The prolonged rise of tensions in recent years has made a significant impact on the international arena. Countries have moved to a more volatile and aggressive stance towards each other. Yet, despite the flourishing of democratic and liberal values around the world, it seems like the international arena has come to a position where the realist view would prevail—the international arena has become more selfish and self-helping.
In this stance of the world, the global actors have tried to navigate towards a new way of enriching their relationship with other actors, especially state-to-state relations. Multilateralism has seen a plummet, and many countries are returning to their “beggar thy neighbor” behavior, such as imposing strict trade tariffs, thus enlarging tensions between countries.
Hence, it is important to understand how then cooperation in a regionalism manner, such as ASEAN, adapts, especially towards great powers such as the U.S., which is seen to become more aggressive towards its international partners. ASEAN and the U.S. itself have already had a long history of relationships. Thus, amid global uncertainty and instability, followed by the upcoming Trump second administration, how can ASEAN navigate towards stronger cooperation with the U.S.?
ASEAN as the Region of Growth
Extraordinary attention to ASEAN is imperative for the international community. It is because ASEAN has emerged as a dynamic economic hub, with a combined GDP of $3.6 trillion in 2024, ranking as the fifth-largest economy globally. Projected to sustain 4–5% annual GDP growth, ASEAN thus will become a crucial player in global supply chains and investment diversification. ASEAN’s 673 million population, 60% under 35, also becomes a prominent fuel for a strong labor market and rising middle class that is projected to reach 350 million by 2030.
Other than that, manufacturing, services, and agriculture drive ASEAN’s economy. Vietnam and Malaysia lead in electronics exports, while Indonesia’s nickel industry dominates EV battery production. Tourism contributes 12% of GDP, recovering post-pandemic, and fintech hubs in Singapore and Malaysia are expanding, and agriculture, still 10% of GDP, is modernizing with automation and sustainability initiatives.
In the investment sector, ASEAN attracted US$229.8 billion of FDI in 2023, a slight increase of 0.3% from US$229.2 billion in 2022. Tech giants like Microsoft ($2.2B in Malaysia) and Google ($1B in Thailand) fuel the digital economy. Other than that, ASEAN’s e-commerce market reached $230 billion, while 5G infrastructure and smart manufacturing advanced rapidly.
Lastly, the most strategic feature of ASEAN is its geographical position. ASEAN is one of the most important sea routes in the world, with its territory ranging from the South China Sea towards Malacca Strait. Hence, this very strategic position upholds ASEAN’s bargaining position with the international community.
Therefore, it can be said that ASEAN holds great potential for the future years. It is named as the region of growth. Henceforth, collaborating and fostering a relationship with ASEAN is a strategic move for great powers in world politics such as the U.S.
The U.S. Cooperation with ASEAN
In the prolonged history, ASEAN has solidified its position as a key U.S. economic partner, with bilateral trade reaching $500 billion in 2023, making the region the fourth-largest U.S. trading partner. By early 2024, the U.S. overtook China as ASEAN’s largest export market, absorbing 15% of ASEAN’s total exports. Key trade sectors include electronics, textiles, and high-tech manufacturing, with U.S. exports to ASEAN averaging $9.8 billion per month. U.S. and average imports with $29.0 billion.
Security cooperation has also expanded to counter China’s regional assertiveness. Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea doubled under Trump, while joint military exercises such as the ASEAN-U.S. Maritime Exercise reinforced defense collaboration. Also, the Philippines reopened four U.S. bases in 2023, increasing interoperability for regional security. U.S. counterterrorism efforts have trained many ASEAN security personnel since 2017.
The Trump Administration’s Approach to ASEAN
Looking back to the first Trump administration, its engagement with ASEAN (2017–2021) was marked by transactional diplomacy, skepticism toward multilateralism, and selective security commitments. Trump’s “America First” doctrine thus prioritized economic nationalism, which led to withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and a shift toward bilateral trade deals.
Trump’s ASEAN policy was also inconsistent. He skipped three consecutive ASEAN summits (2018–2020) and sent lower-level officials, weakening U.S. diplomatic influence. However, his administration doubled Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea, transferred 24 military vessels to Vietnam and the Philippines, and pressured allies like the Philippines to increase defense spending.
Economically, ASEAN nations benefited unevenly from Trump’s trade war with China. Vietnam saw a 320% surge in U.S. imports, while Thailand faced tariff threats over currency policies. Meanwhile, Malaysia’s semiconductor exports rose, but Trump’s unpredictability forced ASEAN economies to hedge risks.
Future Areas of U.S. & ASEAN Cooperation Under Trump’s 2nd Administration
A second Trump administration would likely reinforce bilateral trade over multilateralism, using tariffs as leverage to negotiate economic deals. His aggressive tariff policies thus could further accelerate supply chain shifts to ASEAN that position the region as an alternative manufacturing hub beside China.
However, ASEAN’s reliance on Chinese intermediate goods complicates any attempt at full decoupling. There are also some key industries benefiting from U.S. investment, including electronics, with Thailand gathering around $7 billion from the Japanese automotive industry overall. While these investments align with Trump’s focus on striking China, his transactional diplomacy may create friction with ASEAN’s Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).
Cultural and educational ties remain strong, with many ASEAN students enrolled in U.S. universities, reflecting the continued demand for American education. and tourism has recovered to 90% of pre-pandemic levels. However, U.S. cultural diplomacy lags behind China, where Confucius Institutes outnumber American Centers, which highlights the need for stronger engagement to maintain influence in ASEAN’s soft power landscape.
Defense and security cooperation will likely remain a key pillar of U.S. & ASEAN relations under Trump’s second administration, particularly in response to China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. The U.S. conducted 12 annual Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) under Trump and transferred 24 military vessels to Vietnam and the Philippines, reinforcing maritime security. However, Trump’s demand for greater burden-sharing could pressure ASEAN countries to increase defense spending.
Henceforth, a second Trump presidency could mean greater economic coercion, security realignment, and intensified U.S.-China competition that positions ASEAN in a delicate balancing act. While the U.S. investments in semiconductors, renewables, and defense partnerships offer such great growth opportunities, on the other hand, Trump’s unpredictable trade policies and conditional security commitments still pose unpredictable risks for regional stability.
One last thing to note is that with a $3.6 trillion economy and 700 million consumers, ASEAN holds significant leverage in shaping its economic future, but it must carefully navigate geopolitical pressures, supply chain diversification, and security dependencies to maintain strategic neutrality and long-term prosperity.
