Milton Friedman spoke these words regarding economics and politics. Yet they ring just as true in the Middle East where myths abound with real costs. Israeli politician Avigdor Lieberman outlined in 2006 three common false assumptions: that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the main cause of instability in the Middle East; that the conflict is territorial and not ideological; and that the establishment of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders will end the conflict. These views are not only misguided but damaging. They prevent a realistic understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Middle East and obscure the solutions needed to bring about real improvements in the region.
1 The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the main cause of instability in the Middle East
During its modern history the Middle East has been racked by conflicts. However, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has consistently received the most attention from US administrations and the United Nations. US Presidents since 1967 have sought to be the premier who solves the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Camp David is one example of the grand geopolitical efforts by the US government to invest vast social capital into attempting to resolve this specific conflict. The UN’s unwavering focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been even more disproportionate. In 1980 almost 50 per cent of Security Council sessions centred on Israel despite the ongoing Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq War and situation in Poland. Similarly, in 2022 the United Nations General Assembly passed more resolutions critical of Israel than against all other nations combined. While a myriad of factors contributes to this tunnel-visioned focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a major driver is this myth that the conflict is the root cause of Middle Eastern instability.
At times the conflict does spill over and bedevil the wider Middle East. The effects of this are seen in Lebanon. The arrival of Palestinian refugees following the 1948 and 1967 wars destabilised the country’s precarious sectarian and religious balance. The subsequent use of southern Lebanon as a Palestinian militant base, and the cycles of attack on Israel and Israeli military responses, weakened South Lebanon. Alongside many other factors, this set the groundwork for the bloody Lebanese Civil War with its death toll numbering around 150,000. However, the idea that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the main driver of chronic wars and instability of the modern Middle East is foolhardy. Most of deadliest conflicts and instabilities of the modern Middle East are of course utterly unrelated to Israel-Palestine. The Iran-Iraq War with over a million casualties; the Syrian Civil war with over 500,000; and the Yemenite Civil War with over 300,000 – among countless other examples – put this myth to bed.
This myth also tends to entail the mistaken belief that only by solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can peace, security and prosperity spread throughout the Middle East. A just and practical solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would of course be welcome. Nevertheless, huge amounts of progress on the wider Middle East can be made without such a solution – progress that is likely more feasible considering the failure of countless US administration and international conflict resolutions to solve the Israel-Palestine conflict. This was demonstrated by the Abraham Accords which brought about normalisation between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain with subsequent agreements including Sudan (unratified) and Morocco. These clearly brought political improvements to the region increasing Middle Eastern stability. The economic benefits of the agreement were also immense with increased commerce and trade. One illuminating example was the free flow of Israeli venture capital into Abu Dhabi, leading to a multitude of joint investment development projects.
Hence the myth that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the key driver of Middle Eastern instability is not only erroneous but also harmful in precluding more practical peace-making efforts.
2 The conflict is territorial and not ideological
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, despite the dominant narrative outside of the Middle East, has not been driven by a competition for territory. Rather it is the ideological, ethnic and religious enmity between the two peoples that is the true motivating force of the conflict from its inception until today.
The 1929 Palestinian riots and Hebron massacre clearly indicate the ideological underpinnings of the conflict at its earliest beginnings. These conflagrations were of such importance to the development of the conflict that 1929 is referred to by historian Hillel Cohen as Year Zero of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. The Palestinian riots were caused by conflict over religious Jewish services at the Wailing Wall. Amin al-Husseini, Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, fearing the growing Jewish presence at the Western Wall distributed leaflets suggesting a Jewish attempt take over Al-Aqsa. He sought to halt any Jewish presences by organising new construction next to the wall and driving mules through the praying areas. This unsurprisingly triggered a Zionist response. The Pro–Wailing Wall Committee was established by Joseph Klausner and a demonstration was held proclaiming ‘The Wall is ours’. This unleashed Palestinian fantasies of imminent Zionist plots to take over al-Aqsa, and resulted in a violent uprising. The very Arabic name Thawrat al-Burāq (Buraq Uprising) illustrates the religious nature of these riots. The British-appointed Shaw Commission recognised that the trigger for the Palestinian riots was not territorial competition but rather religious fears over Al-Aqsa Mosque due to ‘the Jewish demonstration … at the Wailing Wall’. The Palestinian riots particularly the Hebron Massacre led to much suffering and had an immense role in the development of the conflict to this day. Due to the riots, a radical shift in the Zionist movement occurred with widespread militarisation including the Haganah’s expansion and the development of new Zionist militias including the Irgun in 1931. Additionally, the riots shattered many hopes for the possibility of coexistence between Jews and Arabs (including possibilities of a binational state) and mutual animosity between Jews and Arabs skyrocketed.
Religious and ideological enmity has continued to be the key fuel of the conflict. The Second Intifada, also known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada, was sparked by Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount and the religious anger it inflamed. The impact of the intifada, like that of the 1929 riots, cannot be overstated. It signalled the death-knell of the Oslo Accords. One study found that the percentage of ‘participants opposed to the Oslo Accords increased substantially following the outbreak of the Second Intifada, from thirty to fifty percent’. Similarly, it gave Hamas the opportunity to grow in power, elevating them above more moderate Palestinian voices.
The forces today most critical in preventing a solution are motivated far more by religious ideology than territorial ambitions. Hamas is an Islamist offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, and its Islamic fundamentalist character is integral in its goals and its violent extremism. This is seen in the name that it gave to the October 7 Massacre: ‘Operation Al Aqsa Flood’. Hamas’ terroristic tactics are hardly unique among Palestinian resistance movements – Fatah’s history is also replete with terror attacks despite its decidedly secular ideology. However, its whole-hearted embrace of terror as the key mechanism of resistance and its uncompromising dedication to the imposition of an Islamic state and the eradication of Israeli Jews makes it a decisive obstacle to peace. This is different from Fatah and other secular-nationalist movements for whom accommodation with Israel is more possible.
