When US President Joe Biden hosted Pacific island leaders at the White House in late 2022 and announced an $810 million aid package , it was more than just a diplomatic gesture. It was a clear signal that Pacific island nations, once considered peripheral, were emerging as key players in the global architecture of an era of strategic competition. These small nations were increasingly playing a central role in the post-pandemic restructuring of globalization.
The COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted some global supply chains, shifted development priorities, and raised concerns across the Indo-Pacific region. As major powers begin to recalibrate their foreign policy strategies, Pacific island nations are moving from a passive role to a central position in geopolitical calculations.
The pandemic has also exposed the dangers of relying on unipolar supply chain hubs, prompting countries like the US, Australia, Japan, and even India to seek to diversify their partners and shipping routes. With their locations on key sea routes and vast exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and rich marine resources, these island nations are becoming strategic buffers and even springboards for major powers to project global influence.
Strategic competition in the Pacific is not new, but the intensity has increased significantly since 2020 and Trump 1.0. China’s unsuccessful attempts to sign a regional security agreement with 10 island nations in 2022 have alarmed Canberra and Washington. The Solomon Islands’s signing of a separate security agreement with Beijing that same year was a turning point, demonstrating that China’s influence is no longer limited to the economic sphere.
Australia responded immediately by reviving its “Pacific Step-up” initiative , doubling its aid budget, and expanding its diplomatic presence. The US reopened embassies in Solomon and Tonga, renewed its compacts of free association (COFA) with Micronesia, Palau, and the Marshall Islands, and reaffirmed its commitment to the “Pacific family.”
New Zealand is focusing on indigenous community development programs, competing with China for influence through a cultural approach that is less sensitive and sustainable. In addition, Japan and the EU are also increasing their presence , worried that if they leave the field empty, Beijing will monopolize influence.
What is often overlooked in the discourse on great power competition is the increasingly active role of Pacific island states themselves. Far from being mere pawns on the chessboard of power, states such as Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and Kiribati are exploiting East-West competition (typically the US-China rivalry) to enhance their negotiating positions. Such trends have created a narrative that Pacific island states have realized that there are benefits to be gained from mutual confrontation between rival parties.
This proactive spirit was evident at the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) meetings, where leaders demanded to be treated as equal partners rather than aid recipients. At COP27 , island nations successfully pushed for the establishment of a “loss and damage” fund for vulnerable countries, demonstrating their strong advocacy capacity.
Not only that, island nations are reshaping their development paths: from ocean economies to climate-resilient agriculture to digital connectivity. Tuvalu’s “digital nation” project, which digitizes the entire state apparatus to survive even when submerged by seawater, is a testament to the creative thinking of island nations in times of existential crisis.
The strategic importance of the Pacific lies beyond regional competition. It is becoming a “laboratory” for new models of international cooperation that are less hegemonic and more egalitarian.
In a post-pandemic world where fragmentation is slowly taking shape into a multipolar order, the Pacific could then be the place where the future of globalization is shaped. Island nations are quietly challenging old norms of global governance.
In addition, the island nations’ diplomatic posture of being friends with all serves as a counterweight to factional politics and emphasizes the role of small states in shaping the larger cooperative order.
For Southeast Asia, especially countries like Vietnam, the rise of the Pacific Islands holds many strategic lessons. ASEAN, which has traditionally focused on continental development, now needs to look beyond the Pacific, where it is increasingly playing a key role in issues such as maritime security and managing potential regional conflicts.
Vietnam, with its growing influence within ASEAN, can certainly play a bridging role. Strengthening cooperation with Pacific island nations in managing non-traditional security issues will help raise Vietnam’s profile in multilateral forums.
Small Pacific island nations are no longer passive observers of global affairs. They are stepping up to shape their future with smart diplomacy and creative strategy.
As globalization enters a new era—more fragmented, more nationalistic, and more digitally transformed—the Pacific will undoubtedly become more important. Great powers should approach the region not as a competitive arena but as partners in creating a more just, sustainable, and resilient world order.
