports, pipelines, and industrial zones) in countries such as the UAE, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.
The danger lies in China’s dual use of ports, meaning the transformation of commercial ports it is building, such as Duqm Port in Oman, Gwadar Port in Pakistan, and Doraleh Port in Djibouti, into dual-use (civilian/military) logistics bases to secure its presence.
In recent years, China has increasingly relied on private security companies. It has begun employing these companies to protect its assets and personnel in unstable regions, particularly in the Middle East. With Beijing seeking to secure its energy supply lines (energy security), due to China’s reliance on the region’s oil approximately 50% of China’s oil imports and 30% of its liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports transiting the Strait of Hormuz Gulf security becomes a vital issue for Chinese national security. In addition to its long-standing strategic partnerships with countries in the region, China has entered into agreements, such as the (25-year agreement with Iran), to ensure a stable energy flow, necessitating security protection for these Chinese investments. This coincides with China’s efforts to expand its geopolitical influence through a policy of balancing diplomacy, where Beijing seeks to present itself as a neutral diplomatic alternative through mediation, such as the 2023 Saudi-Iranian reconciliation.
What’s new is China’s promotion of a militarized development model instead of direct intervention. This is achieved by strengthening its presence through arms sales and joint military exercises, particularly with Iran and Russia. Furthermore, China established a military base in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa in 2017. This base represents a significant shift, being China’s first overseas base, enabling the Chinese navy to conduct evacuation operations and protect its interests in Africa and the Middle East.
Therefore, we conclude that China is operating in the region through a light-footprint strategy. This strategy integrates economic interests with a limited military presence, aiming to protect the flow of Chinese energy and investments while leveraging the security umbrella provided by the United States to avoid the costs of direct intervention.
- Seventh: Will Chinese military intervention in the Middle East remain limited and primarily utilitarian, or does it indicate the emergence of a long-term strategic military presence in the region?
China’s military presence in the Middle East until early 2026 indicates a gradual shift toward a long-term strategic presence, but it remains pragmatic and utilitarian, and does not seek to replace the United States as the sole security guarantor in the region. Beijing aims to protect its growing economic interests and secure energy routes while avoiding direct involvement in regional conflicts, preferring military alternatives such as defense partnerships and a naval presence. Here, we can analyze the features of China’s strategic direction in 2026 through the evolution of its strategic presence. The Chinese naval base in Djibouti (which has been expanded and for which contracts have been signed to guarantee its continued operation until 2026) demonstrates China’s ability to project naval power. China uses the base for evacuating citizens and supporting anti-piracy operations, reflecting a shift from coastal defense to long-range naval power.
Here, China has adopted a military range strategy instead of relying on traditional bases. It now exerts its influence by building a network of civilian-military ports, such as developing ports in Djibouti and the UAE, and by conducting joint military exercises, particularly with Egypt and the UAE. This allows it to secure its interests without bearing the burden of regional conflicts.
Furthermore, China has played a role of strategic technological intervention during the 2026 crises in the Middle East. It has strengthened its position by providing parties such as Iran with intelligence via the (Jiming-1 satellite and the Chinese BeiDou Navigation Satellite System). This grants it military influence without deploying troops, which constitutes a strategic drain on Western and American capabilities.
With China’s strengthening of the principle of strategic independence partnerships, as evidenced by the efforts of regional states (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt) to diversify their security partnerships with China, they see in China a technologically advanced defense partner that does not interfere in their internal affairs, thus reinforcing the Chinese presence as a balancing force.
Therefore, we understand that China’s intervention in 2026 is a delicate mix. It is pragmatic in that it focuses on energy security and protecting investments (the Belt and Road Initiative), but it is also strategic in its pursuit of reducing American hegemony and creating a long-term security network of influence. Hence, China is building an indirect military Silk Road, not a classic base empire.
- Eighth: An analytical assessment of Chinese defense cooperation and arms transfers involving Middle Eastern countries
Defense cooperation and arms transfers between China and Middle Eastern countries are witnessing a significant strategic shift, as Beijing seeks to establish itself as a pragmatic security partner and an alternative supplier of advanced weaponry, capitalizing on Western restrictions. An analytical assessment of this cooperation, based on developments in 2026, reveals that China’s strategy is based on (quiet expansion, soft power, and filling power vacuums). China adopts a light foothold policy in the region, avoiding direct intervention in conflicts, but exploiting US restrictions on the export of certain weapons, such as armed drones, to enhance its influence. This Chinese strategy is grounded in the doctrine of soft power, whereby instead of traditional military bases, China focuses on joint military exercises, high-level visits, and joint arms production projects, as demonstrated in its military development with Saudi Arabia.
With China’s strategy of multilateral cooperation, Beijing is leveraging the Belt and Road Initiative to strengthen defense ties and secure energy routes, particularly in light of threats to maritime security.
China’s arms transfers to countries in the region are driven by a focus on advanced technology, drones, and missiles. China has become the primary supplier of armed drones, such as the CH-4 and Wing Loong, to several Gulf states.
