Israel’s government has crossed a line that previous governments had avoided. In early July 2026, the cabinet openly declared that it would not recognize decisions made under a Supreme Court ruling, creating what opposition leaders and legal figures described as a potential constitutional crisis. The unanimous resolution rejected the court’s decision allowing the country’s commercial broadcast regulator to continue operating despite lacking its usual quorum. This was more than another dispute between ministers and judges. By treating compliance with a court ruling as a political choice, Netanyahu’s government moved the struggle over judicial power into a more dangerous phase. The issue is whether the executive can decide when judicial authority applies.
The immediate trigger was a June ruling involving the Council of the Second Authority for Television and Radio. After a series of resignations reduced the council below the legally required two-thirds quorum, the court allowed it to continue meeting and making decisions. The judges said the resignations raised concerns that the regulator was being deliberately paralyzed. The dispute also affected the proposed purchase of Channel 13, a network frequently critical of Netanyahu, by a group led by a prominent government critic. Communications Minister Shlomo Karhi and Justice Minister Yariv Levin argued that the court could not authorize a body that did not meet the quorum required by law.
That argument should not be dismissed. Courts can overreach, and elected governments have the right to criticize judgments, seek reconsideration, and challenge judicial interpretations of legislation. Karhi and Levin presented the cabinet’s resolution as a defense of parliamentary law rather than an attack on the judiciary. Another account emphasized their claim that the Supreme Court had contradicted the clear language of the law. Yet there is a decisive difference between contesting a judgment through legal procedures and announcing that the government will not recognize actions taken under it. The first is constitutional disagreement. The second makes obedience conditional on the executive’s own view of legality.
This confrontation did not emerge in isolation. Since returning to power in 2022, Netanyahu’s coalition has pursued a judicial overhaul intended to reduce the Supreme Court’s ability to review government decisions and increase political influence over the legal system. Supporters said the changes were needed to correct an imbalance that gave unelected judges excessive power. Critics argued that Israel’s limited formal checks on executive authority made an independent court especially important. In January 2024, the Supreme Court struck down a central part of the overhaul, which had restricted use of the reasonableness standard. The latest dispute revives whether electoral victory gives a majority the right to weaken institutions capable of restraining it.
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The media dimension makes the clash especially important. Regulators can shape who owns influential outlets and which voices remain commercially viable. Petitioners accused Karhi of trying to exert political influence over the council and obstruct the Channel 13 transaction. The court treated the resignations as possible efforts to defeat its earlier orders. Netanyahu himself did not make the strongest public attacks on the judges; those came from Karhi and Levin. Still, the dispute fits a pattern in which pressure on courts and critical media reinforce one another. A government need not close a television station directly if it can immobilize the institutions that determine its future.
The political context deepens these concerns. Netanyahu remains on trial on corruption charges that he denies, and media regulation is connected to two cases against him. This does not prove that every judicial reform or regulatory intervention is designed for personal protection. It does, however, make institutional independence more important, because decisions involving courts, prosecutors, and broadcasters can affect the prime minister’s survival. Netanyahu’s coalition also depends on religious and far-right parties that regard the judiciary as an obstacle. The government therefore has both an ideological reason to reduce judicial power and a political interest in weakening oversight.
The cabinet’s decision drew broad warnings. Opposition leader Yair Lapid and former prime minister Naftali Bennett described it as a threat to the legal order, while President Isaac Herzog said that refusing to comply with court rulings would cross a red line. Their concern goes beyond one regulator. Judicial authority depends on other branches accepting that court decisions are binding even when unpopular. Once a government claims the right to disregard a ruling it considers unlawful, other institutions may adopt the same logic. In a severe confrontation, civil servants or security bodies could face conflicting executive and judicial orders. Israel’s lack of a single written constitution makes such a conflict harder to resolve.
The crisis also reflects a wider populist tendency. Leaders claiming a direct mandate from “the people” often portray courts, regulators, and professional bureaucracies as unelected barriers to democratic rule. Donald Trump has used similar language in the United States, presenting judges who block his policies as political actors interfering with presidential authority. His administration has also pressed the Supreme Court to limit the reach of lower federal judges. The American and Israeli systems are different. Yet Netanyahu and Trump share an instinct to turn institutional constraints into partisan enemies and define strong leadership as the ability to overcome them.
Supporters of both leaders answer that unelected institutions should not cancel the voters’ choices. That concern has democratic force, especially when courts intervene in contested questions. But majority rule is only one part of democracy. Elections determine who governs; they do not give winners unlimited power to decide which rulings deserve obedience. Independent courts matter precisely because their decisions remain binding when political leaders find them inconvenient. Without that principle, democracy can retain elections while losing the limits that prevent temporary majorities from concentrating permanent power.
The immediate dispute may still be addressed through further legal action or political compromise. But the larger danger will remain. When a government treats a court ruling as optional, it does not formally abolish the judiciary; it empties judicial authority of practical meaning. Netanyahu’s confrontation with the Supreme Court therefore matters beyond Israel and Channel 13. It shows how democratic erosion can occur not through a sudden seizure of power, but through repeated decisions that make compliance, oversight, and institutional restraint negotiable. The real test is whether Israel can preserve disagreement over judicial power without allowing the executive to become the final judge of its own authority.
