Despite growing Israeli-Arab collaboration, efforts to establish a NATO-like regional security alliance to counter perceived Iranian threats have not come to fruition. Arab nations do not share Israeli-American enthusiasm for such an alliance due to differing regional priorities and the decline of the United States influence in the Middle East.
For Israel, security is paramount. Israel views Iran as an existential threat that must be addressed by any means necessary. In contrast, the Gulf Arab states, while suspicious of Iran’s regional intentions, do not perceive Iran as an imminent threat that requires urgent actions. Israel remains committed to confronting Iran due to concerns over its nuclear program, despite the risk of escalation into an all-out war. On the other hand, Arab countries neither seek nor support a direct confrontation with their larger neighbor. Instead, they increasingly favor diplomacy over escalation.
As diplomatic efforts have eased the tensions between Iran and its Arab neighbors, trust in the U.S. as a security guarantor for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates has waned. In recent years, Saudi Arabia has unsuccessfully pushed for a security pact with the U.S. that could enhance the kingdom’s regional security. Recent White House administrations have either mocked and bullied the kingdom, as with President Trump, who demanded Saudi Arabia pay for protection, or promised to make the monarchy a pariah for its war in Yemen and human rights record, as with President Biden. The majority in Congress does not view Saudi Arabia favorably. Sales of advanced U.S. arms to the kingdom are often scrutinized or rejected by Congress, which Saudis see as jeopardizing their national security.
The United Arab Emirates, another major Gulf Arab player, also faces rejection from the U.S., though to a lesser degree. This, despite long-standing ties and an active Defense Cooperation Agreement between the two countries. Emiratis believe the U.S. takes their facilitation of U.S. national interests for granted and does not provide adequate security measures for the UAE. Emiratis were not amused when the Biden administration removed the Houthis from the U.S. Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) list. They were further disappointed by the U.S.’s slow and weak response to the Houthis’ missile attack on the UAE in January 2022. Biden’s administration halted the transfer of F-35s fighter jets and Reaper drones to the UAE despite the procurement agreement signed in January 2021. Congress restricted arms sales to the UAE due to its human rights record, contentious involvement in Africa and deepening ties with China.
Such U.S. policies toward major Gulf Arab players have contributed to growing distrust in the U.S. intentions in the region and allowed China to further consolidate its economic and military cooperation with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other countries in the region. China showcased its growing involvement through its successful mediation of a Saudi-Iranian rapprochement in March 2023 that restored diplomatic relations between the two countries and eased the tensions between Iran and its Arab neighbors. Direct and constructive dialogue has been positively gaining momentum across the Gulf since then. Such rapprochement and dialogue reinforced Arab strategy of favoring diplomacy and de-escalation with Iran over adversarial approach and confrontation.
The notion that the U.S. is not a reliable security partner has been gaining traction among the Gulf Arab states. Consequently, the prospect of an Israeli-Arab security alliance, supported by the U.S. as an offshore balancing strategy, seems unlikely to materialize in the near future. Notably, making Iran the prime target of the proposed security pact will jeopardize Arabs’ de-escalation efforts with Iran and complicate future regional security dialogue across the Gulf region.
Iran’s proxies are capable of inflicting significant damage to the Gulf Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Conventional armies have not been successful in quelling the threats posed by non-state actors in the region. Similarly, U.S. military interventions in Iraq, Libya, and Syria have failed to achieve their intended objectives, leading to further destabilization. Therefore, de-escalation with Iran is the most feasible option for Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the rest of the Arab countries.
Arab concerns and lack of optimism for an anti-Iran regional security alliance involving Israel have not deterred Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s longest-serving Prime Minister, from advocating for the envisioned alliance at every opportunity. Netanyahu continues to portray an intimate Israeli-Arab relationship that may not actually exist.
While addressing the UN in September 2018, Netanyahu accused Iran of spreading “death and destruction throughout the region,” bragged about intimate Israeli-Arab relations, and urged European leaders to “join the U.S. and Israel and most of the Arab world in supporting new sanctions against Iran.”
In a more determined manner, Netanyahu stressed the Iranian threats against Israel and “our Arab friends” during his speech in Congress on July 24, 2024, proposing a security alliance involving the U.S., Israel, and other regional Arab countries to counter Iran. He highlighted Arab assistance in countering Iran’s attack against Israel on April 14, 2024, considering it a glimpse of the potential alliance. Viewing it as a “natural extension” of the Abraham Accords, Israel’s Prime Minister suggested calling it “The Abraham Alliance.” The Abraham Accords, negotiated by the U.S. in 2020, established formal diplomatic relations between Israel and four Arab countries: the UAE, Sudan, Morocco, and Bahrain.
Netanyahu’s sentiments fall in line with Dennis Ross and David Makovsky’s argument in Foreign Affairs weeks earlier. Ross and Makovsky of the Washington Institute believe that Arab participation in defending Israel against Iran’s attack has opened a window for “the creation of a regional coalition pursuing a common strategy to counter Iran and its proxies.” The writers urged Israel to accept a ceasefire in Gaza—even a unilateral one if a deal with Hamas proves elusive—to take advantage of this opportunity. According to the writers, a ceasefire would advance a normalization agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia, improve Israel’s relations with “Sunni-majority states within and outside the Middle East,” and “transform the tacit regional alignment that emerged after Iran’s attack on Israel into a more tangible reality.”
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Jordan’s coordination with the U.S. and Israel in countering Iran’s attack is a notably unprecedented incident. However, it does not equate to forming an anti-Iran alliance, taking part in an attack against Iran or providing logistical support for Israel or the U.S. in launching one. Helping with defense does not equate to supporting an offense. Furthermore, Israel’s continued retaliatory and destructive war in Gaza makes it difficult for these Arab countries to continue such collaboration with Israel. No Arab government wants to be viewed by its people as a collaborator with Israel while Palestinians are constantly suffering under Israeli military aggression.
