The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine sparked discourse on Russian energy supply as a crucial resource chokepoint to EU member states. The energy crisis that followed augmented the importance of strategic autonomy in reducing the EU’s dependence on Russian energy. While the post-2022 European approach has drastically reduced Russian oil imports, the Iran war has caused EU member states to renege on promises to decouple from the Russian energy supply. The diversification strategy has also intrinsically tied European economies, once again, to third-party suppliers. The suppliers in question? Norway and the US. Trump’s America has proven to be a volatile partner, especially in its Iran strategy and in calling on its European allies for destructive aid. EU member states such as Spain have already evoked Trump’s ire in this regard. Taking this into consideration, the Iran oil crisis has unmasked the European strategic autonomy narrative as a set of diversification imperatives that still leave European economies vulnerable to geopolitical volatility.
Iran’s display of geopolitical power over the Strait of Hormuz came as a strategic masterstroke, effectively crippling global energy pathways and ushering in unprecedented levels of instability. The Strait of Hormuz, a transit point for 20% of global oil trade, is an essential maritime chokepoint that Iran has weaponized as economic leverage against the US-Israel military axis. While European oil markets are not majorly supplied by parties geographically hurt by Iran’s leverage, the butterfly effects of the oil shock have traveled worldwide. For European consumers, three primary considerations remain: first, whether the oil shortage will cause pushback from post-2022 decoupling from Russian energy; second, how Middle Eastern oil supply scarcity is affecting Asian markets, thus driving up demand from alternative sources; and third, the volatility of Trump’s LNG supply leverage.
The EU had a negative 42.66% energy trade imbalance with Russia in the first quarter of 2022. After the February invasion of Ukraine, the EU levied heavy sanctions and fines on Russian crude oil and LNG imports, significantly reducing European dependency on the Druzhba pipeline. 2024 saw a fall in European gas and oil imports from Russia to 19% and 3% of total categorical imports, respectively. This, however, is descriptive of the cumulative European effort to curb dependency on Russian energy. Individual member countries, such as France, remained heavily dependent on Russian LNG, alongside U.S. and Algerian suppliers, according to energy specialist Ana Maria Jaller-Makarewicz’s 2023 report for the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA). Jaller-Makarewicz depicted growing French LNG infrastructure despite heavy third-party dependency. Now, despite the EU’s October 2025 ban on Russian crude oil, France remained one of the biggest European importers of Russian LNG in March of 2026, alongside Spain and Hungary. The overall resurgence in Russian energy imports due to the Iran war’s catalyzation of instability in the Middle East is demonstrative of the shortcomings in European diversification imperatives post-2022. Despite the EU’s push for strategic autonomy through creating new pathways to prevent energy dependency on Russia, the volatility in the Strait of Hormuz has exposed gaps in Europe’s energy strategy, leaving it open to vulnerability.
Another point to consider is the aftereffects of the oil shock in Asian markets. 60% of Asian crude oil is sourced from the Middle East. According to Reuters, Japan and South Korea hold the largest Middle Eastern energy import share percentages. The impact of the extent of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz has led Asian markets to immediately diversify to meet domestic requirements, pushing alternative source demands. Szymon Kardaś, senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Affairs, writes that Asian demand would clash with European demand, driving up oil and gas prices. This line of thought finds applicability with the current state of European energy prices, at an increase only second to the 2022 Russian oil shock. These circumstances have further given impetus for the EU to decouple from the Russian energy supply, prompting legislation banning LNG and pipeline gas imports from Russia from 2027 onwards. This has led to Russian threats to suspend crucial energy imports to the EU during the decoupling period, once again highlighting strategic gaps in the European strategic autonomy narrative.
Despite these shortcomings, Europe has been able to significantly derisk from the Russian energy supply by increasing energy supply pathways from Norway and the US. In 2021, Europe imported 150.2 billion and 18.9 billion cubic meters of gas from Russia and the US, respectively. These figures came to 51.7 billion and 45.1 billion cubic meters of gas in 2024, bringing out some successes of Europe’s Russia-derisking through diversification strategy. This derisking strategy has, however, increased European reliance on Norwegian and American imports. While Norway remains a stable trading partner, the US has proven too volatile and unreliable through the weaponization of stringent tariffs. In addition to this, there are speculations that Trump may leverage LNG supply as a retaliation to much of the European response to the American military strategy and call for aid in the Middle East.
In essence, Europe’s efforts at strategic energy autonomy are entangled with diversification imperatives that leave EU member states vulnerable to geopolitical unpredictability. The Iran war and the impact of the volatility in the Strait of Hormuz have effectively exposed Europe’s strategic vulnerabilities in the face of its post-2022 energy transition.
