Post-Assad Syria and the Struggle for a New Security Architecture

When Bashar al-Assad’s regime collapsed in a political earthquake on 8 December 2024, it was far more than a mere political transition that occurred. The amount of time Bashar al Assad was in place Israel was up against a Syrian military establishment backed by Iranian, Russian and Hezbollah forces. That system was broken, taking away the immediate strategic and security institutional structure Syria could use to menace Israel. Israel thus was able to strike much of the military apparatus it could see that might serve as the basis for a future Syrian military revival. It created a disorganized and strategic Syria and crushed the political order of the regime. In the following vacuum of security, Israel was able to eliminate for the first time the Syrian military assets which had previously limited the scope of Israel’s freedom of action. What followed was one of the most extensive Israeli air and naval campaigns in the country’s history—codenamed Operation Arrow of Bashan (or Bashan’s Arrow) occurred between the collapse of Assad regime and December 2024 launching 498 strikes targeting 320 positions includes airbases, aircraft, air-defense systems, radars, signaling stations, ammunition depots, research centers, and naval assets.

In a few days, according to Israeli officials, the strikes had “wrecked” about 70-80% of Syria’s strategic military forces, and in some cases as much as 90% of advanced surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and air defense systems (ADS). The European Union Agency for Asylum has documented the Israeli assertion of about 80 per cent of the destruction of its military capabilities in the immediate post-Assad period, but said that this was not independently verified. Independent monitoring and open source analysis is confirming extensive Syria air force, missile stocks and related infrastructure damage. This was not a common interception. It would have been very hard to achieve such a level of military threat degradation to Syria for decades under a viable centralized government. Israel, which was given a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity, took it when the regime collapsed. The goal was to prevent the new regime or other non-state actors from acquiring advanced weapons, and to make sure that a post-Assad strategic equilibrium is maintained in favor of Israeli freedom of action, especially in southern Syria, where Israeli forces have moved beyond the disengagement line of 1974, set up numerous outposts and bases, and have tried to ensure that the region is effectively demilitarized. After these strategic capabilities were all significantly eroded, their restoration became strategically unacceptable to Israel. It was easy to see that any serious attempt to build back a viable Syrian military, particularly air defense or even air-projection capabilities, would lead to the re-emergence of the threats the Israelis had just dealt the country.

This is where Turkey comes in. Turkey has a different idea of what the post-Assad Syria will look like. Ankara is interested in a viable state in Syria. Explanations lie partly in the security sphere, and foremost in the Kurdish issue and the presence of armed groups on the southern border of Turkey, but they also stem from the geopolitical sphere. Turkey is vulnerable to instability, refugee pressures and competing external powers, given a weak and fractured Syria. A viable Syrian state, however, that is connected with Ankara and under Ankara’s control can on the contrary serve as a strategic ally and give Ankara more depth in the Middle East. Therefore, Turkey has gone beyond the political support and security institutions are being rebuilt in Syria. Shortly after Assad fell, Ankara was providing military training. Ankara was providing military training shortly after Assad’s fall. In August 2025, Turkey pledged Syria with weapons systems and logistical support and trained Syrian troops in the use of those systems. By October, Syrian troops were training at Turkish military bases, while Syrian students had started to go to Turkish military academies.

The Israeli response to the airbase in Abu al-Duhur, in northwest Syria, on 18 August 2026 exemplifies this conflict in a peculiar manner. Syrian state media reported eight strikes on the runway and storage facilities, but there were no casualties reported. Israeli claims were made that the operation was in response to fears that the Turks were planning to deploy or establish themselves in the base, in contravention of an agreed security status quo and a threat to Israel’s security. Syrian authorities and Turkey dismissed the idea of a permanent Turkish presence. The facility was undergoing rehabilitation for the Syrian Air Force, says Damascus, while the Turkish officers were involved in training and knowledge exchange, not in setting up a Turkish base. The strike was seen as a general protest against the resurgence of Syrian air capacity and against increasing Turkish military presence. The strike is a sign that Israel is no longer interested just in Syrian abilities. But it’s growing anxious about who’s assisting Syria to rebuild them.

That’s a very important distinction. In the event of a weak Syria, Israel has a lot of leeway in military operations. A Syrian state built up with Turkish support may eventually be armed with trained forces, air-defense systems, surveillance technologies and military installations that will place costs on Israeli operations. In the event that Damascus is not planning a direct confrontation with Israel, a Turkish presence in the country will certainly change the game as it will allow Syria to become more militarily capable and more secure, due to the presence of Turkish troops. The power projection by Turkey into Syria, therefore, poses a second order problem to Israel. Turkey is not only enhancing the strength of Syria but also altering the geopolitical context in which Israel lives. But for Turkey, it’s just the reverse. A result, if Israel is allowed to continue destroying military sites in Syria as long as they build them, Syria may never be able to get rid of its military reliance and its strategic vulnerability. It would not be Syria, it would be something else, some kind of fake Syria. It would continue to be a secure no-man’s land where more powerful neighbors set Syria’s military arms.

The episode brings two visions on Syria’s future security to the fore. Israel’s priorities are limited Syrian military capabilities, maintaining unfettered operations (particularly in the airspace of Syria and in the south), and strategic buffer. Turkey is looking for a competent Syrian government, the restoration of the security forces, advanced military positions, and the prevention of Israeli expansion. The transitional authorities in Syria are seeking to restore sovereignty, national military strength and territorial unity. The United States, which wants to limit a major Turkey–Israel clash in the formation of the new order, is currently pursuing a deconfliction process between Israel, Turkey and Syria. The U.S. special envoy, Thomas Barrack, has highlighted the importance of improving the lines of communication, in particular, because of the “kinetic means of communication,” which are “costly and dangerous”.

The post-Assad security dilemma in Syria is thus a battle between Israeli attempts to safeguard the gains of breaking Syria’s former military structure and attempts by Turkey to build back the state capability. The results are an existing Turkey–Israel rivalry for the establishment of the post-Assad security order in Syria, which Washington is trying to shape through the prism of a trilateral game, not a bilateral one between Israel and Syria. The Abu al-Duhur strike is not unique, but rather a modern example of such a structural tension. As long as Israel sees any sort of reconstruction of Syria’s strategic military potential as a threat to the fruits of its December 2024 to early 2025 achievements, and as long as Turkey values the lack of potential as leaving Syria and its own interests open, friction will remain. This is one of the primary challenges facing strategic management in the post-Assad Levant and is a process that must be managed without the conflict getting out of hand.