Weaponizing the Gulf Arab states’ normalization with Israel against Iran creates more regional tension than it enhances Israeli-Arab collective security. Moreover, these normalization deals were likely intended to influence U.S. domestic politics rather than address the geopolitical complexities of the Middle East. Both the Trump and Biden administrations have pressured Arab countries to normalize relations with Israel, offering incentives to encourage such a step. These normalization agreements were expected to boost each president’s re-election prospects. The assumption that normalizing Arab countries would participate in or support any Israeli or Israeli-American military campaign against Iran does not align with the Arab pragmatic regional strategy, which avoids involvement in military actions against Iran.
Arab countries, particularly those in the Gulf, are not warming up to Israel to provoke a conflict with Iran. Involving Israel in Gulf security measures at the expense of Iran would further destabilize the region. Solving one problem while creating a bigger one is not a feasible long-term strategy for regional security.
Ross and Makovsky’s advocacy for a ceasefire in Gaza that would advance a normalization deal with Saudi Arabia and the formation of a regional alliance to counter Iran garnered President Biden’s support. On May 31st, 2024, Biden emphasized Israel’s gains from accepting a ceasefire agreement in Gaza that would result in a normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia,” and Israel’s integration in the region, including being “part of a regional security network to counter the threat posed by Iran.”
Speaking at the Quincy Institute on May 23rd, 2024, Ohio Republican Senator J.D. Vance, Trump’s running mate, expressed his support to forming an Israeli-Arab security pact to counter Iran. Vance argued that such an alliance would empower Israel and “Sunni Arab nations” to police their own region, allowing the United States to shift its focus to East Asia. Vance used the same terminology as Ross and Makovsky when referring to Arab countries by their predominant religious affiliation, Sunni Islam, potentially hinting at underlying tensions between majority Sunni Muslim nations and Shiite-majority Iran.
Despite years of covert intelligence and security collaboration between many Arab countries and Israel, Arabs’ rejection of involvement in any potential military conflict with Iran did not change. This stance, particularly among the Gulf Arab states, is a long-standing strategy. In his recent book Grand Delusion, former U.S. diplomat Steven Simon shed light on such a strategy. Elaborating on the Khobar Towers bombing on June 25, 1996, which targeted a U.S. Air Force residence in Saudi Arabia and was attributed to Iran, Simon stated that the aftermath of the attack revealed a “Saudi determination to prevent the United States from following the trail of evidence to Tehran.” According to the writer, “Being caught in the middle of a war between the United States and Iran that would be fought at least partially on Saudi soil” was the last thing Saudi Arabia desired. Simon argued that this position reflected “a long-standing pattern” in which Saudis avoided supporting U.S. actions against Iran to prevent escalation. Regarding the Abraham Accords, Simon mentioned that they did not create a new reality; for instance, Israel-UAE security ties were already known. However, when it comes to an alliance against Iran, he elaborated that “the UAE is not looking for a war with Iran and will not be eager to host Israeli forces determined to fight one.”
Recent Saudi and Emirati affirmations and actions confirm Simon’s argument. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been reluctant, if not withdrawing from U.S. military coordination to counter Iran and its proxies to avoid jeopardizing their reconciliation with the country.
Considering Iran “a forever neighbor,” Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince, has frequently expressed aspirations to have a “distinguished relationship” with the country. Amid restoring diplomatic relations with Iran in 2022, Anwar Gargash, Diplomatic Adviser to the President of the UAE, stated that “Abu Dhabi is not open to establishing an axis against any country in the region, especially Iran.” Gargash affirmed the UAE’s stance of not embracing “a confrontational approach with Iran.”
Outside the Gulf, Egypt, the largest Arab country and the first to sign a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, made it clear that it would not be part of the proposed anti-Iran U.S.-backed Middle East Security Alliance. It was reported that Egypt informed Iran that it would not participate in any coalition against the Gulf largest country. Egypt did not participate in the U.S. led coalition that was formed in December 2023 to protect the maritime shipping route through the Red Sea that was affected by frequent attacks by Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen. Recently, it was also reported that Egypt rejected Israel’s request for help in countering projected Iranian retaliatory attack in response to the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. Jordan, which signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1994, affirmed that it would not be a battlefield between Iran and Israel.
Arab rejection of alignment with Israel and the U.S. in a military confrontation with Iran or its proxies resonates with the ancient Arabic adage, “I have neither a female nor a male camel in it.” This proverb, akin to the English saying, “I have no dog in this fight,” underscores the broader geopolitical reality that Arab nations are not interested in a military entanglement that does not serve their own interests and carries unpredictable consequences. However, a sudden and sharp deterioration in Arab-Iranian relations that threatens the security of the Gulf Arab states, could force Arab countries to reconsider their stance. Otherwise, Israel and the U.S. will find themselves increasingly isolated in their maximum pressure strategy against Iran—a tactic that risks direct confrontation and regional instability.
Strong Israeli-U.S. advocacy for an Israeli-Arab military alliance to counter Iran seems more like an attempt to export Israel’s security concerns to the region rather than to provide security for the Gulf Arab states. Alienating Iran neither serves Arab-Iranian relations nor contributes to regional stability. Despite Israeli-U.S. enthusiasm, normalization efforts between Israel and Arab countries, and media hype, an anti-Iran, Israeli-Arab military alliance is unlikely to materialize soon. Neither Iran nor its Arab neighbors seek confrontation across the Gulf. Arab countries and Iran have prioritized diplomacy over confrontation, dialogue over escalation, and regional stability over continued contention.