The China Trail

When presidential candidates discuss foreign policy, a companion mantra would be, “Bash Beijing on the campaign trail, engage from the Oval Office.”

The late New York Governor Mario Cuomo said, “You campaign in poetry. You govern in prose.” When presidential candidates discuss foreign policy, a companion mantra would be, “Bash Beijing on the campaign trail, engage from the Oval Office.” President Trump campaigned aggressively on China, including promises to implement high tariffs on Chinese products, restrictions on Chinese land ownership in America, and the need to maintain the U.S. lead in AI. Now that he is back behind the Resolute Desk, how will a Trump 2.0 deal with Beijing?

During the 1992 presidential election, then-Governor Bill Clinton criticized President George Bush mercilessly for the Bush Administration’s relationship with China, saying they had “toasted the butchers of Beijing,” a reference to the 1989 bloody suppression of demonstrators in Tiananmen Square. Once in office, however, President Clinton tightly embraced Beijing. He eliminated the annual Congressional review of Beijing’s human rights record required to reauthorize preferred trade status for China by granting those same “butchers” Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR).

The pattern continued in the 2000 presidential election; then-Governor George W. Bush was critical of the Clinton-Gore administration’s soft approach toward China. Bush is asserting that “China is a competitor, not a strategic partner.” However, once in the White House, his administration looked to the PRC to be a “responsible stakeholder” and ushered China into the World Trade Organization (WTO), rapidly accelerating China’s economic and trade power.

In the 2008 campaign between Senators Obama and McCain, then-Senator Barack Obama said little about national security outside of the war in Iraq, and as President, there was little pretense of standing up to China. President Xi capitalized on this, militarizing islands made from grinding down coral reefs in disputed areas of the South China Sea, despite standing next to President Obama in the Rose Garden in 2015 and promising otherwise. After winning the 2016 election, President Trump followed through on his promised tough stand on China. He imposed tariffs, repeatedly criticized Beijing’s handling of the COVID-19 outbreak, and raised concerns about China’s relationship with the World Health Organization. Vice President Mike Pence, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien all delivered tough speeches on the China threat. Trump’s 2017 National Security Strategy announced the return of “Great Power Competition” and classified China, not as a partner, but as a competitor. President Obama’s policy of rooting for China’s rise and sharing responsibilities was jettisoned in recognition of a competition, with what the Pentagon called our “pacing threat” for global predominance. Despite Biden’s desire to distance his policies from those of Trump on nearly every issue, with China there was more continuity. Biden maintained Trump-era trade restrictions and tariffs, even strengthening some in the final days of his administration.

During Trump’s 2024 presidential campaign, tariffs took center stage. With President Trump highlighting their virtues to address the U.S.-China trade imbalance. Confronting China’s rise, too long deferred, would be the priority. Stabilizing the Middle East and Europe by quickly ending wars in Gaza and Ukraine to address the challenge posed by the PRC. Trump 2.0 must bolster U.S. leadership abroad and safeguard American national security at home.

Now that the campaign is over and the office won, America will need Trump 2.0 to demonstrate urgency and consistency to counter President Xi’s plan for China to achieve dominance in the Pacific and global leadership. Already the Trump administration has increased tariffs on Beijing by 20 percent, and the 25 percent tariffs on steel and aluminum will hit China hard. Supporting innovation for AI, along with selectively decoupling China from advanced technologies, is needed. Enhancing relations with our Indo-Pacific allies is critical, while made more doubtful given the recent abandonment of our European commitments. These alliances represent a U.S. advantage that Beijing cannot match. Deterrence must be re-established, requiring a military that is smartly and fully funded, so President Xi will not be tempted by doubts of American resolve or capability. Confronting China enjoys rare bipartisan Congressional support, something to be well managed when funds are allocated so that support is more than rhetorical.

In the early erratic days of President Trump’s second administration, it is unclear what China policy will be pursued. Does its abandonment of Ukraine and European security and a naive attempt to split Beijing and Moscow by pursuing Russian President Putin point to a policy based on winning a great power competition with the People’s Republic of China? Or will the Dealmaker-in-Chief use the leverage gained from tariffs and trade restrictions as well as a stronger U.S. economy to pursue a grand bargain with Beijing benefiting both economies at a June birthday summit and leave the challenge of a rising China to a future president?

David A. Merkel
David A. Merkel
David A. Merkel is an Associate with LSE IDEAS and a Visiting Distinguished Fellow in Diplomacy and Global Leadership at the College of Charleston. He served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of the US Treasury and Department of State, as well as international consular to the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Director for South and Central Asia for the National Security Council.