Canada’s most prominent Middle East allies have been the Gulf monarchies and Israel. Yet a strategic partner has been overlooked. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan remains absent from Canadian foreign-policy debate, despite hosting one of Canada’s largest regional embassies and being the first Arab state with which Canada signed a free trade agreement. Jordan is Canada’s most underutilized Arab partner, and that deepening the relationship would serve Canadian interests while reinforcing regional stability. Three arguments support this claim. First, Jordan’s foreign policy is moderate, U.S.-aligned, treaty-bound to Israel, and grounded in middle-power diplomacy, mirroring Canada’s own more closely than that of the Gulf states. Second, Canadian engagement has been warped by an Israel-versus-Gulf framing that pushes Jordan out, visible across the last three prime ministers. Third, the 2026 Iranian retaliatory strikes on Jordan, compounded by water scarcity and refugee burdens, demand precisely the capacity-building, humanitarian, and defence tools Canada possesses. Jordan offers Canada a chance to convert its rhetoric about peace and stability into real diplomatic returns. The case is overdue and urgent.
Jordan’s Structural Stability as a Canadian Partner
Jordan’s centrality begins with a foreign policy that aligns with Canadian habits in ways the Gulf monarchies cannot. The Hashemite Kingdom’s century-long survival has depended on moderate, pro-Western sentiment, sustained alliance management, and external investors who treat its stability as an interest in itself. Its foreign policy is institutionally committed to multilateralism and rules-based order. Jordan is a textbook case of niche diplomacy, concentrating scarce diplomatic resources on areas of comparative advantage: water diplomacy, refugee governance, and mediation. These are where Canada has historically found its expertise and identity.
Canada’s Pearsonian identity, forged in the 1956 Suez Crisis when Canada acted as impartial mediator, still shapes its policy discourse. A partnership with Jordan would align Canadian rhetoric with reality, since both privilege moderation, mediation, and multilateralism. Jordan’s diplomatic exports include hosting Track-1.5 dialogues and quiet de-escalation among Israelis, Palestinians, Syrians, and Iraqis, functions Canada claims to value but rarely performs. The Wadi Araba peace treaty further distinguishes Jordan from the Gulf: its relationship with Israel is strategic, sustained by intelligence and security cooperation that has endured political strain. For a Canada long hostage to Israel–Palestine discourse, partnership with the only Arab state holding both an active peace treaty with Israel and credible standing on Palestinian interests is uniquely valuable.
The Distortion of Canadian Engagement
If Jordan is so structurally similar to Canada, why has it been overlooked? The answer lies in an ideological structure distorted by Israel-versus-Gulf framing that marginalizes other Arab partners. Canadian engagement has been shaped less by strategy than by two forces: the United States and a handful of prominent partners, chiefly Israel and the wealthier Gulf states. The result is case-by-case decisions, not regional strategy. Canada’s ties to Israel are strong and its Gulf trade growing, but its engagement with Arab partners is shallow and driven by domestic politics rather than long-term commitment.
The pattern crosses party lines. Harper-era securitization after 9/11 tilted Canada toward Israel and eroded the Pearsonian language of balance. The Trudeau government’s feminist foreign policy did not reverse it: Liberal governments prove just as willing as Conservative ones to export military goods, including to human-rights abusers. The $15-billion light-armoured-vehicle deal with Saudi Arabia, expanded under Trudeau, placed commerce above the commitments feminist policy claimed, and the 2018 crisis with Riyadh showed how volatile Gulf engagement remains. Jordan, neither wealthy nor ideologically controversial, sits awkwardly in this hierarchy. The Canada–Jordan Free Trade Agreement of 2009, the first with any Arab state, has yielded barely $200 million in annual merchandise trade. That figure reflects neglect rather than potential.
Yet Jordan offers exactly what Canadian policymakers say they value. Jordan has institutionalized refugee governance into a global model through the 2014 Jordan Response Plan and 2016 Jordan Compact, frameworks linking humanitarian assistance to development. The Compact has been celebrated for framing Syrian refugees as economic assets rather than burdens, yet its gains were undermined by donor inconsistency. Reliable Canadian financing could fill that gap.
Why Jordan Matters Now
Canadian indifference was defensible while Jordan’s stability could be assumed. It no longer can. The Iranian retaliatory strikes of February and March 2026, launched after the joint U.S.–Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear and military assets, threatened Jordanian territory directly. The Royal Jordanian Air Force intercepted dozens of ballistic missiles and drones over several weeks, with debris causing civilian casualties and infrastructure damage. Jordan remains the only Arab state to have intercepted Iranian munitions across three Iran–Israel exchanges, consistent with its treaty obligations and its position between the two.
Military exposure compounds structural strain. Jordan hosts over two million Palestinian refugees under UNRWA alongside 1.4 million Syrians, with refugees making up roughly a third of residents and straining labour markets and public services. Integrating them has produced lasting political tension between donor expectations and domestic resistance. Atop this lies one of the world’s most acute water crises: Jordan receives roughly 78 cubic metres per person annually, about one percent of the global average, and the 1994 water-sharing arrangements with Israel no longer reflect equitable supply.
These are exactly the crises Canadian foreign policy is built for. Canada’s Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Program and its 2012 and 2016 defence agreements already provide a structure for deeper cooperation. What is missing is strategic intent. A defensive-realist reading holds that Canada should protect what it has by supporting partners who resist destabilizing forces. A Hashemite collapse would unravel Israel’s eastern security, destabilize Iraq’s western border, and displace millions. Israel itself treats Jordanian stability as a vital national interest; Canada cannot afford to treat it as an afterthought.
What a Deeper Partnership Would Look Like
First, Canada should institutionalize multi-year financing for Jordan’s refugee and development programs, modeled on the EU’s Compact framework, since durable integration depends on predictable funding. A partnership around refugee education and women’s economic inclusion would also reconcile Canada’s contradictory record on feminist policy and arms exports. Second, defence cooperation should expand within existing agreements. Capacity-building with the Jordanian Armed Forces in training, intelligence, and CBRN response advances counterterrorism without implicating Canada in conflict against civilians, unlike its Saudi arms sales. Third, Canada should amplify Jordanian water diplomacy, including the Blue Peace initiative, an inexpensive, high-visibility entry into the rare Middle Eastern issue where multilateral engagement remains possible.
None of this requires choosing between Israel and the Arab world, or between development and security. Jordan’s distinction is that it sits at the intersection of all of them.
Conclusion
Jordan is not Canada’s most glamorous partner, but among its most strategically significant. Its mediation, multilateralism, and niche middle-power diplomacy mirror Canada’s own self-image, while its vulnerabilities, including refugee burden, fiscal fragility, water scarcity, and direct exposure to Iranian violence, match the tools Canada is designed to deploy. Treating Jordan as a residual concern forfeits a partnership well suited to Canadian strengths and cedes the space to less-aligned actors. A Canada–Jordan partnership cannot solve everything, but would convert Canadian rhetoric about peace and humanitarianism into tangible policy and secure a partner whose stability rewards investment and whose collapse Canada cannot afford.