Similarly, extreme parts of the settler and Religious-Zionist movement have a religious-infused nationalism that dedicates them to Jewish sovereignty over all biblically-granted land. Their actions, at times violent, engender opposing extremism in Palestinian society, and their growing importance presents a key obstacle to peace. Hence the key fuel of the conflict is not merely competition for resources and territory but rather deep-seated ideological and religious enmity.
3 The establishment of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders will end the conflict.
The goal of an independent Palestinian state alongside a secure Israeli state is a staple of Western policy thinking. Justice would appear to demand such a solution; both peoples are connected to the region and deserving of self-determination. So too does pragmatism, according to the same argument. Without two-states, Israel will face ever greater terror attacks and resistance. Moreover, demographic pressures will either force it to shed its Jewish character, thus overturning the whole Zionist project, or abandon its status as a liberal democracy.
However, negotiations to this end have always been unsuccessful, often due to a lack of a serious Palestinian or Israeli partner. AWRAD polling (October 31 to November 7, 2023) in Gaza and the West Bank found that 75% of those questioned supported October 7; 76 per cent supported Hamas; and 75 per cent supported a Palestinian state from ‘the river to the sea’. Conversely, only 7 per cent believed in the possibility of coexistence; only 10.3 per cent supported the Palestinian authority; and only 17.2 per cent supported a two-state solution. Clearly there is a long way to go before there is a Palestinian political group with widespread support which can move towards negotiations for peace. Likewise, the Israeli public and its governments, with each passing year and each new settlement built, are less and less supportive of the prospect. A poll after October 7 found less than 30 per cent still supported a two-state solution. Even when both parties are committed, questions over boundary lines, the status of Jerusalem, Israeli settlements and the right of return for Palestinian refugees have derailed efforts.
However, even if these obstacles were overcome, the consequent creation of a Palestinian state under the Palestinian Authority would not solve the conflict. This is because there would remain a plethora of Palestinian resistance movements, including Hamas, opposed to the arrangement. The PA, which currently fails at collecting its own taxes in the West Bank, would clearly fail to prevent terror attacks from these groups. For the same reason, there would be a high chance of a coup within the Palestinian state and a toppling of the PA government. An attack on Israel from this independent Palestine would necessitate an Israeli response, and suddenly the whole of the West Bank could look much like Gaza today. Thus, even if the commonly discussed stumbling blocks were avoided in peace negotiations, any such agreement would likely remain doomed to failure. This is unless the Palestinian leadership had not only widespread support for the goal of two states and coexistence (unlikely), but also the ability to stem any Hamas-like movements (again highly unlikely) that could easily destroy the whole peace process. This was understood by Henry Kissinger in one of his last interviews when he explained that:
A formal peace doesn’t guarantee a lasting peace. The difficulty of the two-state solution is shown by the experience of Hamas. Gaza was made quasi-independent by Sharon in order to test the possibility of a two-state solution. It has led, in fact, to a much more complex situation. It has become so much worse in the last two years than it was in 2005.
Not only is this view that the establishment of a Palestinian state is a surefire path to peace and prosperity a myth, but it is also damaging. It has meant that not enough attention and diplomacy have been allocated to other potential solutions. One of these approaches, the so-called ‘three-state approach,’ is for Jordan to retake control of the West Bank and Egypt to control Gaza (not to be confused with the Jordan is Palestine: Palestinians to Jordan, West Bank to Israel solution favoured by some on the Israeli far-right). The Jordanian Hashemite Kingdom controlled the West Bank until 1967. Unlike other Arab countries that ensured Palestinian refugees languished in refugee camps, Jordan formally annexed the West Bank. This extended citizenship to West Bank Palestinians, who were subsequently well integrated into Jordanian society, and there was little to distinguish West Bank Palestinians from Jordanians. This is hardly surprising given that until the British separation of Transjordan from Mandatory Palestine in 1922, there was no difference between the Arabs on the eastern side of the Jordan River (who would become known as Palestinians) and those on the western side of the Jordan River (who would become known as Jordanians).
The view that Jordan could retake control (perhaps in a federation or annexation) of parts of the West Bank and integrate the Arab inhabitants is far from a pipe-dream. In fact, it almost came to fruition in the Peres-Hussein London Agreement of 1987 which would have seen Jordan moving to resolve the Palestinian issue by extending Jordanian sovereignty over parts of the West Bank. However, talks broke down when Yitzhak Shamir refused to cooperate due to his Revisionist Zionist ideology and personal rivalry with Shimon Peres. Unlike the PA, Jordan would have had the ability to stem militants – as shown in Jordanian Civil War – and hence could have resolved much of the conflict in the West Bank. This is why in the same interview cited early, Kissinger argued: ‘I believe the West Bank should be put under Jordanian control rather than aim for a two-state solution which leaves one of the two territories determined to overthrow Israel.’This is not to say that the three-state solution is a cornucopia without problems. Rather it is to point that other solutions apart from the two-state solution exist, and these solutions are worthy, at the very least, of equal attention.
To conclude overcoming these myths is key to bringing prosperity and progress to the Middle East. Overcoming the myth that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the main cause of instability in the Middle East could catalyse other peace-making efforts in the vein of the Abraham Accords. Proper realisation of the ideological underpinnings of the conflict and the inability of an independent Palestinian state to bring about lasting peace while sobering also helps redirect attention to other potential avenues which could hold far more promise. The deflation of myths may be jolting but it is a necessary step in bringing about a better future for the Middle East.
