Contrast the speeches of the U.S. Secretary of War, Pete Hegseth, and the Secretary-General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Dr Kao Kim Hourn, at the 23rd IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on 30 May 2026. It raises the question of whether the U.S. and Southeast Asia, except perhaps the Philippines, which is strengthening its alliance with the U.S due to the South China Sea dispute with China, have diverging perspectives on regional security. This question also casts a dark cloud over Southeast Asia’s longstanding aspiration to be a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality.
Diplomacy and Rules vs Power and Interests
Secretary Hegseth said that the “globalist rhetoric about the rules-based international order” is a distraction that has weakened the defence capabilities of European allies. Alliances and partnerships should be “grounded in the realities of power and interests”. There should be “more combat power” and “less Shangri-La”, implying that hard military power should take precedence over defence diplomacy. He also commended several Southeast Asian countries as partners strengthening military readiness and interoperability.
Although some of the points Hegseth raised make sense for any country’s national defence, he may have put Southeast Asia in an uncomfortable position if he meant that Southeast Asian countries must increase military spending to align with U.S. interests to contain China in the Asia-Pacific. And regarding cyberspace, do power and interests also matter more than rules and norms? This position could be antithetical to the 11 U.N norms of responsible state behaviour, which ASEAN endorsed since 2018.
On the other hand, the ASEAN Secretary-General said that the five priorities for ASEAN in a changing strategic landscape include “upholding the rules-based regional order” that is “anchored in international law, the U.N Charter and the ASEAN Charter”, and the principles of “peaceful settlement of disputes” and “non-use of force” are fundamentally important to maintain the conditions for international cooperation to continue and “protect smaller states from coercion”. He reminded that “lasting stability cannot rest on power alone”. During the question-and-answer session, he said more countries are increasing their military spending. Against that backdrop, ASEAN’s efforts in preventive diplomacy are increasingly important for building strategic trust and preventing disputes from escalating into conflicts.
Additionally, some points in Secretary Hegseth’s speech diverge from the fundamental ideas on regional security articulated by two other ASEAN leaders, who also emphasised diplomacy and rules in international affairs. For example, Vietnam’s President To Lam said that a just international order can evolve to adapt to changing realities, but only through rules and dialogue, not through the threat of force, unilateralism, or coercion. The Asia-Pacific must “treat preventive diplomacy as a strategic capability” that provides “credible diplomatic off-ramps before parties become drawn into spirals of escalation that heighten the risk of conflict”.
Another example is the speech by Timor-Leste’s President Ramos Horta, who said that “sustained security cannot come from the barrel of a gun, from coercion and fear”. He emphasised the importance of ASEAN’s diplomatic efforts to sustain dialogue amid an increasingly unstable strategic landscape where “bridges are being burned faster than they are built”. After all, as the adage goes, “war is a failure of diplomacy”.
Divergent Strategic Perspectives
President Horta also raised that “history must not imprison nations”. This point is particularly pertinent to China-Japan relations, which are at their lowest due to issues over Taiwan and the Senkaku Islands, as well as the Chinese belief that its World War Two invader is embracing “new militarism”. On a related note, it is plausible that China would question Southeast Asian countries for ignoring history and for their positions on accepting Japan’s Official Security Assistance (OSA) or on purchasing lethal systems from Japanese defence companies, since Japan has abolished restrictions on arms exports.
It is clear from the 23rd IISS Shangri-La Dialogue that the U.S. and Southeast Asia are talking past each other, except for the Philippines, which, given its security situation, supported the U.S. call for increased military spending and categorically attributed regional tensions to China. Secretary Hegseth’s message urging the region to align with the U.S. in preparing for war and prioritising hard power is at odds with Southeast Asian perspectives.
Southeast Asian countries, which are small and medium-sized, generally prefer to balance military spending with economic development, prioritise diplomacy and rules over coercion and unilateralism, and engage external partners, including all major powers. While there are concerns about China’s intentions, there are also concerns about what the U.S. might do in Southeast Asia if a major power conflict occurs. For example, at the Shangri-La Dialogue’s simultaneous special session on “enhancing littoral security in Asia”, Indonesia’s Lieutenant General Bambang Trisnohadi said that China’s blockade of Taiwan could prompt the U.S. to conduct a blockade of the Strait of Malacca.
As China becomes more militarily powerful and more diplomatically and economically influential in the Asia-Pacific, it will not accept the expansion of U.S. military dominance or the growing strength of U.S. allies. It will compete to entrench its vision of regional security. Southeast Asian countries modernising their militaries to protect their national interests amid growing global instability and the changing character of warfare driven by emerging technologies would face Chinese scrutiny of their threat perceptions, geopolitical alignment, and intentions, alongside U.S. expectations that they do more.
Maintaining a Pro-ASEAN Stance will be More Difficult
At the conclusion of the 23rd IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore’s defence minister Chan Chun Sing sent an unambiguous message to the major powers and their allies. He said that Southeast Asia is “not pro-U.S. or anti-U.S., pro-China or anti-China. We are pro-ASEAN.” Nevertheless, the major powers and their allies are likely to continue prioritising their strategic interests over ASEAN’s. Southeast Asia’s aspiration to be a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality is being undermined by geopolitical forces that are cornering the region into a state of unpeace.
Southeast Asian countries would do well to ramp up preparations for the political, security, cyberspace and socio-economic impacts of escalating tensions or a possible military conflict involving the major powers and their allies. These risks cannot be addressed by military defence alone.
