The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railways has been in the spotlight recently. Many observers have highlighted the project, which connects trade routes from China (Kashgar) through Kyrgyzstan to Andijan in Uzbekistan and then on to Europe, as part of an era of power centralization in Central Asia, particularly in Kyrgyzstan. There are also perceptions that this is Chinese propaganda aimed at expanding its geopolitical influence; some have even gone so far as to claim that this is a trap set by China to exert control over a country’s internal affairs, such as asset seizure and political leverage, a tactic known as “debt trap diplomacy.” Theallegations of “debt trap diplomacy, DTD” by China are highly complex, and the claim that Kyrgyzstan faces a “debt trap” risk in the CKU Railway project constitutes an excessive generalization. Although there is currently no truly empirical evidence, case studies of previous projects do exist.
The first argument in favor of this project is the possibility that the profits generated once the project is operational will help cover the cost of the loan provided by Chinese banks for this project. China is providing a loan amounting to 50% of the total project cost of $4.7 billion, and the remaining $2.35 billion will be contributed by each country. Even there, China will be providing loans to these nations to cover the project cost at an annual interest of 1.5%. Income from this project, which is estimated to be completed in the next 4–5 years, is projected to be quite substantial for Kyrgyzstan, at around $200 million-$300 million per year, according to a statement by Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov and the Kyrgyz Prime Minister’s prediction. In this case, it’s in contrast with the case of the Sri Lankan port project, the Hambantota Port. Sri Lanka received a USD 307 million loan at an annual interest rate of 6.3%, which is higher than the Kyrgyzstan loan for the CKU Railways, and also when calculated, the potential profit for Kyrgyzstan generated by the CKU project over the loan term is far greater than the total debt repayment obligations (principal and interest) to China.
Moreover, Kyrgyzstan is a multi-vector foreign policy that always tries to engage in extensive diplomacy with other countries to support itself. In addition to its relationship with China, Kyrgyzstan also has a strong relationship with Russia. This relationship has only strengthened after the application of Western sanctions between the two countries. This insulates Kyrgyzstan from being totally reliant on China.
The CKU pipeline has often been compared with the Laos-China Railway project. In the later project, Laos incurred losses since the project’s completion, even though the railway construction itself is technically sound. This has led to skyrocketing expenditures and mounting debt to China, necessitating restructuring.
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However, this is because the project was rushed without thorough consideration from the time the idea was first proposed in 2009 until the project’s implementation in 2016. The construction process was also affected by external factors, notably COVID-19, which caused delays, while debts continued to grow even though the project had not yet become operational at all. In contrast, the CKU project’s concept has been in the works for a very long time, with years of careful consideration—approximately 28 years since the idea was first proposed and an agreement was reached in 1997. Additionally, the CKU project was assessed by experts from China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan; their report concluded that the project is technically and economically sustainable, as evidenced by the approval of the Joint Feasibility Study Document by June 2023, followed by the signing of a draft MoU by the three parties outlining their respective responsibilities in May 2023.
Economic aspects of the project can also help break the debt trap diplomacy claim. In a report it was stated that a meeting on July 10, 2026, had local officials emphasizing the use of local construction materials that met standards and the involvement of local specialists in the project. According to the latest report as of July 2026, a total of 2,000 workers from Kyrgyzstan were employed, with the possibility of giving impact in financial flows in Kyrgyzstan.
In addition to the economic aspect, the concept of the “debt trap” also encompasses a political dimension involving the political influence and pressure exerted from the creditor country on the recipient country. In the case of China’s involvement with Kyrgyzstan in the CKU Railways project, China does not demand internal reforms or exert political influence on the recipient country’s internal politics when providing funding to Central Asian nations; unlike the U.S. and the European Union, China does not demand any internal reforms. China has the idea of the principle of non-interference as part of its foreign policy.
What’s more is that some parties also argue that the debt trap diplomacy in the cases of several countries is biased and subjective, influenced by emotions and inaccurate interpretation. The examples are case studies from Angola, Djibouti, Venezuela, and Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka could be characterized as a passive borrower; after all the rejection of previous partners to finance this project, despite having other opportunities to decline or reconsider the Chinese loan, it chose to move forward anyway and made China the last of all previous options for this project.
Lastly, it should be emphasized that the validity of the claim depends on the completeness of data, as many people stated that the debt trap diplomacy in this project was caused by a lack of financial transparency, particularly regarding expenses outside the project. In fact, any claim must be based on complete and verifiable data. A lack of information is not evidence, but rather a gap that must first be filled with definitive data so that the assessment remains objective and fair.
However, based on the case studies and evidence above, China’s use of “debt trap diplomacy” in this project cannot be claimed outright. The accusations against the CKU project for Kyrgyzstan are more accurately categorized as project risks and governance challenges inherent to large-scale infrastructure projects.