After SR Talks in Beijing yielded positive eight-point consensus, experts and analysts in India have welcomed the new-found optimism in relations with China. However, the opinion in China remains wary of India suddenly turning friendly. Some even view this ‘friendly’ stance as ‘India essentially trying to buy itself some breathing space.’
Two weeks ago, the 25th meeting of the Special Representatives on the India-China Boundary Question was held in Beijing, where Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi reached an eight-point consensus. Several Chinese strategic affairs experts and IR commentators expressed surprise over India’s sudden and swift “bowing” to China over all 8 points (all points suggested by the Chinese side, it is being claimed in Beijing). Not surprisingly, a quick look at the Chinese media headlines is far more revealing than the official statements issued in Beijing: “India accepted the eight-point consensus faster than expected,” “Modi very well knows he cannot start another border conflict (with China),” “The SR talks signalled a de-escalation, but why did India ‘suddenly change its tune,’ etc., and so on.
Let us quickly recount the eight points both countries agreed upon in Beijing with the aim of seeking a fair, reasonable, and mutually acceptable solution on the boundary question. The eight points simply summed up are 1) establish a demarcation expert group and a working group on border management and control under the framework of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) on the China-India Border Affair; 2) use existing diplomatic and military channels to promptly handle situations along the border; 3) address outstanding issues and avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation in areas along the Line of Actual Control (LAC); 4) the two sides agreed to add two general-level talk meeting points and establish two new military hotlines in the eastern and middle sectors of the border; 5) The two sides spoke positively of progress in cross-border cooperation. India expressed appreciation for China’s efforts to facilitate more pilgrimages by official Indian pilgrims to Mount Gang Renpoche and Lake Mapam Yun Tso in Tibet; 6) the two sides also welcomed the reopening of three boundary trade markets and agreed to strengthen exchanges and cooperation in areas including boundary trade and pilgrimages; 7) they agreed to hold a new meeting of the expert-level mechanism on cross-boundary rivers in September and maintain communication on matters including hydrological information sharing; 8) the two sides also agreed to hold the 26th round of talks in India in 2027.
It is not incorrect to say most analysts in China have welcomed “eight-point consensus” as a crucial step forward in the “mechanization and concretization” of border control. They believe, in addition to numerous border communication systems and frameworks established following the Galwan Valley clash, this “consensus” provides greater scope and a better platform for complete resolution of the border issue. Two changes have been noticed in Beijing as regards the quick and “unopposed” Indian acceptance of the eight-point initiative taken by China: India has finally grasped and understood how to “properly” talk to China, and India chose to send its National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval—Prime Minister Modi’s most trusted advisor—over a career diplomat as New Delhi’s Special Representative.
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What is intriguing and puzzling to observers in India is that two weeks after the eight-point consensus was arrived at on August 25, scholars and media in China remain doubtful of Indian sincerity in carrying out the commitment as agreed upon by the two sides on the eight points. Elaborating on the sudden goodwill India displayed on August 25 in Beijing, a Chinese commentator wrote, “India’s current goodwill towards China is not because it genuinely considers China a ‘partner,’ but because the current international geopolitical environment is unfavorable to it, and it needs China to help relieve pressure.” Remember, the Indian NSA Ajit Doval used the phrase “partner” after the SR talks ended in Beijing.
A good look at the numerous media analyses in the Chinese press on the issue tells us the Indian “goodwill” at the 25th SR talks in Beijing has been partly driven by change in the Indian stance toward China and partly by the rapidly changing international geopolitical environment, which is “unfavorable” to India at the moment. Five new external developments are cited as key factors behind India’s “current ability” to be able to talk properly to China at the recently held SR-level talks and re-emphasize its relations with its powerful northern neighbor. Namely the signing of the Pakistan-Saudi Arabia-Turkey Mecca Joint Defense Agreement last month; the US manipulating India; Bangladesh’s “look east” policy; India heavily relying on China as its largest import source and it not being easy to sever import ties with China; and India wanting to quickly quell the border dispute in order to ensure the smooth running of the 18th BRICS summit in New Delhi next week.
Barring the Mecca agreement, which is the latest strategic development surrounding India and being counted among external pressure sources on India by the Chinese strategic affairs experts, the remaining four factors have been much discussed in recent times. Let’s briefly mention why experts and analysts in China view the recent signing of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan as raising new concerns in New Delhi. In a recent popular blog, a Chinese expert has argued that the Mecca Agreement clearly stipulates that any “armed attack on any of the three countries will be considered an attack on all three.”
Furthermore, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has been widely cited in China, saying that “an attack on all three” clause is technically equivalent to NATO’s Article 5 Collective Defence Clause. In the past, New Delhi dealt with Islamabad through “limited punitive actions”—border skirmishes, cross-border airstrikes, and targeted killings—keeping the conflict within bilateral spheres. “However, with the Mecca Agreement in effect, this approach has become ineffective. Attacking Pakistan would be tantamount to declaring war on both Saudi Arabia and Turkey simultaneously. Turkey is NATO’s second-largest conventional military power, Saudi Arabia has a massive defense budget, and Pakistan is a nuclear power. Therefore, India is now beginning to have concerns,” the Chinese analyst further observed.
Wang Yunfei, cited above, who is a current and military affairs commentator and writes regularly on China’s social media, thinks the above factors – including the Mecca Agreement – are all driven by “external pressure” and do not really reflect a fundamental shift in India’s strategic perception of China. “We must recognize that India’s opportunistic political nature is difficult to change. Once the external environment changes—for example, if the pressure from the United States eases, or if India itself feels the need to leverage China to increase its bargaining power on a certain international issue—this so-called ‘goodwill’ could be withdrawn at any time, as history has repeatedly proven,” Wang further added.
Like Wang Yunfei, several Chinese commentators have been asking the question: What is the deep-seated underlying logic of India’s China policy? Most have replied to the question by portraying India’s negative and typically untrustworthy behavior. They believe India views China as a strategic competitor and therefore maintains a tough stance on border issues to “bolster domestic nationalist sentiment and consolidate its ruling base.” They also emphasize this underlying logic will not change because of a single meeting or a few kind words. Therefore, in the face of India’s “positive posture” this time, China’s attitude should be to listen to its words but, more importantly, observe its actions.
Moreover, most Chinese scholarly analyses and media accounts point out that an eight-point consensus has been reached, but several critical questions remain unanswered. Namely, whether “eight-point consensus” can be implemented depends on India’s subsequent actions, whether India’s troops in the border areas can be substantially withdrawn, whether border trade markets can be truly restored, and whether the number of pilgrims traveling to Tibet can be smoothly expanded. These are all the issues that would truly play the role of litmus tests in establishing India’s sincerity.
In a recent article, seasoned international affairs expert Professor Jin Canrong has cited India’s current domestic economic difficulties and its declining strategic importance as the immediate causes for India “instantly” agreeing to the eight points suggested by China. The progress made in the 25th round of China-India SR talks, which concluded on August 25, is a positive development, Jin noted. However, we cannot be blindly optimistic, as India remains highly uncertain,” Jin added. Cautioning the Chinese authorities against making concessions to India, Jin also warned, “India often lacks rationality on border issues and always tries to gain an advantage. If India can accept a solution that meets China’s reasonable demands, that would be ideal; if it refuses to compromise or even demands concessions from China, we would rather shelve the issue.”
