The Red Sea no longer separates the Middle East from Africa. It increasingly connects their security problems. Across the Horn of Africa, ports, trade routes, military partnerships and local conflicts are attracting greater attention from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Türkiye. The Bab el Mandeb sits at the centre of this changing strategic cartograph. It links the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Recent threats to commercial shipping have made this geography even more valuable. According to the Reuters, In July 2026, Saudi Arabia proposed a multinational maritime defence coalition to protect Red Sea shipping and energy routes. Egypt, Türkiye, Sudan and Djibouti were among its supporters, while the UAE was notably absent from the supporting group. The Red Sea is no longer a dividing line between two regions. It is becoming the strategic bridge between them.
Ports sit at the heart of this competition. They are no longer only places where ships load and unload goods. They now carry political and strategic value. The UAE has built a strong commercial presence around Berbera in Somaliland. In 2025, DP World launched a direct shipping service between Jebel Ali and Berbera. The company presents Berbera as an alternative gateway towards landlocked Ethiopia and says it holds a 58.5 percent stake in the port operation as per the DP World. For Somaliland, such investment brings infrastructure, trade and international attention. For the UAE, it provides commercial access near one of the world’s most important maritime corridors. A port can carry containers in peacetime and influence in a crisis.
Saudi Arabia views the same maritime space through its own security needs. The renewed Houthi threat to Red Sea shipping in 2026 pushed Riyadh to seek a wider maritime security arrangement. Its proposed coalition would cover the Bab el Mandeb, Gulf of Aden and Red Sea trade routes as mentioned in the Reuters. The UAE’s absence from the initial group of supporters does not by itself prove a Saudi-Emirati contest for the Horn. But it does show that the two Gulf powers do not always approach regional security through the same framework. This matters because their economic and political footprints increasingly reach the African side of the Red Sea.
Egypt adds another layer. Its rivalry with Ethiopia has traditionally centred on the Nile and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. That rivalry is now becoming connected with maritime access and Red Sea security. Ethiopia remains landlocked and wants reliable access to the sea. Somalia strongly resists arrangements that it believes weaken its sovereignty over Somaliland. Meanwhile, Egypt has deepened its engagement with Somalia and Eritrea. In July 2026, Cairo hosted talks involving Egyptian, Somali and Eritrean officials alongside a senior US envoy. Horn of Africa security was central to the discussions, according to the Egypt State Information Service. A dispute that began around water can morph into a contest over ports, coastlines and regional power.
Stay ahead of the geopolitical week.
MD Briefing delivers expert analysis across five global fronts — the Indo-Pacific, energy, geoeconomics, European security, and the Middle East — every Monday morning. Free.
Türkiye demonstrates another side of Middle Eastern involvement. Ankara has built deep political and security relations with Somalia but it also maintains working relations with Ethiopia. This gave Türkiye room to mediate when tensions between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu rose over Ethiopia’s search for sea access. According to the Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the Ankara Declaration, Somalia and Ethiopia agreed to respect each other’s sovereignty while pursuing arrangements that could give Ethiopia reliable access to the sea under Somali sovereign authority.Therefore,Türkiye shows that outside involvement does not always deepen rivalry. It can also create diplomatic space. The same geography that invites competition can also create a market for mediation.
Sudan shows the darker side of this trend. Its civil war began as a domestic struggle between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces. It has since become increasingly internationalised. A UN fact finding mission reported on September 3, 2026 that foreign weapons, military technology, fighters and logistical networks were helping sustain the conflict. Investigators found reasonable grounds to believe that individuals and entities linked to a transnational network involving the UAE, Chad, Libya and Somalia supplied the RSF with weapons, equipment, logistics, training and personnel. The UAE has repeatedly denied supporting the RSF as per the Reuters. This distinction matters. External support should be presented through verified evidence, not political accusation. But the larger lesson is difficult to miss. When outside powers or networks invest in armed actors instead of institutions, local wars gain foreign lifelines.
These developments do not mean that Middle Eastern states created the Horn’s conflicts. Ethiopia’s internal tensions, Somalia’s state building problems, Sudan’s civil war and disputes over Somaliland all have deep local roots. Treating every crisis as a proxy war would deny African actors their own interests and choices. External competition works differently. It can extend existing divisions, change local calculations and give governments or armed actors new sources of money, diplomatic support and strategic importance.
This is also why African states should not be described simply as pawns. They have agency. Somalia can use competing partnerships to gain security assistance and diplomatic backing. Ethiopia can bargain for maritime access. Somaliland can use its coastline to attract foreign investment. Djibouti has turned its location into economic and strategic value by hosting several foreign military presences. The Horn is not merely being acted upon. Its governments are also learning to bargain with those who want access to it.
The real question is whether that bargaining creates autonomy or dependency. Ports create leverage when African states control the competition. They become pressure points when the competition starts controlling African choices. A government that can work with several partners may gain room to manoeuvre. A government that becomes dependent on a single external patron may lose it. The same distinction applies to security. Foreign support that strengthens national institutions can improve stability. Support that empowers rival factions can make conflict harder to end.
Therefore, The Horn of Africa is becoming a front in the Middle Eastern power competition but not in the traditional sense of passive states being divided among outside powers. Something more complicated is happening. The security systems of the Gulf, Red Sea and Horn are beginning to overlap. Saudi Arabia wants secure Red Sea shipping. The UAE has built commercial networks around strategic ports. Egypt sees developments in Ethiopia and the Horn through its own national security concerns. Türkiye combines security partnerships with mediation. African governments, meanwhile, are trying to convert geography into bargaining power.
The test will be what this competition leaves behind. If foreign investment produces functioning ports, stronger trade corridors and better African institutions, Horn states may emerge with greater leverage. If it produces rival security blocs, competing armed clients and deeper dependence, the region will increasingly become an arena for struggles designed beyond Africa. The danger is not that Middle Eastern powers have arrived in the Horn. They are already there. The danger begins when African crises become instruments of Middle Eastern competition rather than problems shaped by African solutions.
