On the eve of the first summit of an “expanded” BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) grouping in the Russian city of Kazan, where Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the UAE will be welcomed as full members, India’s Foreign Secretary and former Ambassador to China Vikram Misri made a promising statement that India has reached an agreement with fellow BRICS member China on the disengagement of troops and the restarting of border patrols along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh.
A day after this, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson confirmed that “the two sides have reached a solution on the relevant matters, which China views positively”, even though it did not mention a “patrolling arrangement”. He added, “China commends the progress made and will continue working with India for the sound implementation of these resolutions.” The Chinese media has always been reticent to give the spotlight to border issues with India, compared to the hyper-active Indian media.
However this time, the state-run Global Times has even run an editorial that read, “the achievement of the resolutions seems rather ‘sudden’ … considering international and regional circumstances, it is somewhat inevitable that China and India could break the deadlock at this time … The announcements from both sides indicate significant progress in negotiations over border issues, suggesting that the standoff in the western sector of the China-India border, which began in 2020, may soon come to an end, creating conditions for the improvement of bilateral relations”. This signals an approaching phase of normalcy in ties after a gap of 4.5 years, or perhaps a new modus vivendi.
India’s senior-most diplomat added that over the last several weeks, diplomatic and military negotiators on both sides have been in close contact with each other in a variety of forums, and as a result of these discussions, an agreement has arrived for restarting border patrols and both sides will take next steps in this direction, even though its detailed modalities are not known yet. The corroboration of the same from Beijing and its timing are noteworthy considering the upcoming bilateral meeting between Prime Minister Modi and President Xi in Kazan on BRICS sidelines, which has been notified by the Indian side.
Although the two leaders met as many as eighteen times before the Galwan incident in mid-2020, which lead to fatalities on both sides, they have spoken only twice since then, first in Bali on the sidelines of the G-20 summit of 2022, and then in Johannesburg during the BRICS summit of 2023. And currently, there are still about 50,000 to 60,000 troops on both sides, according the Indian side. India’s Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar, who said last month that “75%” of the disengagement issues with China have been sorted out, has also concurred with Secretary Misri’s statement. He remarked that it has been a very “patient process”, though more “complicated” than how it should have been.
“The fact is if we are able, as we now have, to reach an understanding regarding patrolling, observing the sanctity of the LAC. What it does is, it creates a basis for peace and tranquillity…”, he added. The resumption of patrolling as winter is around the corner is widely expected to be the first step for the restoration of status quo ante as of April 2020. If truly implemented on the ground, Indian troops will regain access to specific patrolling points along the LAC that were previously blocked by Chinese forces. But, the fate of buffer zones depends on how differences in perception of the LAC are sorted out.
However, the larger Sino-Indian bilateral equation – both in the territorial and maritime realms – remains largely competitive. As India’s Defence Minister said earlier this month, India remains “cautiously optimistic” about talks with China, as the navies of the U.S.-led Quad (including India) jointly participated in two naval exercises lately – Malabar and Kakadu, in addition to the Indian Prime Minister’s recent participation in Quad leaders’ summit. Despite a contested border and geopolitical competition, the two Asian giants have been batting for a just “multipolar” world and also cooperate in forums such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), in which Russia is the common factor. Bilateral trade, however, is the silver lining, even though the balance is in favour of China.
All these reveal the complexity of their ties, characterised by simultaneous divergence and convergence of interests, including the strategic insecurities that one cause the other. Last month, the Chinese Defence Ministry opined that both countries were able to “reduce differences” and build “some consensus” on disengaging troops from the remaining friction points. However, the resolution of legacy issues of Depsang Plains and Demchok, predating the current standoff that began in May 2020, and how the existing confidence-building measures, in existence since 1993, are recalibrated based on the new understanding remains to be seen.