In addition to transferring and localizing Chinese technology and manufacturing, China is no longer content with simply selling weapons. It aims to establish local production lines, such as the deal to manufacture (Wing Loong-3 drones) in Saudi Arabia, making the Kingdom a regional hub for Chinese drone production. China has also collaborated in building Saudi Arabia’s indigenous ballistic missile capabilities, indicating a high level of trust and the transfer of sensitive technology. Simultaneously, while China supports its Iranian ally, it has, albeit cautiously, provided indirect support through dual-use materials (missile components, drones, and intelligence equipment) and discussions regarding cruise missiles, thus assisting Iran in rebuilding its capabilities.
China’s main partnerships with countries in the region until 2026 are based on strong ties, particularly with Saudi Arabia, where military relations are witnessing unprecedented development, focusing on air defense systems, drones, and the establishment of local production facilities. China’s strategic partnership with the United Arab Emirates rests on several pillars. The UAE is among the first buyers of Chinese drones and maintains advanced defense deals despite US restrictions. As for China’s partnership with Iran, it is characterized by Chinese support for arms and defense production, keeping Iran within China’s sphere of influence. On the Egyptian side, numerous security, military, and defense partnerships have been explored to enhance cooperation in defense manufacturing with China, which presents logistical challenges in integrating Chinese and Western systems.
As for the strategic analysis of the repercussions of this Chinese support through (strategic, military, defense, and security) partnerships with the Gulf and other countries in the region, its importance lies in the potential for a shift in the balance of power. While the United States remains the largest security supplier, Chinese weapons are beginning to influence the regional balance of power, particularly in asymmetric warfare (drone warfare).
These Chinese moves are seen as an attempt to undermine American hegemony, as Arab states seek to diversify their suppliers as a national security strategy. However, on the other hand, quality and policy challenges arise. Chinese defense industries face accusations of structural corruption and quality issues, which may limit their complete reliance as a full alternative to Western and American weapons. Furthermore, the American and Western propaganda campaign highlighting the threat of Chinese technology has raised concerns. Chinese deals, such as the joint radar/air defense agreement between Saudi Arabia and a Western company, which failed due to the Saudi company’s ties to Russia and China, have sparked American anxieties regarding the protection of classified information.
Based on the preceding analysis and understanding, we conclude that China is transitioning from being merely an arms dealer to a strategic defense partner in the Middle East. This shift will continue to complicate relations between the countries of the region and the United States, bolstering the local capabilities of these countries and providing a vital technological umbrella for Beijing’s allies in the region.
- Ninth: Assessing regional security trends that influence Chinese military engagement
Regional security trends in the Indo-Pacific region are undergoing radical transformations, prompting China to significantly increase its military engagement to bolster its sovereignty and secure its strategic interests. Intelligence and strategic analysis for 2026 anticipates continued gray zone tensions and a 7% increase in the defense budget, with a focus on Chinese military modernization to counter US challenges and the surrounding geopolitical shifts. Within this framework, we can assess the key security trends influencing Chinese military engagement, most notably the US-China rivalry and its impact on the gray zone, as well as China’s strategy of containment and confrontation with Washington. Here, China faces an increasingly competitive security environment with the United States, which relies on alliances with countries such as Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. Furthermore, the gray zone escalation between China and the United States involves China employing non-overtly military operations (gray zone tactics) to exert pressure on Taiwan and the Philippines, leading to heightened tensions in the South China Sea.
In 2026, China is expected to continue using its coast guard and naval militias to assert its sovereignty without resorting to direct war. This comes amidst espionage and technological advancements. The year 2026 witnessed a shift in the rivalry between Washington and Beijing, transforming into an open technological and intelligence confrontation, with the United States conducting active espionage operations to penetrate Chinese military systems. Adding to the tensions surrounding Taiwan and the island chain, and a significant military escalation by China, Beijing intensified its air and naval military activities around Taiwan in 2025 and 2026 in response to US support for Taiwan.
According to 2026 conflict scenarios, a limited blockade or naval clash in the Taiwan Strait could ignite a wider crisis, as China develops sufficient capabilities to exert control over the region. Coinciding with the South China Sea disputes and the escalating confrontation between China and the Philippines, clashes between the Chinese and Philippine coast guards intensified in 2025 and 2026, particularly near (Second Thomas Shoal). With increasing militarization, China has augmented its military presence in the South China Sea to bolster its claims, sometimes exploiting US commitments in other regions, such as the Middle East, to exert pressure on neighboring countries. This highlights the ongoing Sino-Indian rivalry, land border tensions, and persistent conflicts. Despite de-escalation efforts, the border with India remains a potential flashpoint, as China prepares to counter the dispersal of its military efforts across multiple fronts (sea and land).
Recently, China’s military engagement outside its regional sphere, known as maritime diplomacy, has increased. China has resumed its military participation through maritime guardianship task forces to combat piracy and strengthen its presence in regions such as the Middle East, including joint exercises with the UAE, to bolster its economic and security influence through the Belt and Road Initiative.
From this, we can conclude, analytically, that China, by 2026, is striving to achieve a delicate balance between deterring American intervention in its sphere of influence and avoiding a direct confrontation that could hinder its economic rise. This is being done through strengthening its military capabilities (A2/AD) to cover the first island chain, while employing the principle of gradual power in the South China Sea and Taiwan (the gray zone), and strengthening its alliances, such as coordinating with Russia, to counter the strategic encirclement by Western and American alliances.
