The decision of Pakistan to participate in the planned Board of Peace on Gaza by President Donald Trump should be judged by the fact that it is a diplomatic gambit and that it is made at a time when the traditional conflict management protocols appear weak and Gaza as a humanitarian disaster is only getting weaker. Pakistan is not being financed to be there. Now, according to reports that have been brought against the Board of Peace, membership is a state of great contributions of money, and lifelong membership is a gift of a seat and not a gift of a package or of assistance. The ask is reciprocated the other way; that is, pay to be in the room.
The fact is significant because it challenges the slow pace of the plot of Pakistan, which rents its Gaza spot to cash. Pakistan is venturing into a field of purchasing power, as opposed to giving it to Washington, if the board structure is in fact built on membership payment. Media coverage and reactions of allies show that even the amicable states are not very relaxed about governance and constitutional or legal boundaries, which is a sign that this is not a stable, properly trusted system.
The domestic and international critics of Pakistan are inclined to hypocritically believe that any new front is equal to relinquishment of sovereignty. Diplomacy does not work in that manner. Pakistan may look, talk, and bind her presence on values that are already written: she may get an immediate ceasefire, open humanitarian access, and a political solution founded on international law and United Nations resolutions. And that is the framing that the foreign office of Pakistan has publicly undertaken for its intervention in precisely those terms, not as a security compact, not as a military commitment.
And there is the basic strategic reasoning. Gaza is not only a local tragedy but also a stress effect of the world. As the established channels come to a halt, small and mid-sized states have two options, which are to complain on the periphery or to enter imperfect rooms and make things happen in such a way that will cause the least suffering. The move of Pakistan means that it would prefer to act than merely to act out. It also overlaps with the long-proclaimed policy of Pakistan at the United Nations, in which it has repeatedly insisted upon the primacy of international law and the biased practice of international law, which undermines the collective security.
Those attempts of the actors who are fond of being puzzled are the most good-natured that have been made to bend this decision. The voices of Khwarij are trying to portray the stance of Pakistan as betrayal, and they are using the suffering of Gaza as a point to score and a political disguise. It is not a new game: the statements that cannot be proved are to be saturated with the words, the state is to be suspected of undercover maneuvering, and the heat on the street is to become the evidence of the real solidarity. The people are not so gullible as such campaigns assume. Most Pakistanis can differentiate between the true advocacy of Palestinians and opportunism, which is merely out in search of a scapegoat to provoke the society.
In this case the analogy of AQ and TTP serves its purpose more as a warning than as a slogan. Pakistan understands how the warlord blocs may be used, appeased, or even turned to other foreign interests and defragment the national peace and ruin the local politics. The result remains unchanged: the state is weakened, the common people suffer the expenses, and the territory is more controllable. Pakistan’s interest is to respect the sovereignty and internal order of the state and at the same time be a just end to Palestine. It is not a contradiction; it is the sole method of benefiting anybody in a sustainable manner.
The Khwarij would not be able to imply that it is humanitarianly connected with Gaza and simultaneously have an ideology that allows it to use violence against the civilians, the state, and anyone who disagrees. Those organizations that do not adhere to law as an institution cannot turn into the protagonists of the law defending Palestinians overnight. Their sudden concern is an intention, and it is focused on whitening their image and finding supporters as well as demonizing the state as the villain. This is why their message is not as practical as assisting Gaza but that of criticizing the diplomatic decisions of Pakistan.
The decision of Pakistan to join the Board of Peace should subsequently be regarded as a political and humanitarian posture and not the joining of a new security block. As soon as the Board is created as a real channel to stop the matters of ceasefire, provision of aid, and reconstruction guarantees, Pakistan might use its status to demand the outcomes that will be akin to Palestinian consent and United Nations legitimacy. Whether the Board is a paid club, the rules are vague, and there is a lack of accountability, making the efforts to clarify the legal red lines and demonstrate the limits of this behavior, one of the avenues that Pakistan can exploit is to rebrand it a paid club. Anyway, non-attendance will have guaranteed irrelevancy, and attendance at least does not deprive.
Legality and dialogue are not a trend today in the fragmented world, and yet, they are the only way, which will not increase graves. The aspects of the pivotal role of Pakistan, if it is punitive and upright, can help see to it that Gaza is taken under a political course and not endless vengeance. It would mean insisting on humanitarian entry, opposing forced movement, upholding a tenable political tradition, and refusing extremists the means to pervert the language of morality of Palestine to local ends. Pakistan will be unable to solve the war by itself. But it can also choose to be a steady voice of lawful solutions as the world is struggling hard to find any.
